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ABSTRACT 
 
Viruses such HIV, SARS Coronavirus, Ebola, and influenza A virus pose significant burdens globally to 
human health due to their continued emergence from wildlife reservoirs such as birds, bats, and 
rodents. In southern China, animal markets, wildlife trade, and human activity create unique 
opportunities for zoonotic emergence as wild animals frequently come into contact with domestic 
animals and humans. Influenza A H7N9 virus and SARS emerged from live and wild animal markets in 
south China where frequent mixing and high volume of species enabled rapid viral evolution and 
emergence. This research aims to examine zoonotic viral emergence by testing the following 
hypotheses: 
• there are novel Coronaviruses (CoVs) and Paramyxoviruses (PMVs) in wildlife reservoirs in 
south China 
• human behaviour may result in viral spillover from wildlife reservoirs 
• market and other wildlife trade activities may be drivers of disease emergence 
• CoVs and PMVs circulating in wild animal populations may be closely related with or 
ancestral to known pathogenic viruses. 
 
Over a five-year period, oral and anal swabs and blood samples were collected from 3,146 wild-
caught bats and 559 rodents from more than 30 different species primarily focused on wildlife trade 
pathways in southern China. RT-PCR assays were performed to screen for CoVs and PMVs. 39 CoVs 
(1.2%) and 114 PMVs (3.6%) were confirmed from bat samples by sequencing. Of the latter, 80 were 
novel bat PMVs. No rodent samples were positive for either virus. 
 
An online survey was conducted to assess 2,238 Chinese millennials’ attitudes about wildlife 
consumption and perceived health-risks. The results suggest that although this population is 
currently the primary driver of demand for wildlife trade in China, it may also be the most effectively 
targeted with campaigns to educate about zoonotic emergence from wildlife reservoirs. 
 
Diverse mammalian wildlife species including two listed by IUCN as vulnerable and one on China’s 
endangered species list were observed to be maintained in circulation over three years in two of the 
largest live animal wildlife markets in south China. An overall increase in the volume of wildlife 
traded in the two markets was also observed. Through 87 ethnographic interviews and 685 
structured interviews with rural residents observed to be exposed at some level to wildlife, strong 
evidence was provided that local consumption of wildlife has reduced, but exposure and awareness 
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of the commensurate health-risks have not. Additionally, exposure to bats, poultry, and rodents as 
well as handling, hunting and raising animals were all activities positively correlated with self-
reported symptoms of viral infections of unknown aetiology and potentially of zoonotic pathogens. 
 
The information garnered in this study about the current status of wildlife trade, people’s attitudes 
and actions, as well as the ecology of these viruses and their hosts in south China, provides data that 
may be used towards predicting and preventing emergence of these and other as-yet-unknown 
viruses. If patterns of human behaviour, wildlife trade, and viral ecology may be quantified, then a 
relative level of risk may be predicted and evaluated. 
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1.1 Emerging Infectious Diseases 
The world is increasingly interconnected. A world wherein a pathogen such as a virus, bacterium or 
other disease causing agent can infect a human, a mosquito, a dog, a snake, or even a plant and then 
travel by boat, plane, car or some combination thereof from western Africa to London in less than 
12-hours. In fact, this has been observed retroactively in early 2003 when Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) coronavirus spread by infected individuals from mainland China to Hong Kong and 
then as far as Toronto in Canada (WHO 2003b). West Nile virus did this too in 1999 spreading from 
somewhere in Africa or Europe to the Americas for the first time and likely as a hidden passenger in 
an infected human host arriving in the New York City area and then being transmitted to mosquito, 
human, and avian reservoirs (Nash et al. 2001; Gubler 2007). Four or more decades earlier the 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) made the same pandemic and initially silent leap out of Africa 
(Huminer et al. 1987; Jones et al. 2008; Morens et al. 2009; Morse et al. 2012). 
 
Diseases such as SARS, West Nile virus, and HIV and others that are changing their patterns of 
transmission are termed emerging infectious diseases and are defined as having recently increased 
in incidence, shifted host population, are caused by recently evolved strains, or have changed in 
their pathogenicity (Henderson 1993; Krause 1994; Daszak et al. 2000). Emerging infectious diseases 
can have significant effects on human mortality and morbidity such as the 1918 influenza pandemic 
that resulted in over 50 million deaths globally (Johnson & Mueller 2002). Other influenza outbreaks 
H1N1, H5N1, H2N2, H7N9, and others (all subtypes of the influenza A virus) have occurred since, but 
none yet with such devastating effects as the 1918 pandemic (Lai et al. 2016). Avian influenza A virus 
subtype H5N1 alone has caused 452 confirmed deaths globally since 2003 and about twice that 
number in morbidity (WHO 2017). 
 
More recently discovered emerging infectious diseases such as HIV and SARS Coronavirus also 
threaten human health with high mortality. It is estimated that from its initial identification in the 
1980s through 2015 as many as 78 million people have been infected and 40 million people have 
died from AIDS-related causes (UNAIDS 2016). SARS Coronavirus emerged in late 2002 and 2003 
rapidly spreading across 29 countries, infecting almost 7,000 people and resulting in 500 deaths 
(WHO 2003a). Other emerging infectious disease epidemics such as Nipah virus in Malaysia, 
Bangladesh, and India (Clayton 2017); Ebola in Western and Central Africa (Peters & LeDuc 1999); 
and Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) Coronavirus (Cotten et al. 2013), though not 
pandemic, have also resulted in localised mortality and morbidity. 
 
  
3 
Emerging infectious diseases such as Chikungunya (Silva & Dermody 2017) and Zika (Bogoch et al. 
2016) have more recently crossed the Atlantic from the Old World and begun to cause public health 
issues in the Americas. Still other emerging infectious diseases such as morbilliviruses result in 
outbreaks and die-offs in marine mammals (Osterhaus et al. 1995) and other viruses such as 
Bluetongue (Sperlova & Zendulkova 2011), Schmallenberg (Beer & Conraths 2013; Wu et al. 2014a), 
and avian Influenzas (Shriner et al. 2016) cause significant domestic animal morbidity and 
mortalities. 
 
In 2008, the first global effort to evaluate regions that had the highest risk of emerging infectious 
disease was published (Jones et al. 2008). This research generated maps of the highest risk locations 
or ‘hotspots’ for disease emergence and has since been updated (Figure 1) (Morse et al. 2012).By 
targeting disease surveillance and control efforts in these high-risk regions, public health efforts may 
pre-empt disease emergence rather than merely react post-emergence (Morse 1995; Daszak et al. 
2001).  
 
1.2  Economic Impact of Emerging Infectious Diseases 
As a group of pathogens, emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) cause a large number of deaths 
annually and some such as HIV, SARS, influenza A, and Ebola have cost the global economy tens of 
billions of dollars (Keogh-Brown & Smith 2008) in public health costs, but also in tourism and trade 
revenues (Figure 2) (Newcomb 2009). Even emerging viral diseases of agricultural crops such as Plum 
pox virus have caused around USD$10 billion in damage to stone fruits over the past 30 years 
(Cambra et al. 2006). Some studies estimate the total cost of coordinated global efforts to prevent 
and control emerging infectious diseases as between USD$300 and USD$500 billions (World Bank 
2012; Pike et al. 2014). Despite the great social, demographic, and economic impact of EIDs and 
billions of dollars spent on drug and vaccine development to control them (Thanassi & Schoen 2000; 
Hotez et al. 2004), there has been little advance in understanding the underlying process of the 
emergence of infectious diseases and in developing predictive approaches to their prevention 
(Daszak et al. 2000). In particular, more work is required to detail the ecology of the EIDs and the 
causes or drivers of their emergence. Plausible, predictive models of current and future disease 
emergence risk may be built upon knowledge of the ecology and pathogen dynamics of an EID 
(Galvani 2004). Policy and public health decisions may be informed with the results of this sort of 
modelling. 
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Figure 1. Global Hotspots Map of Emerging Infectious Diseases from Wildlife. Global map with hotspots (red and orange areas) indicative of areas (gridded at 1km2 resolution) with highest 
risk of emerging diseases from wildlife modified from Morse et al. (2012). The white circles are an overlay of 12 emerging infectious zoonotic diseases of economic, conservation, and public 
health impact and indicate origins of emergence. From left to right: Morbillivirus, West Nile virus, Influenza A H1N1, Schmallenberg, Bluetongue, MERS coronavirus, Influenza A H7N9, Nipah 
virus, Influenza A H5N1, Hendra virus, SARS coronavirus and SARS-like coronavirus, and Sharka virus. Details of each are briefly discussed in the text, below. 
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1.3 Zoonoses, Public Health, and Security 
Compared to endemic diseases such as schistosomiasis, onchocerciasis, and malaria that affect tens 
of millions of people per year (Hotez 2015; Hotez et al. 2015), emerging infectious diseases have 
relatively low overall morbidity and mortality. Ebola, Nipah virus, Hantavirus, and others, though, 
can have mortality rates exceeding 50% (Simonsen et al. 1995; Epstein et al. 2006; Heymann et al. 
2015). Should these known and unknown emerging infectious diseases with high rates of mortality 
evolve the ability to spread globally, the results could be potentially disastrous for human health 
(Morse et al. 2012). The majority of emerging infectious diseases are zoonotic (Taylor et al. 2001). Of 
the new emerging and re-emerging infectious zoonotic diseases, 71.8% originated in wildlife (Jones 
et al. 2008). Although emerging zoonoses result from diverse pathogens such as deoxyribonucleic 
(DNA) viruses (Herpes and Pox viruses), ribonucleic acid (RNA) viruses (HIV, SARS-Coronavirus), 
bacteria (MRSA), protozoans (Malaria), fungi (cryptococcal meningitis), and helminths 
(Schistosomiasis), the majority are RNA viruses (Jones et al. 2008). RNA viruses’ replication strategy 
is prone to copy-errors or mutations, which results in RNA viruses being rapidly able to adapt to host 
and environment changes (Elena & Sanjuán 2005). 
 
It has been demonstrated that human-caused or anthropogenic changes are driving the increased 
emergence and spread of pathogens from wild animals into domestic animals and humans (Daszak 
Figure 2. Economic Estimates of Emerging Infectious Diseases. Bubble chart modified from a 2009 bio-era figure 
(Newcomb 2009) and using World Bank data (World Bank 2012) showing estimated cost in US dollars and duration 
(years) of Emerging Infectious Disease Outbreaks from Bovine Spongiform Encephalitis (BSE) in the UK in the 1990s to 
Ebola in West Africa in the 2010s. 
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et al. 2001). Global trade and travel, urbanisation, and agricultural intensification are exponentially 
increasing interactions among people, wild animals, and domestic animals, which provides not only 
more, but novel opportunities for pathogens that spill over from animals into humans to then 
spread globally (Daszak et al. 2001). The increased rate of emergence of zoonotic diseases coupled 
with exponential increases in global travel and trade have resulted in highly pathogenic zoonotic 
viruses becoming one of the most significant threats to global economy, health, and national 
security (Cecchine & Moore 2006; Sueker et al. 2010). 
 
1.4 Drivers of Zoonotic Emergence 
To elucidate the ecology of zoonotic viruses and the likelihood of emergence from their wildlife 
hosts into domestic animals or humans, it is necessary to develop a framework within which to study 
the ecology of these viruses in their host species and their interactions with the environment and 
other potential animal hosts including humans (Wood et al. 2012). Understanding the causal factors 
or the drivers of zoonotic disease emergence (Figure 3) is critical to both predicting and preventing 
zoonotic emergence or spillover from reservoir hosts to novel host species (Daszak et al. 2001; 
Woolhouse & Gowtage-Sequeria 2005; Morse et al. 2012). Repeated opportunities for spillover of 
zoonotic pathogens are driven by human activities such as agricultural expansion or intensification 
(Perry et al. 2013); deforestation or land conversion; hunting or wildlife trade as part of animal value 
chains (Smith et al. 2017); and urbanisation and global travel (Epstein & Field 2015). Drivers or 
pathways of zoonotic emergence in human and wildlife populations are “common underlying causal 
themes” such as climate change, agricultural intensification, deforestation, wildlife trade, and others 
(Daszak et al. 2001). Across a gradient of increasing anthropogenic disturbance from forested areas 
to intensive livestock production, the risk of zoonotic emergence increases as drivers such as 
livestock production intensity, land use change, and size of wildlife markets increase (Patz et al. 
2004; Wolfe et al. 2005; Gottdenker et al. 2011). Animal value chains have been implicated as the 
driver of the emergence of SARS coronavirus, HIV, and avian influenza (Webster 2004) with large-
scale fowl or pig production playing a key role in the emergence of Avian Influenza (Yassine et al. 
2013). Animal value chains originate in wild-sourced animals that are brought to consumers and may 
include animal or wet markets of all sizes; animal warehouses; animal farms; restaurants; and 
processing sites or abattoirs (FAO 2011). As the animals move through these chains, their value 
increases from source (wild, forested areas) to sink (end consumer). 
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The risk of zoonotic emergence from one monkey in one cage in a rural village roadside restaurant is 
likely different to that from the same monkey species and cage in a closely packed animal market 
stall along with many other animals including other primates, and in close proximity to humans. 
Parts of this thesis will examine some of these themes further. Additionally, this thesis will attempt 
to answer the question of whether the conditions (human behaviour, wild animal mixing, and 
circulating viruses) that led to the emergence of SARS coronavirus still exist in southern China and 
Figure 3. Three pathways of zoonotic emergence. From top to bottom (top three panels) show: land conversion; animal 
production systems; animal value chains. These pathways drive spillover of zoonoses in different setting and are not 
mutually exclusive. Bottom panel shows increases in animal production systems (livestock production intensity), land 
conversion (land use change), and animal value chains (size of wildlife markets) across a gradient of increasing 
anthropogenic disturbance from forested (left) to highly impacted areas (intensive livestock production). The solid red 
curved line with two dotted tails indicates the risk of zoonotic emergence. The dotted tails raise the question of what 
happens to the risk of zoonotic emergence when livestock production, land use conversion, wildlife markets all increase: 
does zoonotic emergence increase or reduce? Figure created by Chmura and Daszak (unpublished).
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whether there may be an ideal setting for the re-emergence of SARS-Coronavirus or some other 
virus from the same or even another viral family. 
 
1.5 Ecology of Disease Emergence 
When viruses emerge or spillover from viral host species these events may result in outbreaks within 
other species or human populations (Daszak et al. 2000). The magnitude and duration of these 
spillover events or outbreaks depends on the frequency and ease with which the virus is transmitted 
from host species to novel species (Morse 1995). The escalation from small-scale outbreaks to a 
broader epidemic is a result of the connectivity between the initially infected individual and other 
human populations. HIV is a prime example of this sort of emergence. HIV likely emerged in isolated 
communities in central Africa from chimpanzee reservoirs multiple times throughout human history 
(Hahn et al. 2000) following human contact with chimpanzees as bushmeat (Martin 1983; Kalish et 
al. 2005) or even via chimpanzee predation of humans (Wrangham et al. 2000). Despite this low-
level, isolated, episodic viral spillover, it was not until early to mid-20th century increases in mining, 
agriculture, deforestation, international trade, and travel in central and west Africa that HIV began 
to expand globally and evolve into its present pandemic forms (Wolfe et al. 2005; Faria et al. 2014). 
 
Understanding the ecology of host species is fundamental to understanding how host and pathogens 
interact and provides insight to factors that influence infection and transmission dynamics. Figure 4 
details the stages of zoonotic emergence. Localised transmission is maintained (bottom panel, left) 
with endemic viruses transmitted among conspecifics or other species within an ecosystem. Pre-
emergence (bottom panel, right) begins when pathogens are transmitted to novel species such as 
domestic animals or humans following encroachment into wildlife habitat or landuse changes. Minor 
population level or more major ecosystem level changes can alter the dynamics of microbial 
transmission and lead to localised pathogen spillover. In the example above, this would be an 
instance of HIV infecting one hunter after accidental exposure to chimpanzee blood. Highly virulent 
strains of emerging viruses will burn out once the host population is depleted or immune. Given 
enough time, emerging zoonotic viruses would be expected to evolve with their novel hosts and 
natural selection would favour the evolution of low-virulence strains (Murray et al. 2015b). 
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Figure 4. Stages of Zoonotic Emergence. A modified version of this figure was published in Lancet (Morse et al. 2012). 
Original figure credit to Chmura and Daszak (unpublished). 
Green peaks and troughs (centre panel) represent the rise and fall in numbers of infected people 
over time. These localised spillover events or outbreaks are usually self-limiting, but when they are 
not (orange peaks) then a larger-scale outbreak results in higher numbers of infected people and 
may lead to some person-to-person transmission of the pathogen. Usually increasing the incidence 
of contact between humans and wildlife will result in higher incidence of localised emergence 
resulting in higher numbers of infected individuals and more opportunities for viral evolution in 
sustained outbreaks. Ebola virus and Nipah virus epidemics are examples of this stage of localised 
emergence (orange peaks). Some epidemics may spread further resulting in global spread such as 
with HIV, SARS coronavirus, or influenza A (H5N1); these large-scale epidemics are termed 
pandemics. Global emergence is usually facilitated by international trade and travel. The arrow 
indicates the progression from pre-emergence to localised spillover to epidemic to pandemic. The 
frequency of outbreaks decreases from bottom to top in the figure, so pandemics are infrequent 
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occurrences, but result in high morbidity and mortality. Analysis of the process and drivers of 
disease emergence may permit a means towards pandemic prediction and aid in implementing 
preventative measures at the earliest stage where they may be most effective and efficient (Wolfe 
et al. 2007; Morse et al. 2012; Pike et al. 2014). 
 
1.6 Zoonoses in China 
Although there may be more, three broad categories of human activities or drivers of zoonotic 
disease emergence in China are most notable (Figure 3): land conversion including deforestation to 
provide timber and agricultural lands (Liu et al. 2014; Yang et al. 2014a); animal production systems 
including large-scale poultry farms (Patz et al. 2004; Fan et al. 2014; Wu et al. 2015), and animal 
value chains with wild animals sourced from forested areas in China or in surrounding countries and 
transported to different farms, markets, restaurants, and other venues (Daszak et al. 2007; 
Shepherd & Nijman 2007; Zhang et al. 2008; Greatorex et al. 2016; Lynn 2016). The emergence of 
pathogens from wildlife and domestic animal hosts is a key concern for public health (Morens et al. 
2004). The southwest of China is the most rural and biodiverse region of China, yet also has high 
incidences of neglected tropical diseases (Steinmann et al. 2008; Yang et al. 2014a). The relatively 
recent emergence of SARS coronavirus and highly pathogenic avian influenza A subtypes H5N1 and 
H7N9 has heightened concerns about emerging zoonoses in southeast Asia and especially in China 
(Subbarao et al. 1998; Drosten et al. 2003). Other viral zoonotic diseases such as Rabies and Dengue 
have increased in incidence, perhaps due to increased human population density (for Rabies) and 
climate change allowing Dengue vectors (mosquitoes) to expand their geographic ranges (Ooi 2015; 
Zhou et al. 2016a). Additionally, emerging diseases including brucellosis, Japanese encephalitis, and 
other vector (sand fly, tick, or mosquito) borne diseases in China are of increasing concern for global 
public health (Liu et al. 2014). 
 
China is undergoing a rapid economic transformation, with resulting changes to the environment 
(Wan 1998), demography, sociology, agriculture, and trade – all of which are key drivers of disease 
emergence (Morse 1995; Morens et al. 2004; Weiss & McMichael 2004). China’s rapid development 
has led to increased contact between people and wildlife via expansion of hunting, wildlife trade, 
forestry, and agriculture (Knight & Ding 2012). From a political and public health perspective, one of 
the most important emerging zoonotic viruses to have affected China’s population has been SARS 
coronavirus precisely because China and the world were initially so unprepared to respond to the 
pandemic (Huang 2004). 
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1.7 Coronaviruses 
The Coronaviridae is a family of spherical (hence the corona or ‘crown’ nomenclature) non-
segmented positive single strand RNA viruses from the order Nidovirales (ICTV 2017b). With 
genomes of about 30 kilobases in length, these are among the largest and most complex of the RNA 
viruses yet discovered and are found in a wide range of animal species such as domestic animals, 
some bird species, rodents, whales, bats, and humans (Siddell et al. 1983). In humans, most 
coronaviruses are respiratory pathogens causing laryngitis (e.g. HCoV-229E, HCoV-OC43, and HCoV-
HKU1) and croup (HCoV-NL63) (Fehr & Perlman 2015). 
 
Prior to 2002 and the pandemic emergence of SARS coronavirus and more recently MERS 
coronavirus, only two human coronaviruses (HCoVs) had been characterised (HCoV- 229E and HCoV-
OC43) (Fehr & Perlman 2015). Since then, two more human coronaviruses HCoV-NL63 (van der Hoek 
et al. 2004) and HCoV-HKU1 (Woo et al. 2005) were identified in individuals with respiratory 
infections. These HCoVs may account for up to 30% of respiratory infections in the general 
population (Fouchier et al. 2004; Holmes & Rambaut 2004). Animal and human coronaviruses have 
been classified into the subfamily Coronavirinae (Figure 5) with four genera based on their 
antigenicity (Rota et al. 2003; Mihindukulasuriya et al. 2008): 
 
• Alphacoronavirus: containing HCoV- 229E, bat, porcine, feline, and canine coronaviruses 
• Betacoronavirus: with four lineages (A-D) and including SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, HCoV-OC43, 
HCoV-HKU1 containing human, bat, murine, bovine, camel, and other mammalian CoVs 
• Deltacoronavirus: containing avian and porcine CoVs 
• Gammacoronavirus: containing avian and cetacean CoVs  
 
Coronaviruses have been shown experimentally and in nature to undergo genetic recombination by 
a genomic template-switching mechanism and to generate genetic point mutations at a rate similar 
to that of other RNA viruses including influenza A viruses, which suggests a frequency of host 
switching and zoonotic transmission within the group (Tsunemitsu et al. 1995; Saif 2004). A large 
number of novel CoVs have been discovered in bat species in both the Old and New World 
(Dominguez et al. 2007; Müller et al. 2007; Donaldson et al. 2010; Quan et al. 2010; Rihtaric et al. 
2010; Wacharapluesadee et al. 2015) as well as strains discussed in Chapter 3.  
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1.7.1 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 
In November 2002, a new respiratory disease, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), was 
discovered in Guangdong province of south eastern China (Drosten et al. 2003). SARS spread rapidly 
via international travellers, eventually affecting over 8,000 individuals in 32 countries and causing at 
least 800 deaths in early 2003 (Riley et al. 2003; Tsang et al. 2003; Anderson et al. 2004). In response 
to this outbreak, Chinese authorities, working with an international collaborative group set up by the 
World Health Organization (WHO) investigated the outbreak and identified a novel Coronavirus – 
termed SARS coronavirus (SARS CoV) – as the causative agent (Drosten et al. 2003; Guan et al. 2003; 
Ksiazek et al. 2003; Kuiken et al. 2003; Peiris et al. 2003). 
 
During the original SARS-CoV outbreak, the earliest cases reported were from restaurant workers 
(He et al. 2003). By the end of the outbreak in May 2003, assays for IgG antibodies for SARS or SARS-
like coronaviruses in humans in the Guangdong region in China yielded highest prevalence among 
animal market workers, animal traders and particularly in those handling civet cats (Paguma larvata) 
(CDC 2003; Guan et al. 2003). These data suggest that those having contact with animals were 
Figure 5. Phylogenetic relationship of the major genera in the Coronaviridaefamily. Modified from Chan et al. (2015). 
Counter clockwise from bottom right: Alphacoronavirus, Betacoronavirus, Gammacoronavirus, and Deltacoronavirus.
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infected by SARS-CoV first, but that others regularly handling animals had previously been infected 
with other strains of Coronaviruses, provided strong evidence for animal origins of SARS (Wang et al. 
2006). 
 
SARS-like coronaviruses (SL-CoVs) were then identified in wild-caught and farm-bred masked palm 
civets (Paguma larvata), one raccoon dog (Nyctereutes procyonoides), and one Chinese ferret 
badger (Melogale moschata) in wet markets in Guangdong province, suggesting that these animals 
(and particularly civets due to their high viral prevalence) were reservoir hosts (Guan et al. 2003). 
However, subsequent surveys did not find virus in wild or farmed civets and experimental infection 
of civets caused acute clinical signs, which would be unlikely to occur in a wildlife reservoir of a virus 
(Tu et al. 2004; Wang et al. 2006). 
 
Since the outbreak, substantial evidence has been published demonstrating that bats are the natural 
reservoirs of CoVs. This includes (a) high seroprevalence of a wide diversity of SL-CoVs in wild-caught 
bats; (b) these viruses being phylogenetically close to SARS-CoV; and (c) a phylogeny suggesting that 
SARS-CoV originates from within this diverse group of SL-CoVs (Li et al. 2005; Ge et al. 2013; Ge et al. 
2016a). However, the precise mechanisms, in other words the mix of viral and host ecology as well 
as human behaviour, by which SARS emerged are still unknown (Graham et al. 2013). It is possible 
that other animals mixing in wet markets played a role either as reservoir or amplifying hosts for SL-
CoVs (Tu et al. 2004; Shi & Hu 2008). The aim of this thesis is to uncover some of these mechanisms. 
 
The emergence of SARS-CoV is clearly linked to live animal trade in mixed species in wet markets in 
Guangdong province of south China where there was a rapid expansion of the economy and the 
recent growth of a large population of relatively wealthy people (Woo et al. 2006a). It is unclear 
whether the trade regulations and changes in human activities have sufficiently altered so that the 
re-emergence of SARS-CoV or emergence of a SL-CoV is still likely. The dynamics of wildlife trade in 
southern China need to be evaluated to determine the potential risk of coronavirus re-emergence. 
Chapter 3 will delve further into the emergence of SARS-CoV, the recent discoveries of novel 
coronaviruses from work conducted under this thesis, and the ecology of both the virus and its 
chiropteran host species. 
 
1.8 Paramyxoviruses 
Paramyxoviridae are a family of negative single strand RNA viruses of the order Mononegavirales 
with genomes between 15-19 kilobases in length (ICTV 2017a). Paramyxoviridae or paramyxoviruses 
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are subdivided into 7 genera: Aquaparamyxovirus; Avulavirus; Ferlavirus; Henipavirus; Morbillivirus; 
Respirovirus; and Rubulavirus. Paramyxoviruses infect a broad range of species and exhibit high viral 
diversity, which increases the possibility of spillover (Anderson & Wang 2011; Johnson et al. 2015). 
Newcastle disease virus (genus Avulavirus) and Rinderpest virus (genus Morbillivirus) are pathogenic 
with high rates of mortality in domestic and wild animals (Alexander 2001; Morens et al. 2011). 
Some paramyxoviruses have high rates of human morbidity such as measles (genus Morbillivirus), 
mumps (genus Rubulavirus), and human parainfluenza viruses (genus Respirovirus) (Drexler et al. 
2012). 
 
Other lesser known and recently discovered zoonotic paramyxoviruses such as Nipah virus and 
Hendra virus in the Henipavirus genus pose significant burdens to livestock and human health, with 
mortality rates of 40% and higher in humans during outbreaks or spillover events (Marsh & Wang 
2012). These viruses have been shown to originate in bats, as their reservoir hosts (Halpin et al. 
2000; Chua et al. 2002b).  
 
1.8.1 Hendra Virus and Nipah Virus 
In 1994, a novel Paramyxovirus called Hendra virus (HeV) first emerged from fruit bats into infected 
horses in Queensland, Australia, causing severe respiratory and neurological disease, and 
occasionally infecting people who work with or were exposed to these horses (Selvey et al. 1995). 
There have been multiple outbreaks of HeV in Australia since, but no evidence of human-to-human 
transmission and the number of human cases has been low (Field et al. 2011). The mechanism of 
transmission is likely via bat excreta or sputum dropped from roosting or feeding trees into areas 
where horses are present (Field et al. 2016). The reservoir hosts of HeV were shown to be flying 
foxes of the Pteropus genus (Halpin et al. 2000). The urbanisation of the Pteropus species has been 
hypothesised to be the driver for the emergence of HeV (Plowright et al. 2011). Prevalence of HeV 
has been shown to be generally low in bats with a winter-time peak in some regions corresponding 
to equine cases (Field 2016). In 2012 an equine vaccine was developed and has proven highly 
effective in preventing further spillover of HeV (Field et al. 2016), although the challenge now is for 
veterinary and public health authorities to enforce vaccination of all horses (Peel et al. 2016). 
 
Nipah virus (NiV) is closely related to HeV and was first discovered with an outbreak in pigs in 
Malaysia in 1998 (Chua et al. 2000) which caused encephalitis and respiratory disease, as well as 
abortion, with a mortality rate of approximately 2.5% (Nor et al. 2000). During this outbreak, 283 
people, mostly (70%) those directly involved with pig farming, were reported infected with a 38.5% 
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mortality rate (Chua 2003). Pteropus vampyrus and Pteropus hypomelanus bats were identified as 
the reservoir for NiV in Malaysia (Rahman et al. 2013). 
 
In the outbreak of Nipah virus in Malaysia, pigs were an amplifying host shedding virus in droplets of 
saliva expelled when coughing (Chua et al. 2001). There were no documented cases of human-to 
human transmission and only humans exposed to pigs were infected, nor was there any evidence of 
direct bat-to-human transmission (Chong et al. 2003; Tan & Wong 2003). Agricultural intensification 
(pig farming and fruit cultivation) has been implicated in the emergence of NiV in Malaysia (Pulliam 
et al. 2012). Chua et al. (2002a) hypothesise that fruit trees were planted hanging over pig 
enclosures and their fruits attracted fruit bats. In the process of feeding, the bats would let fall 
pieces of fruit contaminated with their saliva and potentially with NiV. Pigs then would consume the 
fallen fruits leading to exposure to NiV. Pulliam et al. (2012) showed that repeated spillover from 
bats and structured intensive production of pigs resulted in a prolonged outbreak and high number 
of human cases. Since the 1998 outbreak there has been no observed reoccurrence in Malaysia and 
this is likely due to government enforced surveillance, prohibition of fruit tree planting near 
livestock, and reduced sizes of pig farms (Lam & Chua 2002). 
 
Viruses similar to NiV were identified in other Pteropus species in Australia (Halpin et al. 2011), in 
Asia (Olson et al. 2002; Sendow et al. 2006; Hasebe et al. 2012) as well as in African bats in the same 
family (Drexler et al. 2012; Pernet et al. 2014). Despite these viruses and their hosts being endemic 
across a broad geographic range, Bangladesh is, to date, the only other location where NiV 
transmission to humans has been recorded, with the first report of spillover near Dhaka in 2001 (Hsu 
et al. 2004; Luby 2013). Outbreaks of NiV encephalitis have since been recorded annually in 
Bangladesh with mortality between 75% and 100% (Luby et al. 2009b; Homaira et al. 2010; Pulliam 
et al. 2012). More recently, two confirmed NiV outbreaks were been reported in West Bengal India 
(Chadha et al. 2006). 
 
Unlike in Malaysia, the route of transmission from bats to humans in Bangladesh and India is direct: 
without an intermediary, amplifying host. In the region, date palm sap is a traditional drink tapped 
by affixing collecting pots to the trunks of date palm trees (Phoenix sylvestris). Using thermal imaging 
or infrared cameras, Khan et al. (2010) recorded Pteropus bats feeding from collecting pots at night. 
The contaminated sap is harvested and consumed by unsuspecting locals (Luby et al. 2006). Recent 
evidence has shown that there are multiple HiVs present both in host species and in humans in the 
region (Anthony et al. 2013; Chowdhury et al. 2014). 
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Paramyxoviruses like Hendra and Nipah virus are of concern to human and domestic animal health 
because they have repeatedly emerged from wildlife reservoirs, bats, into humans, and other 
animals. NiV is associated with high mortality and has the ability to be transmitted person-to-person 
(Luby et al. 2009a; Luby et al. 2009b). Elucidating the ecology of these zoonoses is crucial in order to 
develop targeted prevention and predict emergence. Given the right conditions, these viruses or as 
yet unknown Paramyxoviruses may emerge and result in a larger epidemic or like SARS quickly 
spread globally and potentially become pandemic. 
 
1.8.2 Paramyxoviruses in China 
This research aims to identify novel paramyxoviruses in Chinese bats and test the hypotheses that 
some of these diverse viruses are not only present in their chiropteran hosts, but may be closely 
related or even ancestral to known paramyxoviruses of concern to human and animal health such as 
NiV or HiV. A diversity of paramyxoviruses has already been identified in China (Figure 6) 
predominantly in bats, but also in rodents, birds, and cats (Li et al. 2006; Lau et al. 2010b; Woo et al. 
2012b; Wu et al. 2014b; Yuan et al. 2014). Chapter 4 will delve further into paramyxoviruses in China 
including recent discoveries of novel paramyxoviruses from work conducted within this thesis; the 
ecology of both the paramyxoviruses and the chiropteran host species; and the potential risks of 
paramyxovirus emergence in human populations.  
 
1.9 Host species 
Some wild animals have become well adapted to anthropogenically challenged environments such 
as urban or agricultural landscapes and these species can be reservoirs for known zoonoses as well 
as undiscovered or emerging zoonoses. Foxes and raccoons are reservoir species for rabies in North 
America (Blanton et al. 2010). Deer, rats, and monkeys are hosts for various vectors (ticks and fleas) 
of diseases ranging from Lyme disease, plague, and Kyasanur Forect disease respectively (Kruse et al. 
2004; Gage & Kosoy 2005; Holbrook 2012). Other animals including bats (NiV) and civets (SARS-CoV) 
are implicated in viral spillover resulting in epidemic or pandemic emergence. 
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Recent research has demonstrated that viruses with the ability to infect a diverse range of host 
species are more likely to spread geographically and should be considered at a higher risk of 
pandemic emergence (Johnson et al. 2015). Research suggests that due to anthropogenic drivers an 
‘ecological threshold’ has been crossed and this accounts for the global emergence of zoonoses 
particularly such as coronaviruses and henipaviruses from bats (Field 2009). In Chapter 5, these risks 
and the wildlife trade as a driver of viral emergence will be examined further.  
 
Figure 6. Unrooted, radial phylogenetic tree showing Paramyxoviridae genera. Branch lengths represent relative 
evolutionary distances. Jeilongvirus is not a currently recognised genus, but has been recently proposed by Woo et al. 
(2016) and therefore included for illustrative purposes only.
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1.10 Bats, Rats, Primates, and Other Animal Viral Reservoirs 
Since most emerging infectious diseases are zoonotic in origin (Taylor et al. 2001; Jones et al. 2008), 
and most of these emerge from mammals (Woolhouse & Gowtage-Sequeria 2005), discovery and 
surveillance efforts to predict and prevent disease emergence should focus on mammalian species. 
The orders Rodentia (rodents), Chiroptera (bats), and Soricomorpha (shrews and moles) comprise 
70% of mammalian species. With the addition of Primata (primates, of which humans number), 
these four orders comprise over 75% of mammalian species and diversity (Wilson & Reeder 2005). 
 
Bats and rodents are the most speciose of mammals and are present on every continent excluding 
Antarctica and are found in or proximate to every environment in which humans may occur (Wilson 
& Reeder 2005). Some bat and rodent species are commensal, exploiting human dwellings, 
constructs, and food resources, leading to direct and indirect contact amongst humans, domestic 
animals and rodents and bats (Reperant & Osterhaus 2014). Rodent, bat, shrew and primate species 
are hosts to most of the known zoonoses (Han et al. 2016a). Rodents harbour diverse known 
zoonotic pathogens, are a potential health risk for humans (Mills 2006), and are estimated to host 85 
or more viral species, almost three times as many as bats (Han et al. 2016a). Bats, though, have been 
shown to host more zoonotic viruses per species than rodents and due to their volant nature have 
overlapping and larger home ranges (Luis et al. 2013). One example of this is recent evidence 
showing that bat species with overlapping ranges from Africa to Asia are reservoirs of filoviruses 
including Ebola and Marburg viruses as well as uncharacterised filoviruses (Han et al. 2016b). Other 
studies suggest that bats are unique among mammalian orders, since they are reservoir hosts to 
many recently emerged and significant zoonoses such as Ebola virus, SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, and NiV 
(Brierley et al. 2016; Zhou et al. 2016b). This may be a result of the interplay of both intrinsic (bat 
and viral ecologies) and extrinsic (anthropogenic) factors leading to zoonotic emergence (Han et al. 
2016a). 
 
Bats inhabit a wide range of ecosystems, and while many roost in large colonies in caves or trees, 
some are more tolerant of human activities and roost in buildings and other human structures 
(Nowak 1994; Hutson et al. 2001). Ecologically, bats fall into two distinct groups – those that are 
insectivorous and those that are frugivorous. The latter include large species commonly called fruit 
bats or flying foxes and are often colonial and roost in trees across pristine and anthropogenically 
dominated environments (Nowak 1994; Epstein et al. 2009; Hahn et al. 2014a; Hahn et al. 2014b). 
Some bat species are solitary. Frugivorous bats forage for fruit or flowers from a variety of sources 
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including commercially cultivated fruit trees, which may heighten the likelihood of viral spillover to 
people (Field et al. 2001; Plowright et al. 2015). 
 
Direct human-bat contact may be incidental, for example bats that roost in buildings sometimes 
enter living areas and attempts to catch and remove them may result in accidental scratches or 
bites, which is a common mechanism for rabies and other bat lyssaviruses to directly infect humans 
(McCall et al. 2000; De Serres et al. 2008). Direct human-bat contact may also be due to human 
hunting and consumption of bats, which is a common practice in some countries, particularly in 
southeast Asia and Africa (Mickleburgh et al. 2009; Harrison et al. 2011; Kamins et al. 2011). Indirect 
contact with bats may be through exposure to bat excreta due to close proximity of roosting or 
feeding sites, or through behavioural practices that bring people into contact with feeding or 
roosting sites, e.g. date palm sap collection in Bangladesh (Khan et al. 2010) or guano collection from 
bat caves (Suwannarong & Schuler 2016). Exposure to bat excreta – primarily urine and saliva – is 
thought to be the mechanism of viral spillover of Nipah virus and Hendra virus from bats to humans 
or other animals (Luby et al. 2006; Field et al. 2007; Halpin et al. 2011). 
 
The proximity of a diversity of mammal species including bats in live animal markets in southern 
China, the general lack of biosecurity practices in handling and butchering animals, and sheer 
volume of animals being traded, shipped, and stored is thought to have been responsible for the 
emergence of SARS-CoV in 2003 (Woo et al. 2006a). Non-bat species including civets (Paguma 
larvata), raccoon dogs (Nyctereutes. procyonoides), and ferret badgers (Melogale moschata) showed 
evidence of SARS-CoV infection and all were initially suspected as being the reservoir species (Guan 
et al. 2003). The subsequent discovery of SL-CoVs in bats and more recently of a strain capable of 
directly infecting people (Li et al. 2005; Ge et al. 2013) highlight the importance of surveillance to 
identify wildlife reservoirs of zoonotic viruses.  
 
1.11 Human and Non-Human Animal Interactions 
The emergence of other zoonotic diseases has been associated with contact and the consumption of 
infected animals as part of traditional hunting practices (Leroy et al. 2004). In 2013, an outbreak of 
Ebola Zaire virus in West Africa resulted from a single introduction from an animal reservoir into the 
human population (Gire et al. 2014). Human behaviour, rather than repeated spillover from an 
animal reservoir, was responsible for the uncontrolled, rapid spread of Ebola virus disease through 
the neighbouring countries of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Without information about a 
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reservoir species and the associated human behaviours resulting in spillover, public health efforts 
towards preventing re-emergence will be ineffectual. 
 
1.12 Wildlife Trade in China 
With both a diversity of habitats and an equally diverse number of species within its borders, China 
is considered “megadiverse” (Mittermeier & Mittermeier 1997). About 10% (556/5,416) of the 
world’s mammals may be found in this region (Smith et al. 2010a). This natural resource, China’s 
biodiversity, has become a component of both domestic (Zhang et al. 2008) and international 
wildlife trade (Rosen & Smith 2010; Smith et al. 2017), although much of it is illegal and is difficult to 
quantify (Karesh et al. 2005). Recent research has suggested that because of the volume of trade 
that passes through China it also plays a key role in illegal wildlife trade (Patel et al. 2015). 
 
Wildlife trade routes in southern China have been documented (Yiming & Dianmo 1996; Zhang et al. 
2008), however, the practices and behaviours of those involved in the wildlife trade at the local level 
have not been explored in detail. Among the diverse species traded are bats, rodents, and 
nonhuman primates and these are reservoirs for the many of the zoonotic diseases infecting humans 
(McFarlane et al. 2012). In southern China large animal markets, wildlife trade, and human 
migrations create opportunities for zoonotic emergence as wild animals such as bats, rodents, civets 
and others come into frequent contact with each other, domestic animals, and humans (Morse 
1995; Karesh & Cook 2005; Lau et al. 2005).  
 
In southern China wildlife has long been utilised for food, medicine, pets, and as raw material such 
as clothing and ornaments (Zhang et al. 2008; Chow et al. 2014). Recent globalisation of trade and 
increasing wealth have resulted in higher demand for wildlife foods, both for general consumption 
and for the health benefits attributed by traditional medicine to their consumption (Yiming & 
Wilcove 2005). The animal markets such as those in Guangdong province grew to accommodate this 
demand (Li et al. 1996; Yiming & Dianmo 1998). Trade and farming in masked palm civets (Paguma 
larvata) is a good example of this. Before 2003, it has been estimated that over 660 farm were 
raising at least 40,000 civets to supply demand in southern China (Shi & Hu 2008). After SARS-CoV 
emerged and it seemed as if civets were the source of the virus, the Chinese government prohibited 
the sale of civets ensuring their disappearance from the markets (Zhao 2007). 
 
SARS has not to date re-emerged since the last and minor outbreak in 2004, but the wildlife trade in 
China continues and civets and other farmed and wild animals still may be seen in farms and in the 
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wet markets (personal observations). There has been little available data concerning wild animal 
trade and markets in China since. If these wet markets are not closed, the conditions for SARS re-
emergence may persist. The practice of consuming wildlife represents a substantial risk for zoonotic 
disease spillover, given the diversity of wildlife traded as well as the density of the human 
population in southern China. Surveillance efforts and changes in practice may be able to reduce the 
risk of spillover or to contain the next outbreak. This is discussed further in Chapter 5 with data 
presented on humans and non-human animals surveyed along south China’s wildlife trade networks. 
 
1.13 Surveillance 
Within the last decade, there has been a growing awareness of the interdependence between 
humans and animals as it relates to global health (Daszak et al. 2007; Alexander et al. 2010). The 
human-animal interface has been singled out as one of the most important risk factors to human 
health, well-being, and the emergence of infectious disease (King 2008). With approximately 75% of 
emerging infectious diseases of zoonotic origin (Taylor et al. 2001), a truly multidisciplinary approach 
is key to appropriately address health concerns on a global scale (Daszak et al. 2000). Research has 
been limited in its ability to describe this interface. One of the greatest strengths of an 
anthropological perspective is its interdisciplinary nature in attempting “to understand what it 
means to be human” (Peters-Golden 2008). A number of anthropological theorists have sought to 
move beyond the dichotomies of human-nature and biological-cultural (Kirksey & Helmreich 2010; 
Fuentes 2015). Recent multispecies ethnographies engage with ecology to explore how the relations 
among different actors in an environment provide additional context and meaning (Kirksey & 
Helmreich 2010). Anthropological and ecological surveillance methods can quantify the ways in 
which the human-animal interface is constructed and experienced. This interdisciplinary approach 
can improve health outcomes especially around areas of disease emergence and anthropogenic 
environmental change (Abel 1998). Further, this type of in-depth research is critical as many of the 
identified hotspots of emerging zoonotic diseases are in regions of the world with poorly 
documented indigenous knowledge (Hurn 2012; Han et al. 2016a). 
In Guangdong province, restaurant and food service workers and food animal handlers comprised 
the majority of early cases of SARS infection (Zhong et al. 2003; Xu et al. 2004). Following these 
index cases, SARS-CoV spread rapidly via international travellers, eventually affecting over 8,000 
individuals in 32 countries, and caused at least 800 deaths in early 2003 (Riley et al. 2003; Tsang et 
al. 2003). The highest incidence occurred in Guangzhou city, with 12.5 cases per 100,000 people (Xu 
et al. 2004). During the outbreak “superspreaders”, patients with unusually high numbers of contact 
infections, were the primary mechanism for expansion of case numbers (Tu et al. 2004). During the 
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SARS-CoV outbreak, healthcare workers were infected at unusually high rates, despite following 
standard precautions (Gopalakrishna et al. 2004; Svoboda et al. 2004). Research also supports the 
roles of unrecognised cases of SARS, long incubation periods (~14 days), and high aerosolisation in 
the extensive spread of the disease, especially in hospitals (Ofner et al. 2003; Varia et al. 2003; Chow 
et al. 2004; Shen et al. 2004). Chapter 6 will investigate current human behaviour as surveyed 
throughout south China in regions where humans and wild animals frequently are in contact. Human 
attitudes, perceptions of risk, and current activities such as travel and exposure to wild animals all 
may be predictive of future zoonotic emergence. 
 
In the wet markets of south China, the high degree of contact among people, bats, and other 
mammals due to handling and butchering activities may still result in conditions that allow viruses to 
emerge and spread. To test these assumptions, this thesis reports on results of assays for 
paramyxovirus and coronavirus from samples collected from both wild and captive animal species in 
the wildlife trade pathways in southern China. Behaviour and potential for spillover to humans with 
high occupational exposure to bats and other wildlife are also evaluated. 
 
Qualitative research (ethnographic interviews and observational surveys) conducted with individuals 
living in Guangxi and Yunnan provinces in rural southern China is analysed. These provinces 
bordering Vietnam are known hotspots of faunal diversity (Myers et al. 2000) and have long been 
integral to trading routes from Vietnam to Guangdong (Yiming & Dianmo 1996) as well as home to 
protected forests and other areas where wildlife has been traditionally hunted and captured (Yiming 
& Wilcove 2005). This study was conducted to better understand the local wildlife value chain and 
explore the following four areas: 
• the types of wildlife exposures experienced by people living and working in an environment 
known for its wildlife trade 
• the socioeconomic drivers of the local wildlife trade, as well as the classification and value 
placed upon different wild animals 
• the potential risk factors for zoonotic disease transmission associated with exposure to wild 
animals particularly bats, rodents, and nonhuman primates 
• reported incidences of unusual illnesses. 
 
1.14 Aims and Objectives 
In the immediate aftermath of SARS, Li et al (2005) and others (Tang et al. 2006; Wang et al. 2006) 
called for urgent research in three areas: (1) the ecology and genetic diversity of reservoir species 
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such as bats and civets that have an important role in the ecology and evolution of CoV, (2) the 
mechanisms of disease emergence in the wet-market system, and (3) a predictive model of disease 
emergence integrating both (1) and (2). Zoonotic viruses such as coronaviruses and paramyxoviruses 
are a threat to health globally. Wildlife reservoirs of both viruses have been identified as various bat 
species found globally and since then hundreds of novel CoVs have been discovered. These, and 
other wildlife species, are hunted, traded, butchered and consumed across Asia, creating significant 
opportunity for bats and people to come into contact, thereby increasing the risk of coronavirus 
transmission. 
 
The goal of this thesis is to evaluate the risk of emergence of two families of viruses, coronaviruses 
and paramyxoviruses, found in bats (Chapters 3) along the animal value chain in China and how that 
links to wildlife trade (Chapter 4) and other human behaviours (Chapter 5). 
Detailing the current status of trade and the ecology of these viruses and their hosts provides 
invaluable data that may be used to predict and prevent the risk of emergence of these and other 
as-yet-unknown viruses. This research will evaluate the risk of infectious viral diseases of high 
interest to human and non-human animal health, in the coronavirus and paramyxovirus families, 
emerging in south China. The studies detailed in the following chapters have looked at whether 
current anthropogenic practices, viral and host ecology, human and non-human animal behaviour in 
markets and the wild through the trade networks of south China, as well as the diversity and 
detection rates of viruses of these two families, may result in future disease emergence. One aim is 
to assess the nature and frequency of contact among animals and people in two critical 
environments in southeast Asia: 1) live animal markets and trade routes and 2) rural areas where 
people hunt bats. This information will be used to determine whether viruses discovered in this 
research have the potential to cause large-scale epidemics. If patterns of human behaviour, wildlife 
trade, and viral ecology may be quantified, then a relative level of risk may be predicted and 
evaluated.   
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2 Materials and Methods 
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2.1 Overview of Methods 
The central aim of this research was to evaluate the diversity of coronaviruses and paramyxoviruses 
that may be circulating in human and non-human mammals within the live animal market and trade 
pathways in China. The work will examine the risks of these viruses infecting humans and the 
potential of pandemic threats. In order to achieve these aim, it was necessary to collect biological 
samples from live non-human animals and humans and to assay these samples for coronavirus and 
paramyxovirus ribonucleic acids. The majority of data in this study were derived from surveillance 
efforts designed to identify and characterise these viruses circulating in animals present in the wild, 
wildlife markets, farms, and trading routes in southern China. In addition to assessing the risk of the 
emergence of these viruses, ethnographic data were collected from people working in the wildlife 
trade and communities from which the animals were sampled. 
 
2.2 Field Sampling Locations 
Bats, rodents, other mammals, and humans were sampled in 20 provinces and the capitol district 
(Beijing) of China in this study (Figure 7). Initially samples were collected opportunistically and then 
as behavioural, ecological, observational, and laboratory results became available, sampling efforts 
were prioritised in southern China (a) along wildlife trade pathways and (b) where humans, wildlife, 
and domestic animals were in regular contact. These priority sites were in three southern China 
provinces, from east to west, of Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan. Population-level variables were 
recorded for humans in the farms and in markets and for non-human animals in farms, markets, and 
in the wild. These included data on production of domesticated and farmed wild animals, population 
sizes (of non-human animals) in the wet markets, as well as the temporal and spatial dynamics of 
these. 
 
The project sites are those where both large bat populations were found to exist and the bats 
screened positive for viruses in this study. For the human behavioural surveys, community sites were 
selected based on previous research conducted throughout southern China wherein bat populations 
were identified and tested for existing and novel viruses such as paramyxoviruses and coronaviruses 
(Li et al. 2005; Li et al. 2010; Ge et al. 2012; Yuan et al. 2014).  
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Table 1. Human behavioural field sampling and surveillance sites. Sampling and surveillance conducted at farms and 
markets in Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan Provinces in China including Latitude and Longitude in decimal degrees.
Province Type of Site Lat Long 
Guangdong 
Conghua Market 23.548852 113.586605 
Foshan Market 22.640484 112.258051 
Guangxi 
Wei Farm 24.487824 110.395287 
Shi Farm 24.488242 110.373373 
Jiang Market 24.478321 110.405044 
Lipu Market 24.486367 110.392084 
Yunnan 
Zhou Farm 25.112958 102.076721 
Dali Old Town Market 25.705578 100.153770 
Dai Agricultural Village 24.943728 101.527404 
 
  
Figure 7. Map of China. The 20 Provinces and Beijing shaded in darker grey indicate where human and non-human animal 
biological specimen sampling were conducted for this study. Observational, ethnographic, and qualitative behavioural surveys 
were conducted in southern China in Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan Provinces. 
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The community sites (Table 1) were selected in Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan provinces based 
on the following eligibility criteria where:  
 
• large bat populations exist in caves and other natural or manmade roosting sites 
• bats and other animals including humans were found to be positive for paramyxoviruses or 
coronaviruses 
• regular contact had been observed among wild animals, domestic animals, and humans 
• wild animal farming, consumption, and trade was known or found to occur 
 
Sites in each province included wet markets where wildlife was sold, farms that breed wildlife 
species for consumption and trade, hunting areas, wildlife restaurants, wildlife holding areas where 
animals were kept on the way to larger markets, caves where people dwell or collect guano, and 
residential areas with known bat roosts. In addition, data and samples were collected from 
traditional healers who use animals and animal by-products as part of Traditional Chinese Medicine 
(TCM). 
 
2.3 Field Sampling Methodology 
Three types of field sampling methodology were conducted: observational, biological specimens, 
and ethnographic interviews.  
 
2.3.1 Biosafety, Security, and Approvals 
All field team members were trained in correct use of PPE, hygiene, safety, and veterinary animal 
handling techniques to minimise potential exposure or injury. Additionally, all team members were 
required to pass the Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) Research Team Member 
training modules in Animal Care and Use, Human Subjects Research, Healthcare Ethics Committee, 
and Biosafety and Security (about.citiprogram.org/en/series/animal-care-and-use-acu/). All field 
team members who worked with animals were required to have current rabies and tetanus 
vaccinations. 
 
For all bat, rodent, and other non-human animal capture and sampling, personal protective 
equipment (PPE) was used due to the potential for exposure to both known and unknown zoonotic 
agents. For this research, minimum PPE requirements for field team members were: 
• N95 Respirator – fit tested (sized) per each field team member 
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• Goggles, face shield, or protective glasses 
• Nitrile gloves – when directly handling animals (extracting from cages, or restraining so 
other team members may collect samples), leather gloves were worn on top of Nitrile gloves 
to protect from risk of bites or scratches 
• PPE overalls or other field-sampling, dedicated clothing and washable shoes 
 
2.3.2 Non-Human Animal Sampling Approval 
To ensure the safety and protection of both non-human animals and sampling teams, full non-
human animal sampling field techniques were written up and submitted to the Tufts University & 
Tufts Medical Center and the Human Nutrition Research Center on Aging Institutional Animal Care 
and Use Committee (http://viceprovost.tufts.edu/iacuc/) for approval. The Tufts Institutional Animal 
Care and Use Committee (IACUC) approved non-human animal sampling protocols as per protocol 
numbers G968-08 (2008 – 2014) and G2017-32 (2014 – present). Annual updates and reporting were 
supplied to the IACUC committee as per the Institution’s annual renewal requirements. Some animal 
sampling for this thesis was also conducted under the approval of both the Animal Ethics Committee 
of the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIVH05210201) in Hubei China and by the Institutional Animal 
Care and Use Committee at the University of California at Davis (UCDAVIS16048). The latter 
institution is the prime contractor on one of the sources of funding for this work. Sampling of non-
human animal species was conducted under agreements between EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. and the 
following Chinese Institutions: East China Normal University Joint Institute for Zoonoses and Wildlife 
in Shanghai; the Yunnan Center for Disease Control and Prevention in Dali; and the Guangdong 
Entomological Institute based in Guangzhou. All of these Chinese Institutions regularly conduct bat 
and other wild animal sampling projects in China. 
 
2.3.3 Human Sampling Approval 
To ensure the safety and protection of both human subjects interviewed and field teams, the full 
protocol for quantitative and qualitative human sampling field techniques was written up, submitted 
to, and approved by the USA-based Hummingbird Institutional Review Board (2014-23 and 2016-55) 
(http://hummingbirdirb.com/index.asp), the Wuhan University School of Public Health Institutional 
Review Board (http://en.sph.whu.edu.cn), and the Yunnan Institute for Endemic Disease Control and 
Prevention Ethics Review Board (http://www.yiedc.com). Annual updates and reporting were 
supplied to the IRB committees as per each Institution’s annual renewal requirements (See Sections 
7.7 and 7.8). Human sampling was conducted under agreements between EcoHealth Alliance, Inc., 
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the Wuhan School of Public Health, and the Yunnan Center for Disease Control and Prevention in 
Dali. 
 
2.3.4 Biological Specimen Sampling 
In this study, a conservative estimate of a 10% detection rate was used to calculate sampling target 
sizes. Published detection rates of coronaviruses identified in bats and rodents are between 10% and 
38% (Tang et al. 2006; Osborne et al. 2011) and similar ranges have been identified for 
paramyxoviruses (Wacharapluesadee et al. 2010; Drexler et al. 2012; Young & Olival 2016). A 10% 
detection rate in wild populations of bats or rodents requires a sampling of a minimum of 30 
individuals per species (Wobeser 2013). 
 
Sampling locations in Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan China were selected based upon site 
assessments of proximity to human activities and domestic animals as well as upon prior results 
from species sampled in these regions (Zhang et al. 2009b; Zhu et al. 2012; Ge et al. 2013). Sampling 
of bats was conducted annually between April and October from 2009 to 2014. 
 
Prior to all field sampling, cold chains were set up to maintain sample preservation, prevent 
deterioration, and ensure rapid transport from the field to the laboratory. 
 
2.3.5 Non-Human Sampling Procedures 
Bats were trapped in natural habitat in China (See Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). Free-ranging bats were 
captured using a single mist net, series of mist nets, or a telescoping hand or fish net. The mist net 
system was monitored by two or more people during the entire capture period. Bats were removed 
from the nets as soon as they became entangled to minimise stress and prevent injury. A maximum 
of 30 bats were set per trapping period. Duration of trapping depended upon rate and method of 
capture. Following capture, bats were placed in clean, porous, unbleached and undyed cotton bags, 
sealed with a drawstring, and hung from a branch or post until all samples were collected. Bats and 
bags were monitored constantly to ensure ventilation and prevent bats from escaping. Bats were 
held for a maximum of three hours and immediately released on site following sample collection 
(See Sections 7.2 and 7.3). 
 
Bats were manually restrained during sampling. Sterile paediatric swabs with polyester tips and 
aluminium shafts were used to collect samples from the oropharynx, urogenital tract, and rectum. A 
rectal swab was not collected if fresh faeces were excreted. Blood was collected from bats either 
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from the brachial or femoral artery or vein using a 25-gauge needle and 1cc syringe. Up to 6μL of 
blood to 1g of bat body weight (Table 2) was collected. Collection did not exceed 10% of circulating 
blood volume calculated at 6.25% total body weight (Morton et al. 1993; Smith et al. 2010b). Serum 
was separated on-site by centrifugation at 3000 x g for 15 min within 24 h and preserved at 4.0˚C. 
Urine was collected opportunistically using sterile swabs to soak urine from the exterior urogenital 
opening during urination. Most bats upon handling freely excreted urine and faeces. 
 
Table 2. Circulating Blood Volume (CBV) of mammals sampled. CBV was calculated at 6.25% of body weight in grams. A 
10% of CBV maximum blood draw (in millilitres) from mammals was permitted. This table was used by field teams to 
rapidly calculate 10% ranges for small mammals such as bats and rodents. Modified from published methods (Morton et 
al. 1993; Smith et al. 2010b).
Body weight (g) Circulating Blood Volume (ml) 10% CBV (ml) 
20 1.10 – 1.40 0.11 – 0.14 
25 1.37 – 1.75 0.14 – 0.18 
30 1.65 – 2.10 0.17 – 0.21 
35 1.93 – 2.45 0.19 – 0.25 
40 2.20 – 2.80 0.22 – 0.28 
125 6.88 – 8.75 0.69 – 0.88 
150 8.25 – 10.50 0.82 – 1.0 
200 11.00 – 14.00 1.1 – 1.4 
250 13.75 – 17.50 1.4 – 1.8 
300 16.50 – 21.00 1.7 – 2.1 
350 19.25 – 24.50 1.9 – 2.5 
 
Throat and faecal swab samples were collected in viral transport medium (VTM) composed of Hank’s 
balanced salt solution, pH 7.4, containing bovine serum albumin (1%), amphotericin (15 mg ml/l), 
penicillin G (100 U ml/l) and streptomycin (50 mg ml/l) (Li et al. 2010). 
 
Free-ranging rodents were captured with standard procedures as described by Mills et al. (1995) 
using small (7.62 x 8.89 x 22.86 cm), perforated, folding, aluminium Sherman traps (H. B. Sherman 
Traps, Inc., Tallahassee, Florida; https://www.shermantraps.com). As permitted by terrain, traps for 
free-ranging rodents were placed along transects and checked a minimum of every 6 hours. Traps 
were not set, if weather conditions were adverse, such as abrupt changes in precipitation intensity 
resulting in flash flooding or extreme heat spells. Traps were always placed beneath vegetation or in 
areas protected from direct sunshine to prevent heat stress. In areas without any vegetative or 
other cover, traps were closed between sunrise and sunset. 
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Wild and farmed rodents were docile enough to permit direct, manual restraint for sampling. 
Captive bred and wild rodent sampling procedures involved the same manual restraint, 
venepuncture, mucosal swabs, faecal, and urine sample collection as those described above for bats. 
 
Blood samples were collected by making a small puncture to the submandibular or facial vein. Blood 
was collected in a small heparinised tube or capillary tube and the bleeding was stopped by applying 
pressure to the puncture. Saphenous or femoral venepuncture was used for larger rodents such as 
bamboo rats (Rhizomys spp.). In all rodents and as with bats, blood of no more than 10% of total 
circulating blood volume (6.25% of body weight) was withdrawn (Table 2). For example, 125μL blood 
was collected from a 20-gram rodent (Lee & Blaufox 1985; Morton et al. 1993). 
 
Since sampled animals on farms were ultimately intended for human consumption anaesthesia was 
not permitted. Animals in farms were manually restrained. Blood as drawn from the femoral artery 
or saphenous vein using the same method of calculating maximum volume (Table 2) as for bats and 
rodents (Lennox & Bauck 2012). 
 
All animals survived the sampling process and were immediately released back into their habitat or, 
for farmed animals, into their cages or confinement areas. All sampling was performed by 
veterinarian-trained team members (See Section 2.3.1). 
 
2.4 Observational Research 
Observational research was conducted in wild animal farms and wild animal markets in Guangdong, 
Guangxi, and Yunnan provinces in southern China. Sites were identified based upon previous, 
repeated observations of contact among humans, wild animals (both farmed and wild-caught), and 
domestic animals. Sites included both wild animal farms and markets (Table 1). 
 
The following checklist was developed for observational research: 
• Assess facilities and condition, e.g. toilet, hand washing, waste disposal, and drainage 
• Assess animal and livestock conditions 
• Estimate the number of cages; the number of animals in each cage; how many animals there 
are in the market; and how cages and animals are stacked. 
• Map: draw the site including all buildings, roads, and other features 
• Look for signs of health department inspections, sanitation conditions, and hand washing 
• Look for butchering activities, de-feathering, etc.  
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• Assess customer and vendor population: age, sex, ethnicity, and relationship 
• Observe ventilation conditions and infrastructure including number of floors 
• Observe if people use any personal protective equipment (PPE) 
 
Field observations including drawings (Figure 8). Notes were taken electronically or manually on site 
when possible or otherwise recorded immediately following exit from the site. Drawings, notes, 
photographs, and audio recordings were used to add context to quantitative data collection and 
analyses. Drawings of markets were invaluable tools for recollection and providing supplemental 
details. 
 
 
Figure 8. Post-site-visit hand-drawn diagram of the Conghua Shichang wild and domestic animal marketwetmarket is 
located in Conghua City, Guangdong Province, China. The drawing from a visit on 05 April 2015, shows the layout of stalls; 
groupings of species and domestic animals; as well as administrative, housing, and other organisational structures of the 
market. (Cf. Figure 32).From 2014 to 2016, six direct observational market surveys each were conducted 
in two large animal markets in Guangdong Province: Foshan and Taiping Markets (Table 1). In order 
to be as unobtrusive and inconspicuous as possible, animal count estimates were made by the same 
two members of the field team and recorded immediately upon leaving the market using 
methodology modified from Gray (2009). Counts were compared and averaged when dissimilar. 
 
2.5 Human Sampling 
The number of humans exposed to wildlife at any site is difficult to enumerate, so an adaptive 
cluster sampling method was utilised (Thompson 1990). Adaptive cluster sampling is a standardised 
sampling methodology used when it is not possible to compile an exhaustive list of the elements 
 
33 
(e.g., individuals) that make up the target population. The site specific/cluster approach, in which 
well-defined sites are identified for sampling is widely used in infectious disease research (Seber & 
Salehi 2014). In this study, site specific clusters consisted of well-defined groups of highly exposed 
individuals (e.g., wildlife market vendors, hunters, people who live near known bat roosts). If the 
population size of the cluster was equal to or less than 50 individuals, then a one-stage cluster 
sampling method was employed wherein the entire cluster of potential respondents was 
approached to be included in the sample survey. A two-stage cluster sampling method was 
employed, if the population size of the cluster were over 50 individuals wherein only a subset of 
respondents from the site-specific cluster were selected to be surveyed (Thompson 1990; Seber & 
Salehi 2014). 
 
2.6 Human Behavioural Surveillance 
Both qualitative and quantitative surveys were conducted. Qualitative research is used to 
understand the social and environmental context in which infectious disease spillover occurs 
between animal reservoirs and human populations. The two distinct qualitative methodologies 
utilised in this study to better understand this context include observational research and 
ethnographic interviews. Important behavioural information from different sociocultural levels was 
collected using each methodology. Following observations and qualitative or ethnographic 
interviews, standardised quantitative questionnaires were administered to collect data on living 
circumstances; income or resource generating activities; experience with unusual illnesses; and a 
range of human-animal contacts. 
 
The provinces bordering Vietnam are known hotspots of faunal diversity (Myers et al. 2000) and 
have long been integral to trading routes from Vietnam to southern China and especially to 
Guangdong province (Yiming & Dianmo 1996). They are also home to protected forests and other 
areas where wildlife has been traditionally hunted and captured (Yiming & Wilcove 2005). 
Qualitative or ethnographic interviews were conducted with individuals living in the border 
provinces of Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan in rural southern and southwestern China. The 
ethnographic survey methods consisted of (i) targeted interviews (see section 2.6.1), (ii) 
observational records, and (iii) field notes (Brewer 2000). 
 
All surveys, consent forms, and protocols are included in Sections 7.11-7.14 and 7.16-7.23 in both 
English and Chinese. 
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2.6.1 Ethnographic Interviews 
Targeted, in-depth ethnographic interviews were conducted with participants in rural Southern 
China along wildlife trade routes that have been documented {Zhang, 2008 #128}. Individuals were 
required to be able to provide informed consent in order to participate. As part of the consent 
process, participants were advised of the voluntary and anonymous nature of the study, the kinds of 
questions that would be asked, the fact that the interview would be audiotaped, and that 
precautions would be taken to protect their data. 
 
In an effort to collect consistent qualitative data concerning factors relevant to zoonotic disease 
spillover, standardised qualitative and quantitative methods were first developed and pilot tested in 
live animal markets and abattoirs in New York USA. The methods were designed to provide a 
framework to gain a rapid understanding of the human-animal interactions that may lead to 
zoonotic disease spillover. Additionally, protocols and training materials were developed for 
interviewers with a range of skills and familiarity with social science methodology. 
 
Five core themes were developed to guide the ethnographic interviews: 1) human movement, 2) 
socioeconomics, 3) biosecurity in human environments, 4) illness, medical care/treatment and 
death, and 5) human animal contact (See Section 7.15). An ethnographic interview guide was 
developed with examples of questions that could be asked around each theme. A 2.5-day qualitative 
research training workshop for interviewers was developed that covered observational research 
methods, ethnographic interviews, and preliminary analysis. All interviewers attended the training 
workshop. Workshop sessions included abstracting or creating appropriate thematic questions as 
well as conducting, recording, reviewing, and discussing practice interviews. In addition, field based 
participant-observation was ongoing throughout the study and involved site observations and 
informal conversations with people in a natural setting (Agar 1996; Spradley 2016a, b) Detailed field 
notes were maintained of all observations and discussions. 
 
Recruitment sites in each province included forested areas or preserves, wildlife farms, hunting 
areas, wildlife restaurants, live animal markets, and residential areas or farms near known bat caves 
or roosts. Participants were recruited primarily through local contacts developed as part of wildlife 
conservation and health research conducted by team members over the past decade. Contacts 
facilitated introductions and provided referrals. Time available, resources, and the aims of a study 
best determine the optimal qualitative sample size (Patton 1990; Morse 1994; Creswell 2013). To 
achieve a sample with sufficient representation of categories of interest, participants were recruited 
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using purposive sampling, which provided minimum quotas in terms of sex, age and wildlife 
exposure setting e.g., live animal market, forest preserve.  
 
Surveys were conducted throughout 2015 and early 2016 by the same 3 trained interviewers from 
regional Centres for Disease Control and Prevention in Yunnan and Guangdong Provinces as well as 
Wuhan School of Public Health personnel. Interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed verbatim, 
and then translated into English. All participants received a token gift of cooking oil valued at US$10 
in appreciation of their time. 
 
Ethnographic and qualitative surveys may have been subject to intentional or unintentional 
variations in responses. Interview target numbers were chosen so as to achieve a level of responses 
sufficient to yield either a consensus or lack of consensus for specific responses. Other types of 
questions in surveys were too subjective for this approach. 
 
2.6.2 Quantitative Research 
Risks for disease transmission and spread likely differ according to behavioural factors. In addition to 
understanding the contributions of ethnicity/cultural group, occupation, age, gender, the aim of this 
research is to understand contact with wild and domesticated animals and the factors motivating 
those behaviours, such as occupational exposure in markets or extractive industry zones, or hunting, 
preparation, consumption and other exposures to wild and domestic animal meat, in order to 
develop an evidence base for identifying appropriate interventions and messages to decrease 
exposure to emerging infections. This research aims to improve understanding of the drivers and 
host-pathogen dynamics, including which human behaviours and practices increase risk, and under 
what circumstances these behaviours facilitate spillover of zoonotic viruses. 
 
As with the qualitative survey above (Section 2.6.1), research subjects enrolled were those living, 
working, or visiting the locations where previous studies have isolated several SARS-like 
coronaviruses with potential pathogenicity to humans (Zhang et al. 2006; Ge et al. 2012; Yang et al. 
2015) and where observational studies (Section 2.4) indicate high levels of human-wildlife contact 
and expected high risk for zoonotic disease emergence. Recruitment began with visits to existing 
contacts at local CDCs. During site visits, informal discussions were held to educate, sensitise, and 
inform people about zoonotic pathogens and potential pathways for disease spread/emergence. 
Cluster sampling (See Section 2.3.4) was performed where concurrent or past sampling of animals in 
this study was conducted.  
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A full questionnaire (See Sections 7.20 and 7.21) was administered and the duration of this was 
between 20-30 minutes. Questions included addressed contact with animals, travel, health, disease, 
and hygiene. Interview locations were identified before the interviews and conducted in a quiet, 
private locations without other individuals present. 
 
2.6.3 Attitudes to Wildlife Trade Survey 
An online survey was developed and conducted to assess Chinese people’s attitudes towards wildlife 
trade in China and their awareness of whether or not any direct or indirect risk to themselves may 
be involved (See Section 7.10). The survey included questions about involvement in wildlife trade 
and awareness of health risks. Additionally, there was an informative or educative component to the 
survey. Since this was an online survey, sample size was estimated using the current, official number 
of online users of approximately 100,000,000 as provided by the China Internet Network 
Information Center (2016). Minimum sample size was calculated (Charan & Biswas 2013) at 1,500 
respondents (95%±2.5). The survey was translated into Chinese and conducted online from August 
to September 2016. 
 
2.7 Laboratory Methodology 
All laboratory work was conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese Academy of Sciences 
(http://english.whiov.cas.cn) based in Wu Chang, Wuhan, Hubei Province, China under the 
supervision and collaboration with the laboratory director Dr. Zhengli Shi. Laboratory protocols were 
tested and developed at Wuhan Institute of Virology and the Centre for Infection and Immunity at 
Columbia University in New York City USA (https://www.mailman.columbia.edu/research/center-
infection-and-immunity). 
 
2.7.1 RNA Extraction 
All RNA extraction was conducted under dedicated, sterile RNase free hoods using all efforts to 
avoid RNase contamination of samples including suitable lab coat, disposable gloves, and protective 
goggles. Field samples were removed from -80˚C freezers, sorted by sample number, and placed in 
ice baths. Using Qiagen RNeasy kit and as per the manufacturer’s instructions 
(https://www.qiagen.com/gb/resources/download.aspx?id=14e7cf6e-521a-4cf7-8cbc-
bf9f6fa33e24&lang=en) RNA was extracted from each sample type (whole blood, oral swab, and 
anal swab) and pooled by individual sampled. Briefly, 170µl was pipetted from sample cryovials and 
into 1.5mL sterile RNase free centrifuge tubes, centrifuged at 4˚C and 5,000rpm for 5 minutes, and 
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stored on ice. RNase free tubes were prepared with 5.6µl carrier RNA (Qiagen). To these 554.4µl of a 
viral lysis buffer was added along with 140µl of supernatant from samples. Samples were then 
buffered in two rounds in order to ensure complete binding of viral RNA to the QIAamp membrane 
(Qiagen) and then loaded into spin columns (Qiagen). Once RNA was bound to the QIAamp 
membrane, contaminants were washed away through the spin column in successive centrifuging. 
The final, extracted RNA was eluted with the RNase-free buffer (Qiagen) and stored in RNase-free 
1.5ml vials, labeled, and kept at -80˚C. 
 
2.7.2 RT-PCR 
Extracted and pooled RNA was reverse transcribed (RT) to cDNA using Invitrogen Superscript III One-
Step RT-PCR System with Platinum Taq DNA Polymerase 
(https://tools.thermofisher.com/content/sfs/manuals/superscriptIII_onestepRTPCR_man.pdf) 
according to manufacturer’s instructions and then sensitive and broadly reactive Polymerase Chain 
Reaction (PCR) assays were performed to screen for novel coronaviruses and paramyxoviruses using 
respectively and specially designed primer sequences for the highly conserved RNA dependent RNA 
polymerase (RdRp) gene motifs in Coronaviruses (Xu et al. 2003; de Souza Luna et al. 2007) and in 
Paramyxoviruses (Tong et al. 2008).  
 
2.7.2.1 Coronavirus cDNA Extraction and RT-PCR 
RT-PCR protocols for Coronavirus assays were developed at the Wuhan Institute of Virology 
Laboratory in China and the Center for Infection and Immunity at Columbia University in the USA 
and based upon published protocols (Guan et al. 2003; Xu et al. 2003; de Souza Luna et al. 2007) 
targeting the highly conserved RNA-dependent RNA Polymerase (RdRP) gene, which contains short 
amino acid motifs (A and C) that are 100% identical to all known coronaviruses(de Souza Luna et al. 
2007). 
 
RNA was extracted from 140μl of swab samples with QIAamp Viral RNA Mini Kit (Qiagen, Germany) 
following the manufacturer’s instructions. RNA was eluted in 60μl Qiagen buffer AVE (RNase 
free water containing 0.04% NaN3) and stored at -80˚C until RT-PCR assays were conducted. 
 
Amplification was conducted on an automated Applied Biosystems VeritiTM 96-Well Fast Thermal 
Cycler. 
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One-step RT–PCR (Invitrogen) was used with a round 1 mixture consisting of 12.5μl reaction mixture 
(dNTPs, MgSO4, and buffer solution); 1.0µl BSA (bovine serum albumin); 1.0µl of each of the two 
forward primers TTATGGGTTGGGATTATC and TGATGGGATGGGACTATC; 1.0µl of each of the two 
reverse primers TCATCACTCAGAATCATCA, TCATCAGAAAGAATCATCA; 0.5μl MgSO4; 1.0μl RNA 
polymerase inhibitor; 1μl Platinum Taq enzyme; and 5.0μl extracted RNA template. 
 
The round 1 amplification procedure comprised cycling of 30 minutes at 50°C; 2 minutes at 94°C; 10 
cycles of 15 seconds at 94˚C; 15 seconds at 62˚C (decreasing by 1˚C each cycle); 40 seconds at 68˚C; 
35 cycles of 15 seconds at 94°C, 15 seconds at 52˚C; and 40 seconds at 68˚C; with a final extension at 
68°C for 5 minutes. 
 
Round 2 mixture consisted of 34.3μl of ddH2O; 5.0μl PCR reaction buffer ((Invitrogen, Karlsruhe, 
Germany); 1μl deoxynucleoside triphosphate (dNTP); 2.5μl MgCl2; 1μl of each of the three forward 
primers CTTATGGGTTGGGATTATCCTAAGTGTGA, CTTATGGGTTGGGATTATCCCAAATGTGA, and 
TKATGGGWTGGGAYTATCCYAARTGTGA; 1μl of the reverse primer 
CACACAACACCTTCATCAGATAGAATCATCA; 0.2μl Platinum Taq DNA polymerase, and 2.0μl of DNA 
product from round 1 PCR. 
 
The round 2 amplification procedure comprised cycling of 3 minutes at 94°C; 40 cycles of 15 seconds 
at 94°C; 15 seconds at 52°C; 40 seconds at 72°C; with a final extension of 72°C for 10 minutes. 
 
SARS Coronavirus cDNA was used as a positive control and a blank (double distilled water – ddH2O) 
as the negative control throughout. No false-positive signal was observed in the negative controls. 
Laboratory procedures were designed to avoid contamination. Designated UV cabinets were used 
for each step: mix, RT-PCR step one, RT-PCR step-two.  
 
2.7.2.2 Paramyxovirus cDNA Extraction and RT-PCR 
RT-PCR protocols for broadly reactive Paramyxovirus assays were developed at the Wuhan Institute 
of Virology Laboratory in China and the Center for Infection and Immunity at Columbia University in 
the USA and based upon published protocols (Tong et al. 2008) targeting the highly conserved RNA-
dependent RNA Polymerase (RdRP) gene, which contains short amino acid motifs that are 100% 
identical in all known Paramyxoviruses (Tong et al. 2008). 
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RNA was extracted from 140μl of swab samples with QIA amp Viral RNA Mini Kit (Qiagen, Germany) 
following the manufacturer’s instructions. RNA was eluted in 60μl Qiagen buffer AVE (RNase 
free water containing 0.04% NaN3) and stored at -80˚C until RT-PCR assays were conducted. 
 
Amplification was conducted on an automated Applied Biosystems VeritiTM 96-Well Fast Thermal 
Cycler. 
 
One-step RT–PCR (Invitrogen) was used with a round 1 mixture consisting of 12.5μl reaction mixture 
(dNTPs, MgSO4, and buffer solution); 1μl Bovine Serum Albumin (BSA); 2.3μl of forward primer 
GAAGGITATTGTCAIAARNTNTGGAC; 2.3μl of reverse primer GCTGAAGTTACIGGITCICCDATRTTNC; 
0.4μl MgSO4; 0.5μl RNA polymerase inhibitor; 1.0μl Invitrogen Superscript IV/Platinum Taq Enzyme; 
and 5.0μl extracted RNA template. 
 
The round 1 amplification procedure comprised cycling at 1 minutes at 60˚C; 30 minutes at 50°C; 2 
minutes at 94°C; 40 cycles of 15 seconds at 94°C, 30 seconds at 50°C, and 50 seconds at 68°C; with a 
final extension of 72˚C for 10 minutes. 
 
Round 2 mixture consisted of 29.8μl of ddH2O; 5.0μl PCR reaction buffer (Invitrogen, Karlsruhe, 
Germany); 1.0μl deoxynucleoside triphosphate (dNTP); 2.0μl MgCl2; 5.0μl of forward primer 
GTTGCTTCAATGGTTCARGGNGAYAA; 5.0μl reverse primer GCTGAAGTTACIGGITCICCDATRTTNC, 0.2μl 
Platinum Taq DNA polymerase; and 2.0μl DNA product from Round 1 PCR. 
 
The round 2 amplification procedure comprised cycling at 3 minutes at 94°C; 40 cycles of 15 seconds 
at 94°C, 30 seconds starting at 50°C, 40 seconds at 72°C; with a final extension of 72°C for 7 minutes. 
 
Paramyxovirus cDNA was used as a positive control and a blank as the negative control (double 
distilled water – ddH2O) throughout. No false-positive signal was observed in the negative controls. 
Laboratory procedures were designed to avoid contamination. Designated UV cabinets were used 
for each step: mix, RT-PCR step one, RT-PCR step-two.  
 
2.7.3 Gel Electrophoresis, DNA Extraction, and Sequencing 
PCR products were size fractionated by electrophoresis on gel moulds comprised of 1% agarose gel, 
ethidium bromide, and TAE buffer. Bands of gene fragments of 450 base pairs for Coronaviruses and 
561 base pairs for Paramyxoviruses were removed from the gel and DNA was extracted using Omega 
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Bio-Tek E.Z.N.A. Gel Extraction Kit. Purity of the samples was confirmed by running another gel with 
6μl of extracted DNA and if confirmed, the DNA was sequenced commercially using ABI 3730 PRISM 
Big Dye Terminator 1.1 Cycle Sequencing kits (Life Technologies, Carlsbad, CA, USA) at the Genomic 
Sequencing Commercial Facility of the Biological Engineering Co., Ltd., Wuhan, China. 
 
DNA barcoding was used to confirm field species identification for positive samples. DNeasy Blood 
and Tissue Kit (Qiagen) was used to extract DNA from field samples. Extracted DNA was amplified 
using QIAGEN Fast Cycling PCR Kit according to manufacturer’s instructions and then Polymerase 
Chain Reaction (PCR) assays were performed to amplify bat cytochrome b gene sequences. Forward 
primer GTHACHGCYCAYGCHTTYGTAATAAT and reverse primer CTCCWGCRTGDGCWAGRTTTCC were 
used. Amplification was conducted on an automated Applied Biosystems VeritiTM 96-Well Fast 
Thermal Cycler. PCR cycling was as follows: 10 minutes at 95°C followed by 38 cycles of 60s at 95°C, 
30s at 60°C, and 30s at 72°C with a final extension step of 10 minutes at 72°C. DNA products were 
visualised on 2% agarose gels and extracted and sequenced using the same methods as described 
for RT-PCR above. 
 
2.8 Wildlife Trade Analysis Methodology 
Data were acquired from multiple sources including (a) personal observations in wet markets and 
farms in southern China; (b) the China TRAFFIC data base (http://www.trafficchina.org) of reports of 
wildlife trade confiscations, (c) peer-reviewed published reports on wildlife trade in the region (See 
Chapter 5), (d) direct market observations by trained field team members, and (e) a viral-
mammalian cross-referenced database (Olival et al. 2017). The collected data were statistically 
analysed by Wizard 1.9.2 and Microsoft Office Excel 15.29.1. Standard statistical analyses were used 
to summarise the respondents’ data. 
 
2.9 Viral Sequences 
To assess the phylogenetic relationship of coronaviruses and paramyxoviruses identified in this 
study, full and representative nucleotide reference sequences of known viral species were 
downloaded from National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) GenBank 
(https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genbank/). Nucleotide sequences were then aligned and translated 
by using Geneious 10 (Kearse et al. 2012). The best-fit model of the phylogenetic relationship was 
determined using CIPRES (https://www.phylo.org) {Miller, 2010 #1087} and Maximum Likelihood 
phylogenetic trees were constructed with both reference and outgroup sequences using 1,000 
bootstrap replicates using PhyML with Smart Model Selection (Guindon & Gascuel 2003). 
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Correlations between both geographic locations and variation in genetic polymorphisms within and 
between populations (Fst) were calculated using Microsoft Office Excel Version 15.29.1. 
 
2.10 Statistical and Risk Analyses 
Quantitative data from human behavioural surveys were analysed for statistical significance using 
Chi-Squared test and Fisher’s exact test to show association between categorical variables based 
upon gender, age, or education and behaviours listed in the questionnaires; i.e. eating or hunting 
wild animals. Using R software package (R Core Team 2016) and within the context of disease spill-
over or emergence, data were classified and analysed to generate heat maps of highest risk animals, 
viruses, activities, and geographic locations (See Chapter 5). 
 
2.11 Coding of Ethnographic Surveys 
A thematic analysis framework was used to code and analyse the data from the human ethnographic 
interviews (Braun and Clarke 2006). Individual interviews and field notes were analysed to allow 
complete familiarity with the data set in its entirety and to confirm narrative consistency within 
individual interviews. The process of coding relied on the specific themes such as Human Movement, 
Socioeconomics, Human-animal Contact (See Section 7.15). Themes were further subdivided into 
topics (Human Movement -> Home, Work, Travel, Observed Environment) for coding. These 
subdivisions or codes allowed for a directed and consistent coverage of the domains that were the 
focus of the ethnographic interviews. Qualitative data were used to develop additional theoretical 
categories or typologies and develop the quantitative questionnaire. Central to the qualitative 
analysis was an assessment of the individual perceptions, knowledge, and participation in the 
wildlife trade as well as observed changes over time (such as agricultural expansion, urbanisation, 
etc.). The data were coded for factors associated with wildlife consumption, the socioeconomic 
drivers of the local wildlife trade, conservation and legal efforts, the prevalence and types of wildlife 
observed, and wildlife exposures that could transmit disease to humans. 
 
All coding and qualitative data analyses and abstraction of quotes were performed using Quirkos 
(2017), Microsoft Word, and Excel (2016). 
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3 Coronaviruses and Paramyxoviruses in Chinese Wildlife 
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3.1 Introduction 
Several viruses have recently spilled over from wildlife reservoir hosts to become pandemic with 
significant global health and economic impacts, including Human immunodeficiency viruses (HIV-1 
and HIV-2), Zaire ebolavirus in West Africa, and Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 
(SARS-CoV) (Keogh-Brown & Smith 2008; Gire et al. 2014; Katz et al. 2014). Outbreaks of novel 
zoonoses are usually infrequent events that have been, so far, difficult to predict (Murphy 1998). A 
better understanding of how zoonotic viruses and their hosts interact may aid in predicting and 
preventing emergence or future pandemics. However, the complexity of their ecosystems and the 
rapidity with which they are changing presents a challenge, because these changes have been 
causally linked to disease emergence (Morse et al. 2012). Understanding of the viral-host system 
dynamics can take years, decades, or even longer, because of challenges in collecting field data to 
estimate host abundance, distribution, and infection status, and because our understanding of the 
mechanisms of zoonotic spillover is rudimentary (Morse et al. 2012; Daszak et al. 2013; Pike et al. 
2014). Additionally, the requisite laboratory analyses are expensive, and for viruses that have low 
prevalence, they yield few results per assays or effort expended (Anthony et al. 2013). 
Consequently, the ecology of many emerging zoonoses still is poorly understood and this hinders the 
prediction and prevention efforts to mitigate outbreaks (Karesh et al. 2012; Morse et al. 2012; 
Daszak et al. 2013; Murray et al. 2015a). 
 
Recent studies suggest that the risk of zoonotic emergence increases with factors such as livestock 
production intensity, land use change, and size of wildlife markets (See Figure 3), and that these are 
related to landscapes such as when forested areas are urbanised or changed to intensive livestock 
production (Patz et al. 2004; Wolfe et al. 2005; Gottdenker et al. 2011). In 2003, SARS-CoV spilled 
over from bat reservoirs in live animal markets of southern China and rapidly spread globally 
becoming pandemic (Li et al. 2005). This was likely driven by the volume and proximity of diverse 
mammal species as well as poor sanitary and biosecurity practices particularly in handling and 
butchering animals (Ka-Wai Hui 2006). In these markets, SARS-CoV and spread to humans and 
several other vertebrate species including Raccoon dogs (Nyctereutes procyonoides), Civets (Paguma 
larvata), and Ferret badgers (Melogale moschata) (Guan et al. 2003). Since the SARS-CoV outbreak, 
many SARS-like Coronaviruses (SL-CoVs) have been discovered in bats in southeast Asia including a 
SL-CoV capable of binding to human cells (Ge et al. 2013). 
 
The emergence of many zoonotic diseases has been associated with contact and the consumption of 
infected animals as part of traditional hunting practices (Leroy et al. 2004). Human contact with 
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animals is thought to be responsible for the spread of Ebola virus disease in west Africa (Gire et al. 
2014). Without information about a reservoir species and associated viruses, efforts towards 
preventing emergence cannot be effectively targeted (Morse et al. 2012). 
 
Around 60% of emerging infectious diseases are zoonotic in origin (Taylor et al. 2001; Jones et al. 
2008) and most of these emerge from mammals (Woolhouse & Gowtage-Sequeria 2005). Bats and 
rodents are the most speciose of mammals and present on every continent excluding Antarctica 
(Wilson & Reeder 2005). Some bat and rodent species are commensal in the sense that they exploit 
human dwellings, constructs, and food resources, leading to direct and indirect contact amongst 
humans, domestic animals and rodents and bats (Reperant & Osterhaus 2014). Rodents harbour 
diverse zoonotic pathogens, and their close contact with people and livestock make them a 
significant health risk for humans (Mills 2006). Viral surveys to date have identified around 85 viral 
species from rodents, almost three times as many as have been identified in bats (Luis et al. 2013; 
Han et al. 2016a). 
 
3.2 Bat and Rodent Reservoirs of Zoonotic Viruses 
Recent evidence shows that bat species from Africa to Asia are reservoirs of filoviruses including 
Ebola viruses and Marburg virus, as well as other uncharacterised filoviruses (Han et al. 2016b). 
Filoviruses have been discovered in bats in southwestern China (Yuan et al. 2012; He et al. 2015). 
Other viruses with pathogenic potential for humans such as Adenoviruses (Li et al. 2010) and 
Henipaviruses (Li et al. 2008) have been discovered in Chinese bats. Other studies have shown that 
diverse Paramyxoviruses are found in Chinese bats and in rodents (Magoffin et al. 2007; Li et al. 
2008; Lau et al. 2010b; Wu et al. 2014b; Yuan et al. 2014). 
 
Bats are reservoirs of many recently emerged and significant zoonotic viral pathogens such as Ebola 
and Marburg viruses, SARS-CoV, Middle East respiratory syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV), Nipah 
and Hendra viruses (Brierley et al. 2016; Zhou et al. 2016b). Recent evidence suggests bats are 
reservoir hosts to a disproportionately high number of zoonotic viruses (Olival et al. 2017). This may 
be a result of the interplay of both intrinsic (bat and viral ecologies) and extrinsic (anthropogenic) 
factors leading to zoonotic emergence (Han et al. 2016a; Olival et al. 2017). This chapter will 
examine whether Coronaviruses and Paramyxoviruses circulating in bat and rodent wildlife 
reservoirs are potential sources for zoonotic emergence in South China. 
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Bats in China inhabit a wide range of ecosystems, and while many roost in large colonies in caves 
and trees, some tolerate human activities and roost in buildings and other human structures (Nowak 
1994; Hutson et al. 2001; Smith et al. 2010a). Other species are distributed across natural and 
anthropogenically dominated environments (Nowak 1994; Epstein et al. 2009; Hahn et al. 2014a; 
Hahn et al. 2014b). Frugivorous bats forage for fruit or flowers from a variety of sources including 
commercially cultivated fruit trees, which may heighten the likelihood of viral spillover to people. In 
Bangladesh bat reservoirs of Nipah virus regularly feed at palm sap collection sites and contaminate 
collection vessels leading to Nipah virus spillover (Khan et al. 2010). Direct human-bat contact may 
be incidental and indirect. For example, bats that roost in buildings sometimes enter living areas and 
attempts to catch and remove them may result in accidental scratches or bites, which is a common 
mechanism for Rabies and other bat Lyssaviruses to directly infect humans (McCall et al. 2000; De 
Serres et al. 2008). Exposure to bat urine, faeces, and saliva is thought to be the mechanism of viral 
spillover from bats to humans or other animals (Leroy et al. 2005; Luby et al. 2006; Field et al. 2007; 
Towner et al. 2009; Halpin et al. 2011; Openshaw et al. 2015). 
 
Like bats, rodents in China also are found across varied ecosystems (Wilson & Reeder 2005; Smith et 
al. 2010a). Some rodent species (Rattus rattus and Rattus norvegicus) are commensal and have been 
the cause of much human morbidity and mortality including Plague, Hantaviruses, and other 
pathogens (Meerburg et al. 2009; Blasdell et al. 2011; Goeijenbier et al. 2013; Morand et al. 2015; 
Van Cuong et al. 2015). 
 
In Asia, direct human contact with wild animals occurs due to hunting and consumption of rodents 
and bats, which has long been, and still is, a common practice in countries in these regions 
(Mickleburgh et al. 2009; Ripple et al. 2016). In southern China large animal markets, the wildlife 
trade, and largescale consumption of wildlife as food create unique opportunities for zoonotic 
emergence as diverse wild animals such as bats, rodents, and civets come into novel or increasing 
contact with each other, domestic animals, and humans (Morse 1995; Karesh et al. 2005; Lau et al. 
2005). Both volume and frequency of the transportation of wildlife from their respective sources in 
the wild to markets, abattoirs, and restaurants, along animal value chains, are potential and likely 
drivers for viral spillover events (Johnson et al. 2015). 
 
3.3 Coronaviruses 
The Coronaviridae is a family of spherical non-segmented positive single strand RNA viruses from the 
order Nidovirales (ICTV 2017b). With genomes of about 30 kilobases in length, these are among the 
 
46 
largest and most complex of the RNA viruses yet discovered and are found in a wide range of animal 
species such as domestic animals, some bird species, rodents, whales, bats, and humans (Siddell et 
al. 1983). In humans, most coronaviruses are respiratory pathogens causing laryngitis (e.g. HCoV-
229E, HCoV-OC43, and HCoV-HKU1) and croup (HCoV-NL63) (Fehr & Perlman 2015). Prior to 2002 
and the emergence of SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV, only two human coronaviruses (HCoVs) had been 
characterised (HCoV- 229E and HCoV-OC43) (Fehr & Perlman 2015). Since then, two more human 
coronaviruses HCoV-NL63 (van der Hoek et al. 2004) and HCoV-HKU1 (Woo et al. 2005) were 
identified in individuals with respiratory infections. These human coronaviruses may account for up 
to 30% of respiratory infections in the general population (Fouchier et al. 2004; Holmes & Rambaut 
2004). Animal and human coronaviruses have been classified into the subfamily Coronavirinae 
(Figure 9) with four genera based on their antigenicity (Rota et al. 2003; Mihindukulasuriya et al. 
2008): 
 
• Alphacoronavirus: containing HCoV- 229E, bat, porcine, feline, and canine coronaviruses 
• Betacoronavirus: with four lineages (A-D) and including SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, HCoV-OC43, 
HCoV-HKU1 containing human, bat, murine, bovine, and camel CoVs 
• Deltacoronavirus: containing avian and porcine CoVs 
• Gammacoronavirus: containing avian and cetacean CoVs  
 
Coronaviruses have been shown experimentally and in nature to undergo genetic recombination by 
a genomic template-switching mechanism and to generate genetic point mutations at a rate similar 
to that of other RNA viruses including influenza A viruses, which suggests that there may be frequent 
host switching and zoonotic transmission (Tsunemitsu et al. 1995; Saif 2004). A large number of 
novel CoVs have been discovered in bat species in both the Old and New World (Dominguez et al. 
2007; Müller et al. 2007; Donaldson et al. 2010; Quan et al. 2010; Rihtaric et al. 2010; 
Wacharapluesadee et al. 2015).
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3.3.1 Alphacoronaviruses 
Alphacoronaviruses infect various mammal species including humans, pigs, cats, and bats (Pedersen 
et al. 1984; Kusanagi et al. 1992; van der Hoek et al. 2004; Chu et al. 2008). Among the 11 currently 
established species within the genus Alphacoronavirus, four have been identified in Chinese 
insectivorous bats: Miniopterus bat coronavirus 1, Miniopterus bat coronavirus HKU8, Scotophilus 
bat coronavirus 512, and Rhinolophus bat coronavirus HKU2 (Tang et al. 2006; Lau et al. 2007; Chu et 
al. 2008). The first bat Alphacoronavirus designated bat CoV 1 was reported from three different 
Miniopterus bat species found in Hong Kong (Poon et al. 2005). The high prevalence rate (63%) of 
the virus in Miniopterus pusillus suggests that it might be a commonly circulating CoV in this species 
(Poon et al. 2005). In two subsequent studies of Hong Kong bats, four distinct Alphacoronaviruses 
(CoV 1A, 1B, HKU7, and HKU8) were found in Miniopterus sp. These viruses were demonstrated to 
be closely related genetically and derived from a common ancestor (Chu 2006; Woo et al. 2006b). 
Co-infections of bat CoV 1B and HKU8 were observed in Miniopterus pusillus (Chu et al. 2008). The 
presence of genetically diverse but related Alphacoronaviruses in Miniopterus sp. bats within a 
relatively small geographical region suggested that Alphacoronaviruses had adapted to this bat 
genus for a long time (Chu 2006). Bats of Myotis, Scotophilus, and Rhinolophus genera in China have 
been shown to harbour Alphacoronaviruses (Tang et al. 2006; Woo et al. 2006b; He et al. 2014).  
 
Alphacoronaviruses discovered in Miniopterus fuliginosus in Japan show a close relationship to those 
from Miniopterus magnater in Hong Kong (Shirato et al. 2012). In the Philippines, two 
Alphacoronaviruses were found in Scotophilus khulii and Hipposideros diadema with high nucleotide 
sequence identities (95% and 80% respectively) to the strains previously described in China 
(Watanabe 2010; Tsuda et al. 2012). In Spain, France, and Germany, a number of 
Alphacoronaviruses with a wide diversity and distribution were reported from multiple bat species 
including Myotis sp., Pipistrellus sp. and Nyctalus lasiopterus (Gloza-Rausch et al. 2008; Falcon et al. 
2011; Goffard et al. 2015). Some European bat Alphacoronaviruses are related to those found in Asia 
while others are distinct and clustered in new monophyletic clades (Gloza-Rausch et al. 2008; 
Drexler 2011; Falcon et al. 2011). A great diversity of bat Alphacoronavirus is also present in Africa. 
Alphacoronaviruses (Miniopterus bat coronavirus 1, BtKY22, BtKY41, and BtKY43) were identified 
from Chaerephon sp. and Cardioderma sp. bats in Kenya (Tao et al. 2012). In North America, 
Alphacoronaviruses were found in Eptesicus fuscus and Myotis occultus bats with significant 
dissimilarity from Alphacoronaviruses of Asian bats (Dominguez et al. 2007). More recently, a novel 
Alphacoronavirus was discovered in guano of New Zealand Mystacina tuberculata bats with 80% 
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nucleotide identity to bat CoV HKU8 and despite the geographic and evolutionary isolation of the 
host species, the virus had not diverged significantly from Chinese bat Alphacoronaviruses (Hall et al. 
2014). Although some studies suggest host species restriction of bat Alphacoronavirus, different bat 
species from the same colony have been shown to harbor Alphacoronaviruses of the same genetic 
lineage, which indicates some complexity of the ecology of this viral genus in bats (Tang et al. 2006; 
Falcon et al. 2011). The first evidence for interspecies transmission of Alphacoronavirus (CoV HKU10) 
between different suborders of bats (Rhinolophus leschenaulti to Hipposideros pomona) has recently 
been described (Lau et al. 2012). 
 
There have been reports of bat Alphacoronaviruses closely related to human pathogenic 
coronaviruses. An Alphacoronavirus was detected in Hipposideros caffer ruber bats in Ghana with 
92% nucleotide identity to HCoV 229E and predicted to share a common ancestor only 200 years ago 
(Pfefferle et al. 2009). Another bat Alphacoronavirus discovered in North American tricolored bats 
(Perimyotis subflavus) was also predicted to share common ancestry with HCoV NL63 (Huynh et al. 
2012). 
 
3.3.2 Betacoronaviruses and other Coronaviruses 
Compared with bat Alphacoronaviruses, bat Betacoronaviruses have been identified from fewer 
host species and show lower genetic diversity (He et al. 2014). Bat Betacoronaviruses are distributed 
among three of the four betacoronavirus lineages. Betacoronavirus lineage B contains diverse bat 
SARS-like coronaviruses while lineage C Betacoronaviruses include diverse MERS-related 
coronaviruses that have been identified in bats. The other bat-associated Betacoronavirus species, 
Rousettus bat coronavirus HKU9, was first discovered in bats in China in Rousettus leschenaultii in 
Guangdong Province (Woo et al. 2012a) as well as in Hipposideros sp. from Yunnan Province (Ge et 
al. 2012). Although not as abundant or diverse as bat Alphacoronaviruses, bat Betacoronaviruses are 
of special importance, since they include SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, and other as yet unknown zoonotic 
viruses that may threaten human health (Hu et al. 2015). The huge diversity of Alphacoronaviruses 
and Betacoronaviruses in bats supports the hypothesis that bats as ideal hosts fuel the evolution and 
dissemination of these two genera (Woo et al. 2012a). Currently, the sole recoded bat Gammavirus 
(PgCoV-4) was discovered in a bat (Pteropus giganteus) in Bangladesh (Anthony et al. 2013).  
 
3.4 Paramyxoviruses 
The Paramyxoviridae is a family of negative single strand RNA viruses of the order Mononegavirales 
with genomes between 15-19 kilobases in length (ICTV 2017a). Paramyxoviridae or Paramyxoviruses 
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comprise 7 genera: Aquaparamyxovirus; Avulavirus; Ferlavirus; Henipavirus; Morbillivirus; 
Respirovirus; and Rubulavirus (Figure 10). Less than 20 years ago only three genera had been 
described in this family (Enders 1996). Paramyxoviruses that have recently been discovered such as 
Beilong virus (Li et al. 2006), J virus (Jun et al. 1977), Mossman virus (Miller et al. 2003), Tailam virus 
(Woo et al. 2011), and Tupaia virus (Tidona et al. 1999) are not yet classified within any of these 
seven genera. All have been isolated from wild animals. Novel Paramyxoviruses are still being 
discovered and an additional genus (Jeilongvirus) proposed to the International Committee on 
Taxonomy of Viruses (ICTV) may incorporate some of these as yet unclassified Paramyxoviruses 
(Kurth et al. 2012; Woo et al. 2016). 
 
Horizontal transmission from one conspecific to another via viral particles in faeces, urine, or saliva 
seems to be the main mechanism of Paramyxovirus infection and the likely means of zoonotic 
spillover (Plowright et al. 2008). 
 
Paramyxoviruses have been discovered in a broad range of species and they exhibit high viral 
diversity, which may increase the likelihood of their spillover to people because there is a greater 
chance of some of these diverse lineages having receptor binding domains able to bind to human 
cells (Anderson & Wang 2011; Johnson et al. 2015). Newcastle disease virus (genus Avulavirus) 
primarily affecting poultry and other birds and Rinderpest virus (genus Morbillivirus) affecting cattle 
and other grazing animals (and now eradicated in the wild) are both pathogenic with high rates of 
mortality in domestic and wild animals (Alexander 2001; Morens et al. 2011; Roeder et al. 2013). 
Some Paramyxoviruses such as measles (genus Morbillivirus), mumps (genus Rubulavirus), and 
human parainfluenza viruses (genus Respirovirus) have high rates of human morbidity (Drexler et al. 
2012). Aquaparamyxovirus and Ferlavirus (Woo et al. 2014) genera contain viruses affecting salmon 
and reptiles respectively. 
 
Emerging zoonotic Paramyxoviruses such as Nipah virus and Hendra virus in the Henipavirus genus 
pose significant burdens to livestock and human health, with mortality rates of 40% and higher in 
humans during outbreaks or spillover events in Australia and Asia (Marsh & Wang 2012). These two 
viruses have been shown to originate in bats (Halpin et al. 2000; Chua et al. 2002b). Viruses similar 
to Nipah virus have been identified in other bat species in Australia, Asia, and African (Olson et al. 
2002; Sendow et al. 2006; Halpin et al. 2011; Drexler et al. 2012; Hasebe et al. 2012; Pernet et al. 
2014). Paramyxoviruses such as Hendra virus and Nipah virus are of concern to human and domestic 
animal health because they have repeatedly emerged from wildlife reservoirs (Han et al. 2015). In 
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Bangladesh, there is growing evidence that Nipah virus can be transmitted person-to-person (Luby 
et al. 2009a; Luby et al. 2009b). Elucidating the ecology of these zoonoses is crucial in order to 
develop targeted prevention programs. Given the right conditions, these viruses or as yet unknown 
Paramyxoviruses may emerge and result in a large epidemic or like SARS-CoV quickly spread globally 
and become pandemic. A diversity of Paramyxoviruses has already been identified in China, 
predominantly in bats, but also in rodents, birds, and even cats (Li et al. 2006; Li et al. 2008; Shi et al. 
2008; Lau et al. 2010b; Wu et al. 2014b; Yuan et al. 2014; Awu et al. 2015). The research reported in 
this chapter aims to identify novel Coronaviruses and Paramyxoviruses in Chinese bats and rodents. 
Using sequence data from these and other described species of these viruses, the hypothesis that 
some of these diverse viruses are closely related or even ancestral to known Coronaviruses and 
Paramyxoviruses of concern to human and animal health may be tested. 
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3.5 Methods 
The field collection period for this study was between April 2009 and September 2015. Pilot surveys 
were conducted from 2008 to 2010 across China. Based upon initial surveys and results from other 
assays for Coronaviruses and Paramyxoviruses in bats and rodents in China (Li et al. 2008; Shi et al. 
2008; Lau et al. 2010b; Ge et al. 2013; Ge et al. 2016a), field survey efforts were focused along 
wildlife trade pathways (Figure 3) particularly in Yunnan, Guangxi, Guangdong, and Hainan provinces 
(Figure 11).  
 
 
 
Figure 11. Map of China with sampling locations. The 20 provinces, autonomous regions, or national central cities are 
indicated where bats and rodents were sampled from 2009 to 2015. The four green shaded provinces (Yunnan, Guangxi, 
Guangdong, and Hainan) were where 70.2% of samples were collected along the wildlife trade pathway in southern China. 
The fewest samples were collected in Ningxia (17) and Gansu (12) in the north and Hunan (4) in the south. Bats sampled in 
13 regions (65%) yielded samples positive for Paramyxoviruses. 
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Sampling sites were then identified based on the available information about bat roosts; bat and 
rodent proximity to human activities; human interactions with wildlife; and field observations of 
flying and foraging bats. The project sites were selected where both bat populations were found to 
exist and previously screened positive for viruses in this study (Table 3). Sites for rodents (Table 4) 
were selected based upon previous studies demonstrating Paramyxoviruses (Li et al. 2006) and 
other viruses circulating in these animal populations in southern China (Lei et al. 2007; Blasdell et al. 
2011; Zhang et al. 2011). Sites for bats were selected with the same methodology (Table 3) (Li et al. 
2008; Lau et al. 2010b). Field sites for rodents and bats included a total of 26 villages. 27 caves, 8 
public parks or university campuses, 1 market, 4 bridges (bats roost beneath), and 5 wild-animal 
farms (rodents). Twelve locations (all caves) were relatively inaccessible to people and domestic 
animals. All other (non-cave) locations (59) had varying levels of humans and domestic animals 
present. Repeated sampling efforts were conducted between April and October each year. A total of 
3,705 individual animals (3,146 bats) and (559 rodents) were sampled. All bats were sampled in 
locations ranging from undisturbed, forested habitat (caves) to urban environments (parks and 
university campuses). Sampling trips lasted a maximum of four weeks. No more than 30 individuals 
were sampled per each 24-hour sampling period. The sampling protocols of animals in this study 
were approved by Tufts University Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (USA) and the 
Animal Ethics Committee of the Wuhan Institute of Virology (China) (See Section 7.1). 
 
Field team support was provided through agreements between EcoHealth Alliance, Inc. and the 
following Chinese Institutions: East China Normal University Joint Institute for Zoonoses and Wildlife 
in Shanghai; the Yunnan Center for Disease Control and Prevention in Dali; and the Guangdong 
Entomological Institute based in Guangzhou. To capture bats, field teams used a single mist net, 
series of mist nets, or a telescoping hand or fish net depending upon location and accessibility of 
roosting site. Hand nets were used in the caves and human dwellings. Mist nets were used in roosts 
or locations where bats were foraging or otherwise difficult to catch by hand. Free-ranging bats were 
captured either while roosting or at crepuscular times when returning or exiting roosts. Following 
capture, bats were placed in clean, porous, unbleached, and undyed cotton bags, sealed with a 
drawstring, and hung from a branch or post until all samples were collected. Bats were held for a 
maximum of four hours and immediately released on site following sample collection. 
 
Free-ranging rodents were captured with standard procedures as described by Mills et al. (1995) 
using small (7.62 x 8.89 x 22.86 cm), perforated, folding, aluminium Sherman traps (H. B. Sherman 
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Table 3. Bat sampling locations. Bats sampled in 20 provinces, autonomous regions, or national central cities in China from 
2009 to 2015.
Province and Sampling Location No. Sampled Latitude Longitude 
Anhui 45     
Jade Dragon Cave, Qingyang County  42 30.3419 117.836 
Zuyun Village, Sanxi Town, Jing County  3 30.4464 118.413 
Beijing 66     
Bat Cave, Xiayunling Town, Fangshan District 36 39.7380 115.724 
Sihe Village, Fangshan 30 39.7380 115.724 
Fujian 98     
Qixian Cave, Fukou town, Sha County, Sanming City 14 26.4197 117.655 
Rong Cave, Laiyuan town, Longyan City 43 26.4196 117.655 
Yinghua Cave, Jiangle County, Sanming City 41 26.6553 117.576 
Gansu 12     
Pingliang County 12 35.5356 106.698 
Guangdong 616     
Shuili and Wendao Caves, Nanling Natural Reserve, Shaoguan City 162 24.9287 113.016 
Banshan Cave, Dongkeng Village, Chengjia Town, Yangshan County 121 24.6500 112.750 
Biluo Cave, Yingde County 45 24.1158 113.353 
Kuang and Lutian Caves, Chenjia, Yangshan County 77 24.7749 112.831 
Paishui Yanaian Qiao Caves, Ruyuan County 50 24.9308 113.084 
Shanxin and Shitazi Caves, Tianjingshan, Nanling Natural Reserve 59 24.7302 112.999 
Huidong and Zhuao Bridge, Qiao Island, Zhuhai 102 22.434 113.649 
Guangxi 184     
Bawang, Gaoxiang, Liming Viliege, Longzhou County, Chongzuo City 70 22.3847 106.762 
Bidi Cave, Guilin City 9 25.2901 110.388 
Fenkeng Cave, Guilin City 10 25.2855 110.386 
Jishui Cave, yaoshan Town, Guilin City 50 25.2817 110.388 
Kuang Cave, Hezhou City 37 24.4991 113.552 
Lipu Village Near Farm A 8 24.4646 110.405 
Guizhou 58     
Feilongdong, Xingyi Town 58 27.7166 109.183 
Hainan 871     
Helai and Jiacha Villages, Qiongzhong County 68 18.9974 109.677 
Longhe Town, Dingan County  8 19.3829 110.219 
Luqiao Cave, Chenpo, Qiongzhong County 44 18.8976 110.015 
Nanxi Cave and Power Station Diaoluo Shan, Lingshui 210 18.6700 109.929 
Shibian Village, Fengguoshan, and Maogan Baoting County 215 18.6352 109.705 
Shikuang, Changzheng, and Mengqianling, Qiongzhong County 58 19.0830 109.552 
Xianren Cave, Wenling, Dafeng, and Lingshan, Haikou 155 19.9480 110.259 
Yinggeng Town and Park Qiongzhong 113 19.0500 109.830 
Hebei 48     
Heilong Cave, Suobao Village, Suobao Town, She County 35 36.6613 113.602 
Lianhua Cave, Jingyu Village, Huoshui Town,Wuan City 13 36.8370 113.914 
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Table 3. Bat Sampling Locations (continued). 
Province and Sampling Location No. Sampled Latitude Longitude 
Henan 41     
Shengxian Cave, Donggou Village, Yingyang City 20 34.6301 113.263 
Yunhua Cave, Xixia County 21 33.3133 111.427 
Hubei 72     
Meikuang Cave, Tiangou Village, Zhushan County, Shiyan City 33 32.4258 110.150 
Yeren Cave, Fang County, Shiyan Ctiy 39 31.9190 110.732 
Hunan 4     
Jiangjundong, Xinqiao Town, Zhangjia Jie 4 29.1705 111.487 
Jiangsu 44     
Linggu Cave, Yixing City 44 31.2225 119.740 
Jiangxi 89     
Longhu Shan, Yingtan City 66 28.0964 116.970 
Yingtan City, Jiefangdong 23 26.1121 116.988 
Ningxia 17     
Haikou Village, Gucheng Town, Pengyang County 2 35.8413 106.354 
Plaza of Wang Luobin, Liupan Town, Longde County 15 35.6904 106.233 
Shaanxi 133     
Daluping Village, Wuming Town, Anzhong County 6 33.0320 107.313 
Shanhuai Village, Yangdi Town, Shanyang County  11 33.3312 109.758 
Xiaozhang Village, Bin County 26 35.0580 108.096 
Yulongdong, Huaping Village, Zhenoing Town, Ankang County 44 31.7504 109.384 
Zhashui Rongdong Fengdong, Zhashui Village, Shangluo County 46 33.6174 109.159 
Shandong 49     
Chaoyang Cave, Laiwu City, Shandong Province 23 36.1217 117.666 
Kuzi Cave, Xiaoshankou Village, Liancheng Town, Menglian County 26 35.7281 117.839 
Sichuan 119     
Bridge in Leshan County 48 29.4335 103.861 
Longdong Bridge, Emeishan County, 15 29.5876 103.861 
Machongkou, Zigong County, Sichuan 39 29.3773 104.771 
Wutong Qiao, Leshan, Zigong 17 29.4337 103.862 
Yunnan 539     
Huize Town, Qujing 5 25.4997 103.694 
Jinning Cave, Kunming 75 24.7025 102.575 
Natural Bridge of Xianggelila 59 27.7998 99.8455 
Tropical Botanic Garden at Menglun of Xishuangbanna 84 21.6830 101.417 
Xianrendong, Longlin Town 24 24.3571 99.036 
Yuanjiang, Xishuangbanna 247 23.3500 101.570 
Xishuangbana, Menglun Town, Pingfeng Cave and Tiansheng Qiao 45 21.9367 101.258 
Zhejiang 41     
Shihua Cave, Shiruiheqiao Town, Linan County 14 30.0948 119.097 
Tianzidilao Cave, Luojiang Village, Tonglu County 27 29.7798 119.361 
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Table 4. Rodent sampling locationssampled in four provinces or autonomous regions in China from 2010 to 2015.
Province and Sampling Location No. Sampled Latitude Longitude 
Guangdong 
   
   Wendao Cave, Gaojia Village, Ruyuan County, Shaoguan City 3 24.9421 113.105 
Guangxi 
   
   Wei Shangzheng Farm, LiPu Village, Guilin County 161 24.6160 110.465 
   Xiao Wei Farm, Lipu Village, Guilin County 66 24.5497 110.404 
   Dongwu Shichang Market, Nanning City 20 22.9177 108.355 
Hainan 
   
   Jiege cave, Lingshui County 4 18.6434 109.961 
Yunnan 
   
   Luzi Village, Huangshan Town, Yulong County, Lijiang City 144 26.7384 100.149 
   Yaping Village, Fugong County, Nujiang Prefecture 161 27.2115 98.706 
 
Traps, Inc., Tallahassee, Florida; https://www.shermantraps.com). As permitted by terrain, traps for 
free-ranging rodents were placed along transects and checked a minimum of every 6 hours. Traps 
were not set, if weather conditions were adverse, such as abrupt changes in precipitation intensity 
resulting in flash flooding or extreme heat spells. Traps were always placed beneath vegetation or in 
areas protected from direct sunshine to prevent heat stress. In areas without any vegetative or 
other cover, traps were closed between sunrise and sunset. 
 
Wild bats, rats, and farmed rodents were docile enough to permit direct, manual restraint during 
sampling. Swabs were taken from the oropharynx, urogenital tract, and rectum. Urine was collected 
opportunistically using sterile swabs to soak urine from the exterior urogenital opening during 
urination. No more than 6μL of blood to 1g of bat body weight was collected from bats and rodents 
either from the brachial or femoral artery or vein. Blood samples were centrifuged on site. 
 
Adult and subadult animals (estimated from body size) were opportunistically collected. All animals 
were identified to species visually and sexed (M/F) upon sampling. 
 
All biological samples were stored in 1.2ml internally threaded silicon O ring sealed Cryovial® storage 
cryovials. Serum was stored in cryovials without viral transport medium (VTM). All other samples 
were stored, separately in cryovials pre-loaded with VTM. All cryovials with samples were put 
immediately into dewars or dry shippers containing liquid nitrogen. Within 7-days of collection, all 
samples were transported directly to the Wuhan Institute of Virology Laboratory where they were 
rapidly catalogued and transferred to ultralow (-80°C) freezers for long-term storage and analysis. 
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All laboratory work for this research was conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, Chinese 
Academy of Sciences (english.whiov.cas.cn). RNA was extracted using Qiagen RNeasy kit and as per 
the manufacturer’s instructions at dedicated vertical fume cupboards with protection panels, airflow 
monitors, and UV light. RNA was extracted from each sample type (whole blood, oral swab, and anal 
swab) and stored in RNase-free 1.5ml vials and kept at -80˚C. Extracted RNA was pooled by animal 
and reverse transcribed (RT) to cDNA as detailed in Section 2.7.2. 
 
Coronavirus and Paramyxovirus amplification was conducted as detailed in Sections 2.7.2.1 and 
2.7.2.2. Bat RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) nucleotide sequences were compared to RdRp 
gene sequences (Table 30 and Table 28) available in the National Center for Biotechnology 
Information database (NCBI 2016) using the algorithm blastn from the standard nucleotide BLAST 
program (Altschul et al. 1990). Sequences identified in this study were then aligned with 33 and 31 
homologous reference sequences from other Paramyxoviruses and Coronaviruses respectively using 
Geneious 10 (Kearse et al. 2012). The best-fit model of the phylogenetic relationships was 
determined by constructing both Bayesian and Maximum Likelihood trees. Newcastle virus 
(Avulavirus) was used as the outgroup for Paramyxoviruses and Turkey Coronavirus for 
Coronaviruses. To generate Bayesian trees sequences were analysed by MrBayes 3.2.6 (Miller et al. 
2010) run on the Cyberinfrastructure for Phylogenetic Research server (CIPRES: 
https://www.phylo.org). Maximum Likelihood trees were constructed with 1,000 bootstrap 
replicates using PhyML 3.0 with Smart Model Selection (Guindon & Gascuel 2003) on the ATGC 
South of France Bioinformatics Platform (http://www.atgc-montpellier.fr). FigTree 1.4.3 
(tree.bio.ed.ac.uk) was used to produce the phylogenetic tree figures. 
 
Correlations between both geographic locations and variation in genetic polymorphisms of the RdRp 
gene within and between populations (the fixation index: Fst) were calculated using Microsoft Office 
Excel Version 15.29.1 and DnaSP 5.10.1 (Librado & Rozas 2009). 
 
Field species identification of positive samples was confirmed by DNA barcode and detailed in 
Section 2.7.3. Detection rate data along a latitudinal gradient and by gender were analysed with a 
chi-square analysis calculated using Microsoft Office Excel Version 15.29.1. 
 
3.6 Results 
Animals were sampled from seven bat families and four rodent families (Table 5). 
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Table 5. Rodents and Bats sampled by family. 
Rodents 559 
Cricetidae 118 
Hystricidae 39 
Muridae 194 
Spalacidae 208 
Bats 3,146 
Emballonuridae 89 
Hipposideridae 662 
Miniopteridae 323 
Molossidae 25 
Pteropodidae 147 
Rhinolophidae 807 
Vespertilionidae 1,093 
 
Individual rodents from 15 species were sampled (Table 6) including Malayan porcupines (Hystrix 
brachyura), voles (Eothenomys sp.), bamboo rats (Rhizomys sp.), rats (Rattus tanezumi and 
Niviventer sp.), field mice (Apodemus sp.), and one climbing mouse (Vernaya fulva). Of the rodents 
sampled, 250 (45%) were sourced from wild-animal farms where they (only Rhizomys sp.) were 
being raised for sale. Rodents were trapped and sampled in the wild totalled 309 (55%). No 
Rhizomys sp. were trapped in the wild. Of the rodents sampled, 543 (97.1%) were adults. Juvenile 
rodents sampled were all Rhizomys sinensis. 
 
Individual bats from all 7 known Chiroptera families in China (Table 5) were sampled (Smith et al. 
2010a). Most (92%) were from four families: Vespertilionidae, Rhinolophidae, Hipposideridae, and 
Miniopteridae. Samples were collected from 58 (48.3%) (Table 7) of the 120 known bat species in 
China (Smith et al. 2010a). 
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Table 6. Family, genus, and species for 559 rodents sampled. 
Cricetidae   
Eothenomys cachinus 92 
Eothenomys proditor 26 
Hystricidae   
Hystrix brachyura 39 
Muridae   
Apodemus chevrieri 123 
Apodemus draco 1 
Apodemus latronum 7 
Apodemus peninsulae 28 
Niviventer confucianus 1 
Niviventer coxingi 2 
Niviventer eha 27 
Niviventer fulvescens 2 
Rattus tanezumi 2 
Vernaya fulva 1 
Spalacidae   
Rhizomys pruinosus 20 
Rhizomys sinensis 188 
 
No rodent samples collected in this study were positive for Coronaviruses or Paramyxoviruses. Field 
identification of 89% (136/153) of host species (bats) with samples that tested positive for 
Coronaviruses or Paramyxoviruses was independently confirmed in the laboratory by commercial 
barcoding using the cytochrome b gene of bat mitochondrial DNA as a marker. Barcoding to identify 
species of 17 (11%) specimens was not possible due to insufficient sample quantity remaining after 
RT-PCR assays. Of the 89% tested and confirmed, the field identification was 100% accurate 
providing assurance that the unconfirmed species (by barcoding) had also have been accurately 
identified. 
 
All Coronavirus positive samples were collected in four south China provinces (Hainan, Guangdong, 
Guangxi, and Yunnan), therefore no north-south gradient was discernible. Paramyxovirus positive 
samples were collected across a greater geographic range in China. Along a north-south gradient, 
the detection rate was significantly highest (X2 = 7.8372, p = 0.005118) in the southern provinces of 
Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, and Yunnan. No correlation was evident between bat gender 
and detection of either virus (X2 = 0.2638, p = 0.607534). 
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Table 7. Family, genus, and species for 3,146 bats sampled.
Emballonuridae  
Taphozous melanopogon 89 
Hipposideridae  
Aselliscus stoliczkanus 23 
Coelops frithi 4 
Hipposideros armiger 175 
Hipposideros cineraceus 31 
Hipposideros larvatus 158 
Hipposideros pomona 134 
Hipposideros pratti 137 
Miniopteridae  
Miniopterus fuliginosus 160 
Miniopterus pusillus 72 
Miniopterus schreibersii 91 
Molossidae 25 
Chaerephon plicata 14 
Tadarida plicata 6 
Tadarida teniotis 5 
Pteropodidae 147 
Cynopterus sphinx 48 
Eonycteris spelaea 28 
Rousettus leschenaultii 71 
Rhinolophidae 807 
Rhinolophus affinis 204 
Rhinolophus ferrumequinum 109 
Rhinolophus huananus 6 
Rhinolophus lepidus 21 
Rhinolophus luctus 13 
Rhinolophus macrotis 12 
Rhinolophus pearsonii 37 
Rhinolophus pusillus 133 
Rhinolophus rex 11 
Rhinolophus sinicus 261 
Vespertilionidae 1093 
Barbastella beijingensis 25 
Hypsugo alaschanicus 9 
Ia io 57 
Myotis altarium 18 
Myotis annectans 1 
Myotis blythii 15 
Myotis bombinus 1 
Myotis brandtii 10 
Myotis chinensis 28 
Myotis daubentonii 97 
Myotis davidii 24 
Myotis emarginatus 1 
Myotis fimbriatus 1 
Myotis longipes 18 
Myotis myotis 10 
Myotis pilosus 223 
Myotis siligorensis 14 
Nyctalus plancyi 30 
Pipistrellus abramus 10 
Pipistrellus mimus 4 
Pipistrellus pipistrellus 151 
Plecotus ognevi 13 
Scotomanes ornatus 2 
Scotophilus heathii 34 
Scotophilus kuhlii 145 
Scotozous dormeri 1 
Tylonycteris pachypus 80 
Tylonycteris robustula 21 
Vespertilio murinus 3 
Vespertilio sinensis 8 
Vespertilio superans 39 
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3.7 Coronaviruses 
In this study, 39 bat Coronaviruses (CoVs) were identified (Table 27). The percentage of identical 
bases in the sample sequences (identities) ranged from 100% to 57%. BLAST results for all 39 
sequences had identities of 93.3% or higher to known bat CoV sequences in GenBank (Table 28). 
Coverage was 100% for 35 sequences (90%) and 93.54% or higher for the other 4 sequences (10%). 
The total detection of CoV positive samples from bats in this study was 1.2% (39/3,146) (Table 7). 
Coronaviruses were most often confirmed in samples from Hipposideridae (0.3%), Miniopteridae 
(3.1%), Rhinolophidae (1.4%), and Vespertilionidae (1.5%) (Table 8). Detection of CoV was highest in 
the following species Ia io (3.5%), Rhinolophus rex (63.6%), Tylonycteris pachypus (7.5%), and 
Miniopterus fuliginosus (6.3%) (Table 9). 
Table 8. Coronavirus detection rate by family for bats sampled. 
Family Positive Sampled Percent 
Hipposideridae 2 662 0.3% 
Miniopteridae 10 323 3.1% 
Rhinolophidae 11 807 1.4% 
Vespertilionidae 16 1039 1.5% 
Other Families 0 261 0.0% 
Total 39 3146 1.2% 
 
Table 9. Coronavirus detection rate by bat family, genus, and species sampled. 
Family and Species Positive Sampled Percent 
Hipposideridae       
Hipposdieros armiger 1 175 0.6% 
Hipposideros pratti 1 137 0.7% 
Other Hipposideridae 0 350 0.0% 
Miniopteridae       
Minopterus fuliginosus 10 160 6.3% 
Other Miniopteridae 0 163 0.0% 
Rhinolophidae       
Rhinolophus rex 7 11 63.6% 
Rhinolophus sinicus 4 261 1.5% 
Other Rhinolophidae 0 535 0.0% 
Vespertilionidae       
Ia io 2 57 3.5% 
Myotis pilosus 5 223 2.2% 
Pipistrellus pipistrellus 3 151 2.0% 
Tylonycteris pachypus 6 80 7.5% 
Other Vespertilionidae 0 582 0.0% 
Total 39 3146 1.2% 
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Table 9 total (3,146) in the final row includes an additional 261 bats sampled from other families for 
which there were no positive samples. 
 
Bayesian (Figure 12) and Maximum Likelihood (Figure 13) trees corresponded generally in 
topography with the majority of sequences (59%, 23/39) aligning within the Alphacoronavirus genus 
and the rest (41%, 16/39) within the Betacoronavirus genus. Sequences identified in this study were 
distributed only in the Alphacoronavirus and Betacoronavirus two clades and these corresponded 
between both Bayesian and Maximum Likelihood trees as indicated in Figures 12 and 13. The 
relationships between the 39 sequences from this study and proximate Coronavirus genera and all 
Coronavirus genera are also detailed these two figures. Diversity tests run in DNAsp showed a high 
level of genetic variation in nucleotide diversity for Coronavirus sequences. 
 
3.8 Paramyxoviruses 
In this study, 114 bat Paramyxoviruses were identified (Table 29). The number of identical bases in 
the sample sequences (identities) ranged from 99% (PAR-4287) to 68% (PAR-4274) both isolated 
from samples from Rhinolophus affinis. Of the 82 sequences (72%) had 80% identity or less. Only five 
sequences (4%) had identities higher than 90%. Half (50%) of query reference sequences had a 
coverage of 100% and 99% of query reference sequences had a coverage of over 92%. Total 
detection of Paramyxovirus positive samples from bats sampled in this study was 3.6% (114 out of 
3,146) (Table 10). Hubei (40%), Ningxia (12%), and Guizhou (41%) provinces had the highest rate of 
detection. Paramyxoviruses were found mostly in Emballonuridae (2.2%), Hipposideridae (10.6%), 
Rhinolophidae (2.5%), and Vespertilionidae (1.5%) (Table 10). Detection of Paramyxovirus was 
highest in the following species Aselliscus stoliczkanus (26.1%), Hipposideros pratti (27.7%), Hypsugo 
alaschanicus (11.1%), Plecotus ognevi (15.4%), and Vespertilio sinensis (37.5%) (Table 11). 
 
Table 10. Paramyxovirus detection by family for bats species sampled in China. 
Family Positive Sampled Percent 
Emballonuridae 2 89 2.2% 
Hipposideridae 70 662 10.6% 
Miniopteridae 6 323 1.9% 
Rhinolophidae 20 807 2.5% 
Vespertilionidae 16 1093 1.5% 
Other Families 0 172 0.0% 
Total 114 3146 3.6% 
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Table 11. Paramyxovirus positive samples by bat family and species. 
Family and Species Positive Total Percent 
Emballonuridae 
   
Taphozous melanopogon 2 89 2.2% 
Hipposideridae       
Aselliscus stoliczkanus 6 23 26.1% 
Hipposideros armiger 16 175 9.1% 
Hipposideros larvatus 1 158 0.6% 
Hipposideros pomona 9 134 6.7% 
Hipposideros pratti 38 137 27.7% 
Other Hipposideridae 0 35 0.0% 
Miniopteridae       
Miniopterus fuliginosus 4 160 2.5% 
Miniopterus schreibersii 2 91 2.2% 
Other Miniopteridae 0 160 0.0% 
Rhinolophidae       
Rhinolophus affinis 9 204 4.4% 
Rhinolophus pearsonii 2 37 5.4% 
Rhinolophus pusillus 1 133 0.8% 
Rhinolophus sinicus 8 261 3.1% 
Other Rhinolophidae 0 172 0.0% 
Vespertilionidae       
Hypsugo alaschanicus 1 9 11.1% 
Ia io 2 57 3.5% 
Myotis altarium 1 18 5.6% 
Myotis davidii 2 24 8.3% 
Myotis pilosus 5 223 2.2% 
Plecotus ognevi 2 13 15.4% 
Vespertilio sinensis 3 8 37.5% 
Other Vespertilionidae 0 741 0.0% 
Total 114 3146 3.6% 
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Figure 14. Correlation of Fst and distance. Graph of the fixation index or a measure of genetic polymorphism within 
populations vs between populations and distance between populations (sampling locations) in 1,000 kilometres. This 
figure suggests a negative association between genetic diversity and distance between populations. 
Diversity tests run in DNAsp showed a high level of genetic variation in nucleotide diversity for 
Paramyxovirus sequences. Of the 114 positive samples, a total of 88 Paramyxovirus haplotypes were 
identified. Southern provinces had higher genetic diversity than northern provinces. An analysis of 
variation in sequence polymorphism or genetic variance within bat populations versus between bat 
populations (Fst) showed a negative correlation with genetic variance increasing as distance 
decreased (Figure 14).  
 
Bayesian (Figure 15) and Maximum Likelihood (Figure 16) trees corresponded generally in 
topography (Figure 17) showing a ‘superclade’ including Feline Paramyxoviruses from Japan and 
Hong Kong, rodent and shrew Paramyxoviruses from Africa and Asia, Beilong virus, and J virus. 
Henipavirus is monophyletic to this ‘superclade’. Sequences identified in this study are distributed in 
two clades; these corresponded between Bayesian and Maximum Likelihood trees and are indicated 
in the green and yellow shaded regions in Figure 15 and Figure 16. The relationships between the 
114 sequences from this study and proximate Paramyxovirus genera and all Paramyxovirus genera 
are shown in Figure 17 and Figure 18 respectively. 
 
Based upon the cytochrome B gene, a phylogeny was constructed of all species tested positive from 
this study along with rodent genera sampled, as well as domestic cat (Felis catus), raccoon dog 
(Nyctereutes procyonoides), and other species found to either harbour or have been infected with 
SL-CoV or SARS-CoV (Figure 19).
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Figure 17. Comparison of Paramyxovirus Bayesian inference and Maximum Likelihood phylogenetic trees. Paramyxoviruses 
from this study are grouped into clades (yellow triangles). The Baysian Inference (BI) tree has only one clade whereas the 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) tree has two, distinct clades. Feline Paramyxovirus reference sequences (from cats in Hong Kong 
(Woo et al. 2012b)) fall within one of the two clades in the Maximum Likelihood tree. Support values and other details are 
shown in Figure 15 and Figure 16. 
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Figure 18. Summary phylogenetic analysis of tree of bat Paramyxoviruses detected in this study. Tree is based upon the 
partial RdRp gene sequences. Tree was constructed using MrBayes 3.2.6 under assumption of GTR model, using 3,000,000 
trees sampled every 100 steps. Node support values are indicated. The 114 Paramyxoviruses identified in this study are 
grouped within the two triangles at the top labelled 101 PMV and 13 PMV respectively. The upper most grey retangle 
indicates the proposed, novel Jeilong virus genus. Other genera (Henipavirus, Morbillivirus, Rubulavirus, and Avulavirus) 
are listed in the rectangles below.  
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Figure 19. Bayesian inference chytochrome b phylogenetic tree of bat and other species. Tree shows bat species 
(Chiroptera suborders Yinpterochiroptera and Yangochiroptera) from which Paramyxovirus samples were collected in this 
study along with Carnivora including domestic cats (Felix catus), civets (Paguma larvata), raccoon dogs (Nyctereutes 
procyonoides), and ferret badgers (Melogale moschata), Rodentia (Rattus rattus and Rattus norvegicus), and humans 
(Homo sapiens), since Paramyxoviruses have been discovered in all of these orders. Humans are the outgroup. Tree was 
constructed using MrBayes 3.2.6 under assumption of GTR model, using 3,000,000 trees sampled every 100 steps. Node 
support values are indicated. Scale bar indicates 0.3 nucleotide substitutions per site.  
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3.9 Discussion 
While several studies have detected Paramyxoviruses from bats (Li et al. 2008; Tong et al. 2008; Lau 
et al. 2010b; Yuan et al. 2014) and rodents (Li et al. 2006; Wu et al. 2014b) in China, this is the first 
study to present such a broad sampling both spatially and temporally – including both wild and 
farmed animals. The detection of known and potentially novel Paramyxoviruses in 19 species of bats 
from five families that are natural reservoirs for Paramyxoviruses confirms the hypothesis that 
diverse Paramyxoviruses are circulating widely in multiple bat populations in China. 
 
Although the Coronavirus sequences discovered in bats in this study were not novel, they were 
diverse further providing evidence of these viruses circulating within wild bat populations.  
 
As host species, rodents and bats may be persistently and asymptomatically infected by viruses 
(Schountz 2014; Plowright et al. 2015). This also means that viruses would be expected to be shed 
continually and would be present in samples assayed for viruses by RT-PCR. Although no evidence of 
Coronaviruses or Paramyxoviruses was found in either farmed or wild populations of rodents in this 
study, the RT-PCR assay protocol used had been sufficiently sensitive to detect Coronaviruses and 
Paramyxoviruses in wild rodents collected elsewhere (Funk et al. 2009; Woo et al. 2011; Sasaki et al. 
2014; Wilkinson et al. 2014; Wang et al. 2015). Additionally, out of 871 bats sampled in Hainan 
province, none tested positive for Paramyxoviruses. No other studies to date have reported 
Paramyxoviruses in bats in Hainan. Given the detection rates of these viruses elsewhere in China, 
this suggests that viral detection may be low in rodents and also in bats or associated with temporal 
or seasonal variance of these viruses in their host reservoirs (Plowright et al. 2015). A total of 6 bats 
in Hainan did test positive for Coronaviruses and unlike the Paramyxoviruses sampled in this study, 
the Coronaviruses appear to clearly correspond by species to geographic location and host (Figure 
12 and Figure 13). No bat species in this study was found to be coinfected with Coronavirus and 
Paramyxovirus at the time of sampling. Detection of Coronaviruses in Chinese bats from other 
studies is higher than the 1.2% reported here and ranges from 6.5% (Tang et al. 2006) and 6.84% to 
(Lin et al. 2017) as high as 9.8% (Gloza-Rausch et al. 2008) and 12% (Woo et al. 2006b). Although 
detection of Coronaviruses in bats in China has been published, detection for Paramyxoviruses is not 
currently known, but detection of Paramyxoviruses in bats and rodents elsewhere has been 
published between 10% and 38% (Young & Olival 2016). In this study, a conservative estimate of 
10% detection rate was used for both viruses. A 10% detection rate in wild populations of bats or 
rodents required a sampling of a minimum of 30 individuals per species in order to ensure detection 
of an infected individual with 95% confidence (Wobeser 2013). Minimum species sampling targets 
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were set to this number, although not always attained for rare species, i.e. Myotis pilosus (Csorba & 
Bates 2008; Smith et al. 2010a). The overall detection of 4% Paramyxoviruses and 1.2% 
Coronaviruses in bats sampled in this study was lower than some other surveys, particularly for 
Paramyxoviruses in bats in Asia, Australia, and Africa regions (Li et al. 2008; Breed et al. 2010; Baker 
et al. 2012; Yuan et al. 2014) although well within the range of those found in bats in other studies in 
Asia and in the Americas (Yob et al. 2001; Segovia et al. 2016). Bat species and effort were not 
equivalent in all provinces (Table 3) and after initial, broad, China-wide surveys sampling was 
focused exclusively in southern China, so no conclusions may be drawn from the high rates of 
detection in Ningxia (12%, 2/7) and Hubei (40%, 29/72) provinces. It is interesting to consider 
whether this was a result of random sampling or some other effect such as stress (migration, scarcity 
of food) or mixed species roosting. Likely due to uneven sampling efforts there were no discernible 
correlations between host or viral species at sampling sites along any gradient: north-to-south; east-
to-west; rural-to-urban. In an effort to examine whether there may have been any patterns of 
genetic diversity correlated with geographic location (sampling sites), population differentiation (Fst) 
yielded an unexpected result of increased genetic diversity of Paramyxoviruses between 
geographically proximate locations such as between Guangxi and Guangdong provinces (600km) 
with decreased genetic diversity between more distant provinces such as between Yunnan and 
Fujian or Zhejiang (2,400km). The expectation would have been that as host species are more distant 
and separated both they and their viruses would diverge genetically over time. One explanation for 
high, local genetic diversity may be barriers to conspecific mixing resulting from changes in bat host 
ecology such as only some species accessing food sources or roosting sites in proximity to urban 
habitats. This, though, would not account for the decrease in diversity over distance. A likely 
explanation for this decrease in diversity may be in the relatively unbalanced sample sizes along the 
latitudinal gradient in China. A total of 79% (2,485) of bats sampled were in the southern China band 
of provinces while only 21% (661) were sampled from northern provinces. Positive Coronavirus 
samples were from southern provinces only, so no gradient for these viruses was discernible.  
 
The stochastic effect of sampling within populations may have resulted in the positive 
Paramyxovirus sequences geographically most distant to each other having lower overall diversity. 
Given that bats are volant and no sampling site was outside of the known and shared ranges for 
these bat species, these results may be explained by seasonal or other migrations of bats. Bat 
species sharing roosts would also shed and share viruses resulting in co-infections or repeat 
infections, which would result in viral evolution by increasing diversity. If bats with roost-sharing 
behaviour in south China were to migrate north in April and May, they or more likely other roost-
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sharing species could have been sampled again in other regions of China in August. As bats sampled 
were not tagged for capture-release it is unknown if species were sampled repeatedly along any 
gradient, although this may be unlikely across distances exceeding 2,000km for example from 
Jiangsu to Yunnan or Hainan to Ningxia. It must be noted that some species of European and 
American insectivorous bats have been shown to migrate over 1,000km, although usually along 
corridors corresponding to river valleys or coastlines (Fleming & Eby 2003; Furmankiewicz & 
Kucharska 2009; Popa-Lisseanu & Voigt 2009; Altringham 2011). 
 
In currently published literature and online resources there is much information about most of the 
Chinese bat species sampled in this study, but details about these species’ migratory behaviour are 
absent (Nowak 1994; Fleming & Eby 2003; Francis 2008; Smith et al. 2010a; IUCN 2016). Only 
absence or presence is recorded. Most of the bats sampled in this study are insectivorous (excepting 
the fishing bats: Myotis spp.) and have ranges within southeast Asia spanning China and 18 other 
countries within Asia as well as for one species (Miniopterus magnater) Africa and Europe (Table 12). 
Most also are found in forested, agricultural and urban environments so have opportunity for 
contact with humans and domestic animals. Only 1 species is currently listed as threatened (M. 
magnater) and is also found across the greatest geographic range. The 4 bat species sampled that 
had the highest occurance of Paramyxovirus (Rhinolophus affinis, Hipposideros pomona, 
Hipposideros armiger, and Hipposdieros pratti) are found across all habitat types: urban, agricultural, 
forested, and degraded forest (indicated in grey in Table 12). Of the other bats from which positive 
Paramyxovirus samples were collected, 9 are also present in all habitat types. 
 
Of the 25 species of bats from which positive viral samples were discovered, six (Taphozous 
melanopogon, Hipposideros armiger, Hipposideros larvatus, Hipposideros pratti, Miniopterus 
schreibersii, and Rhinolophus affinis) are known to roost with one or more other bat species 
(Willoughby et al. 2017). Three other species (Rhinolophus pearsonii, Rhinolophus pusillus, 
Rhinolophus sinicus) have no recorded roosting behaviour, but when collected for this study 
observed to be roosting with other species. One species (Myotis pilosus) known to have single-
species-roosts, was collected in this study from caves with mixed species assemblages. Multiple 
species roosts provide ample opportunities for continuous shedding of viral particles within and 
between species and is theorised as one of the drivers of the diversity of Coronaviruses and 
Paramyxoviruses in bats (Wong et al. 2007; Drexler et al. 2012). 
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Table 12. Geographic ranges, IUCN status, and ecology of bat species sampled in this study. Abbreviations as follows: Y = Yes; N = No; LC = Least Concern; UK = Unknown; NT = Near Threatened; Spp. = Species. Bat species indicated by 
grey bars were hosts to most (63.2%) Paramyxoviruses found in this study. R. rex, M. fuliginosus, and T. pachypus were hosts to most (59%) of the Coronaviruses found in this study. Species indicated with an § were observed and 
captured from mixed species roosting areas. Horizontal grey bars indicate the five species that were confirmed hosts to both Paramyxoviruses and Coronaviruses. (Nowak 1994; Smith et al. 2010a; IUCN 2016).
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T. melanopogon Emballonuridae x x x x x   x                             Y LC   x x x x  
A. stoliczkanus Hipposideridae x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x             N LC x x x x x  
H. armiger Hipposideridae x x x x x   x   x x                       Y LC x x x x x x 
H. larvatus Hipposideridae x x x x x x x x x   x                     Y LC x x x x x  
H. pomona Hipposideridae x x x x x x x x x x                       N LC x x x x x  
H. pratti Hipposideridae x x x x x                                 Y LC x x x x x x 
H. terasensis Hipposideridae x   x                                     UK UK   x   x   
M. schreibersii Miniopteridae x                             x x x x     Y LC   x x x x  
M. fuliginosus Miniopteridae x   x x x   x   x x                       N LC   x x x x x 
M. magnater Miniopteridae x x x x x   x   x x x     x     x x x x x N NT x x x x   
C. sphinx Pteropodidae x x x x x x x x x   x x x x x             N UK   x x x   
R. affinis Rhinolophidae x     x             x                     Y LC x x x x x  
R. pearsonii§ Rhinolophidae x       x                                 UK LC   x   x x  
R. pusillus§ Rhinolophidae x x x x x   x   x   x                     UK LC       x x  
R. rex Rhinolophidae x                     UK LC x x x x  x 
R. sinicus§ Rhinolophidae x   x       x                             UK NT 
 
x 
 
x x x 
H. alaschanicus Vespertilionidae x                             x x x       N LC x x x x x  
I. io Vespertilionidae x x x x x x x x x x x   x                 N LC x x x x x x 
M. altarium Vespertilionidae x x x x x   x x x x     x                 N LC x x x x x  
M. davidii Vespertilionidae x x x x x x x   x x x               x     N LC   x   x x  
M. pilosus§ Vespertilionidae x   x x         x x                       N LC x x x x x x 
P. pipistrellus§ Vespertilionidae x   x     x   x     x   x x N LC x  x x  x 
P. ognevi Vespertilionidae x x x x x x x   x   x     x x             N LC x x x x x  
T. pachypus Vespertilionidae x x x x x x x x x  x           N LC  x x x  x 
V. sinensis Vespertilionidae x                             x x x x     N LC x x x x x  
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Most bat and rodent samples (76.3%) were collected between July and September; (96.5%) were 
collected annually in a 7-month window from April to October after which, bats in southern China 
were no longer in roosts (personal observations) likely having migrated to the southern areas of 
their home ranges (Wilson & Reeder 2005; Smith et al. 2010a) to southeast Asia (Laos PDR, Thailand, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia). Although other studies have shown relationships between 
seasonality and environmental stressors (Plowright et al. 2015) and about half (55.3%) of positive 
samples were collected from bats during the month of August. Other studies have had much higher 
detection rates for Coronaviruses in bats sampled from November to March (Tang et al. 2006) 
suggesting that longitudinal sampling conducted in the southernmost regions of China, may shed 
further light on temporal trends in Coronavirus and Paramyxovirus detection in bat populations. 
 
Sample results have a bias towards both abundant species and those that are comparatively easier 
to trap for effort expended. Bat and rodent species that do not roost or forage in urban, semi-urban, 
and agricultural areas were more difficult to sample with the same frequencies as those that 
habituated human dominated landscapes. Some bat and rodent species prefer locations relatively 
inaccessible to field teams or at times when frequent sampling trips were not possible, e.g. due to 
seasonal flooding. Sampling efforts were designed to be longitudinal, but in practice weather 
(flooding) or seasonal variation of target species (migration) hindered repeated sampling efforts. 
Future studies may consider focusing on longitudinal sampling in locations across the southern 
region of China, especially during the Oct to April period, to test the hypotheses that there may be a 
seasonal component to viral spillover from host species. 
 
Figure 19 exhibits the phylogenetic relationships of the mammalian species sampled in this study 
and includes mammalian species with which they would likely come into contact with such as 
domestic cats (Felis catus), civets (Paguma larvata), raccoon dogs (Nyctereutes procyonoides), ferret 
badgers (Melogale moschata), rats (Rattus rattus and Rattus norvegicus), and humans (Homo 
sapiens). Phylogenetic proximity of host species such as bats sharing roosting sites does predict 
potential for sharing of viral species (Young & Olival 2016). Other studies have suggested that there 
is direct transmission of Paramyxoviruses between rodent and bat species (Wilkinson et al. 2014) 
and the emergence of SARS-CoV is theorised to have originated via spillover in live animal markets, 
potentially from a bat to another species (Wang et al. 2006). The nucleotide identities of feline 
Paramyxovirus sequences from NCBI GenBank (Woo et al. 2012b; Sieg et al. 2015) and bat 
Paramyxovirus sequences from this study had 50%-78% nucleotide identity. Most sequences from 
sampled bats in this study had between 50%-80% nucleotide identity to known Paramyxoviruses and 
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greater than 93% nucleotide identity to known Coronaviruses. Some Paramyxovirus sequences from 
Hubei and Jiangsu had less than 60% nucleotide identity to any currently in GenBank. If a threshold 
may be set at 80% (or less) nucleotide affinity for novel viral Paramyxovirus species (Anthony et al. 
2017; ICTV 2017a), then 71% (82 out of 114) of the Paramyxovirus sequences in this study may be 
considered novel, which confirms this study’s hypothesis that there is a diversity of Paramyxoviruses 
circulating in bats in China. Since only the RdRp gene was analyses in this study, further 
characterisation of the viruses would be required to confirm whether they are truly novel. For the 
Coronaviruses in this study, although diverse, none were novel and all had already been described 
elsewhere. The phylogenies detailed in Figure 12 and in Figure 13 include homologous strains from 
BLAST results in NCBI. 
 
From the phylogenetic analyses, there is a clear grouping of Paramyxoviruses sequences from this 
study into two, distinct clades. Together they form a ‘super-clade’, which may include 
Paramyxoviruses from rodents, shrews, and domestic cats. The Paramyxovirus sequences from this 
study would likely be within the proposed Jeilongvirus genus (Woo et al. 2016), which would be 
paraphyletic with Henipavirus genus. Whether some of this study’s potentially novel 
Paramyxoviruses are ancestral to the feline and rodent Paramyxoviruses is not clearly resolved, but 
the predator-prey interrelationships among these species would suggest viral exchange. 
 
Rodent Paramyxoviruses have recently been identified as having caused morbidity (Wu et al. 2014b) 
and mortality (Wu et al. 2014b) in humans in China. This, as well as the results of this study, provide 
more evidence that there are a diversity of Paramyxoviruses circulating in wild animals (bats and 
rodents) and commensal species (rats) (Figure 19). Although the novel Paramyxoviruses identified in 
this study are not closely related to known viruses of human concern such as Hendra virus and Nipah 
virus or others affecting livestock, the ubiquity and diversity of these Paramyxoviruses raise the 
consideration that zoonotic transmission may occur frequently and poses a clear risk to human and 
animal health. 
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4 Attitudes of Chinese Millennials Towards Wildlife Trade and 
Disease Risk 
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4.1 Introduction 
Demand for wildlife and wildlife products is a global threat to conservation (Lenzen et al. 2012; 
Moran & Kanemoto 2017). The wildlife trade has also been linked to a series of emerging diseases 
and is thought to heighten the risk of zoonotic disease spillover due to increased animal-human 
interaction (Fèvre et al. 2006; Smith et al. 2009; Johnson et al. 2015). For example Ebola viruses, 
Marburg virus, and henipaviruses are carried by bats in Africa which are hunted and traded widely 
and there is evidence of spillover of henipaviruses into people in the region (Kamins et al. 2011; 
Pernet et al. 2014). Ebola virus is known to cause illness in primates which are part of the bushmeat 
trade in Africa, and this has led to previous outbreaks in human (Chapman et al. 2005) and non-
human primates (Formenty et al. 1999). In China, the first spillover of SARS-CoV from bats to civets 
and humans is thought to have occurred in large wildlife markets in Guangdong province, leading to 
its pandemic emergence (Guan et al. 2003). 
 
Legislation and global conservation efforts have successfully reduced wildlife trade in some regions 
or for some species, but stronger enforcement and international cooperation have been called for 
(Zimmerman 2003). As a result of the diversity, breadth, and constant shifts in demand and supply, 
assessing the volume of wildlife trade is difficult (Karesh et al. 2005). Some studies have concluded 
that, after the USA and Europe, which trade wildlife mainly for pets (Smith et al. 2009), China is the 
third highest consumer of wildlife (Wyler & Sheikh 2008; Patel et al. 2015). This is driven by high 
demand in China for use of wildlife or wildlife products in traditional medicine, food, decorative 
items, and to a lesser extent as pets (Zhang et al. 2008). 
 
4.2 Chinese Wildlife Trade in Ivory 
Elephant Ivory is a prime example of a wildlife product in high demand and that has devastating 
consequences on wildlife populations (Clarke & Babic 2016). Chinese demand for ivory has been 
considered one of the main drivers of the ivory trade (Gao & Clark 2014). It is difficult to ascertain 
whether recent legislative prohibitions on ivory trade in China have had any effect on the demand, 
since there exists a relatively unquantifiable illegal market for ivory. Additionally, there are factors 
external to China such as a recent decrease in the cost of shipping rates and political instability in 
countries where elephants are found that make ivory trade more appealing to some of the actors 
involved (Moyle 2014). Despite the legislation, legal, illegal, and indeterminate trade in ivory persists 
within China (Gao & Clark 2014).  
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In 2009, the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) launched a China-based public awareness 
campaign to make the Chinese people aware that ivory is sourced from dead elephants. The 
announcement consisted of a poster (Figure 20) that was placed in airports, office buildings, 
universities, subways, and other public locations. IFAW hoped that the campaign would discourage 
Chinese people from buying ivory. IFAW felt that if more Chinese people were made aware that 
ivory for sale in China came from slaughtered elephants, they might then stop buying ivory (Ge 
2011). 
 
 
Figure 20. International Fund for Animal Welfare public service announcement from Shanghai subway. In the 
advertisement text, the baby elephant excitedly tells his mother three times, “Mama, I grew my tusks!" She does not 
respond and he says, “Mama, why are you not happy?” The word for “teeth” and “tusks” in Chinese is the same. To the 
right of the advertisement (not shown) text explains that elephant ivory or “teeth” come from slaughtered wild elephants. 
Source: IFAW (2009). 
Four years later, an online Chinese language survey assessed both the awareness generated by the 
campaign and the potential impact either the campaign or the survey had on respondents’ future 
intent to purchase ivory (Li 2013a). The results showed that 75% of those surveyed (n = 1,067) had 
viewed the campaign in the past years and of these 66% would not buy ivory in the future (Li et al. 
2013). Of the surveyed population that had not previously seen the campaign, 33% said they would 
not buy ivory in the future (Li 2013a). 
 
These survey data show a positive correlation between (a) people being made aware of the harm 
that ivory trade does to elephant populations and (b) their decision to no longer purchase ivory. The 
theory is that legislation and enforcement alone cannot stop the supply of wildlife products such as 
ivory as long as there is still a demand, which must also be addressed. This suggests that awareness 
campaigns can nudge behaviour and complement legislation and enforcement efforts. In line with 
these findings, recently there have been calls to consider applying a demand-side approach, via 
education and awareness campaigns rather than reliance solely upon legislation and enforcement, 
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to reduce or halt the demand for ivory and other wildlife products in China (Zhang et al. 2008; Rosen 
& Smith 2010; Zhang & Yin 2014; Challender et al. 2015). 
 
4.3 Wildlife Trade Legislation in China  
The Convention on International Trade of Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is the 
primary international treaty protecting the movement of endangered species globally (CITES 1973). 
CITES’ signatories regulate global wildlife trade, protect threatened species, and indirectly reduce 
disease risk (Rosen & Smith 2010). CITES has proven successful at reducing wildlife trade 
internationally (Fuchs 2008), but local or national involvement is necessary to achieve this (Cooney & 
Abensperg-Traun 2013; Biggs et al. 2017). In China, a number of laws have been enacted to address 
wildlife trade. In 1989, the Seventh National People’s Congress established the Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on the Protection of Wild Animals (PRC 1988). The stated goal of the law was both 
to protect and preserve wildlife, but also to develop and use wildlife as a natural resource to be 
exploited for China’s economic gain (Article 1). Domestication and breeding of wildlife and 
development and use of wildlife resources was specifically encouraged (Article 4 and Article 17). 
Criticism was directed at the law with calls for amendments to revise or remove the promotion of 
wildlife as an exploitable resource (Cao 2011). Effective 1st January 2017, the law was amended to 
forbid the purchase and sale of any wild animals and their products (Articles 15, 27, 44, and 48) (PRC 
2016b). The language about wildlife as a resource to be exploited was removed. The penalty for 
illegal sale or use of wildlife is a fine levied by the local Wildlife Protection Department of at least ten 
times the sale value of the confiscated wildlife, or if there is no value to the confiscated wildlife, then 
a fine between RMB10,000 and RMB50,000 (£1,200 and £5,800) (Article 44). The amendment 
further stated that a list of the national key protected wildlife will be formulated by the Central 
Government Level Department of Wildlife Conservation after scientific assessment and updated 
every five years (Article 10). 
 
Chinese legislation is very clear in prohibiting wildlife trade, but defining the specific species 
protected and the enforcement efforts are left entirely up to regional departments. Local or 
provincial authorities prohibit or permit in “special circumstances” the sale, purchase, scientific 
research, artificial breeding, public display, hunting, or use of wild animals and their products (Article 
25). Without a concrete list of key protected species, it is also up to the regional authorities and 
departments to enforce legislation against wildlife hunting, use, and farming. Additional language 
(Article 25) permits hunting (Articles 21-23), breeding, and sale (Articles 26-28) of wildlife with a 
license from the relevant local or provincial authorities. At the local and regional level, Chinese 
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government agencies that are responsible for oversight and regulation of wildlife trade include the 
State Forestry Administration, Bureau of Fisheries, Ministry of Commerce, and Ministry of Police. 
Currently, there is little or no coordination amongst these agencies (Yiming & Wilcove 2005). 
 
The impact of the amended legislation on reducing wildlife trade is likely to be undermined by both 
a lack of clear definitions of the protected species and the exceptions, with state sponsored license, 
to all prohibitions to wildlife trade (Ge 2016; Shytov 2017). Local government and enforcement 
agencies lack clear and consistent information about which wildlife species and products may or may 
not be legally traded, hunted, farmed, or otherwise consumed (Zhang et al. 2008). 
 
4.4 Wildlife Trade and Zoonotic Emergence in China 
In addition to being a hotspot for wildlife trade (Shepherd & Nijman 2007), China has received 
scientific and media attention as a hotspot for emerging zoonotic diseases, and a recent history of 
important zoonotic disease outbreaks, including highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A (H5N1) 
and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) caused by the SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) (Li et al. 
2004; Jones et al. 2008; Hotez et al. 2015; Wu et al. 2017). SARS-CoV originated in large wildlife 
markets in southern china in late 2002 (Drosten et al. 2003). The virus spread rapidly via 
international travellers, eventually affecting over 8,000 individuals in 32 countries and causing at 
least 774 reported deaths by mid-2003 (Riley et al. 2003; Tsang et al. 2003; Anderson et al. 2004; 
Zhao 2007). During the SARS-CoV outbreak, the earliest cases reported were from restaurant 
workers (He et al. 2003). By the end of the outbreak in May 2003, serological assays for antibodies 
to SARS-CoV or SARS-like coronaviruses (SL-CoV) in humans around Guangzhou City in China yielded 
the highest prevalence among workers in wildlife animal markets and traders of wildlife (CDC 2003; 
Guan et al. 2003). These data indicate that people regularly handling wild animals may have been 
infected with other less virulent strains of coronaviruses and this provided strong evidence for 
animal origins of SARS-CoV (Wang et al. 2006) and for its emergence being driven by the live wild 
animal trade (Bell et al. 2004). 
 
Why had SARS-CoV or SL-CoVs not emerged before? It is possible there had been prior spillover 
events that were undetected, as evidence of SL-CoV found in the market workers suggested (Guan 
et al. 2003).  
 
Few data are available, but consumers of wildlife in China do so mainly because they enjoy the 
flavour, although some say they also do so for the status or prestige that comes from hosting a 
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dinner for their colleagues with wildlife on the menu (Zhang et al. 2008). Research has shown that 
individuals with higher income and education, usually men, living in the large, eastern, coastal cities 
(e.g. Guangzhou, Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen) are the principal consumers of wildlife in China (Zhang 
et al. 2008; Zhang & Yin 2014). Urban centres have been identified elsewhere as principal drivers of 
environmental change (Grimm et al. 2008). The demand for wildlife in China greatly increased 
following the rapid growth of the economy especially starting in the 2000s (World Bank 2016b) 
coinciding with a growing urban population of younger Chinese with more capital to spend (Woo et 
al. 2006a; Wu et al. 2017). As defined by Howe and Strauss (2009) for the West and then expanded 
to China by others (Moore 2005; Wang 2010), Chinese millennials are those born between 1976 and 
2004; they are wealthier, especially as they often have no siblings due to China’s one child policy 
(Yepes 2016), optimistic, better educated, and much more technologically savvy than previous 
generations (Wang 2010). Despite being the current driver of Chinese wildlife trade there is some 
evidence that the millennial generation , as they and their children become wealthier, are 
developing long-term interest in improving and conserving their environment as well as public 
health (Zhang & Shaw 2015; Kang et al. 2016; Li et al. 2016). A survey of the attitudes towards 
animal welfare of 1,300 university students in mainland China found that 62.6% opposed eating 
wildlife (Shuxian et al. 2005). No differences were found between students with and without science 
backgrounds and more than half the students were from big cities. The survey was conducted in 
2003 during the time of the SARS-CoV epidemic in China. Only 13% of the students said that the 
emergence of SARS-CoV had influenced them in their decision to not eat wildlife.  
 
4.5 Demographics of Chinese Internet Users 
In 2015, estimates were that over 50% of the Chinese population (710 million people) had access to 
the internet (CNNIC 2016). The National Bureau of Statistics of China (2017) reported that 49% (668 
million) people in China had an active online presence in 2015 and that this was split between men 
(53%) and women (47%) at rates comparable to the general population – 51.2% to 48.8% 
respectively (NBSC 2017). In cities (versus rural areas), 67.2% of the population have internet access 
with a per-city access increasing by size of city (CNNIC 2016); larger cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, 
and Guangzhou have higher proportions of populace with access to the internet. Over 87% of 
internet users in China are between the ages of 10 and 49; 54.6% are millennials between the ages 
of 20 and 39. Almost half of all Chinese internet users (43%) have a monthly income of RMB3,000 
(£350) or more (CNNIC 2016); employed urban monthly salaries in China for the upper quintile were 
RMB5,169 (£600) in 2016 (NBSC 2017). Of internet users in China, 95% access the internet via a 
mobile phone. All users spend an average of 3 hours 47 minutes online per day (CNNIC 2016). 
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Estimates of daily social media platform (e.g. QQ, WeChat, Douban, Renren, Weibo) users by 
account in 2016 range widely and by application from 200 million for Weibo, 400 million for Qzone, 
and over 500 million for WeChat (CNNIC 2016; NBSC 2017; Statista 2017). With only 51% of its 
populace online, China lags behind other regions of the world (only in percentage, not in numbers) 
such as Europe (72% online) and North America (76% online) (World Bank 2016a), but in all regions 
globally the online and offline demographics are becoming equivalent (Lindhjem & Navrud 2011), 
particularly for populations such as the millennials that are by definition familiar with technology 
and frequently use web-based social media and networking applications (Jiang 2018). 
 
4.6 Questioning Chinese Millennials Attitudes Towards Wildlife Trade 
The study detailed in this chapter aims to provide data that support policy and behavioural change 
interventions to reduce the risk of novel emerging infectious disease (EID) events originating in 
China. One of these could be an awareness campaign around the risk of viral spillover from wildlife, 
which may produce similar changes in behaviour as resulted from the IFAW campaign. As per capita 
income continues to increase in China, perhaps interest in the environment and conservation may 
also increase. Subsequently, this would reduce the demand for wildlife and the risk of zoonotic 
emergence via the wildlife trade. If so, then intervention policies targeting Chinese millennials may 
be most effective, since presently it is this population that is driving the demand for wildlife trade 
(Zhang & Yin 2014; Liu et al. 2016b; Wu et al. 2017). 
 
The research reported here investigates the attitudes of Chinese millennials in regard to the role 
wildlife trade plays in emerging diseases in China and globally. An online survey was developed to 
evaluate whether Chinese millennials are: (a) involved in the wildlife trade; (b) are cognisant of the 
potential risks wildlife trade poses to human health; and (c) know of, or on being informed were 
motivated to stop any future involvement in wildlife trade. It was expected that most Chinese 
millennials are involved in wildlife trade in some way, either presently or in their past. Additionally, 
this demographic would be expected to be aware of the conservation of wildlife, but be less aware 
of health risks related to wildlife trade or exposure to wildlife. 
 
4.7 Methods 
Following a standardised survey methodology for a stratified random sample (Sturgis 2006; Van 
Selm & Jankowski 2006) an online survey (Table 13) was designed to test hypotheses about Chinese 
people’s attitudes towards wildlife trade and disease emergence. The survey was piloted via face-to-
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face interviews first in English and then in Chinese. This iterative process ensured that the final 
online Chinese language survey would be easily intelligible to a very general audience and take no 
more than 5 minutes for a respondent to complete. All respondents were informed at the onset that 
their responses were completely voluntary and confidential. All respondents had the options to stop 
the survey at any time and to click on a link at the end to share the survey with their contacts and 
others in their social network. No data on employment, street address, contact information, 
affiliation, name, or any other identifying details were collected. Since the survey was designed to 
target a specific population and the data were planned to be aggregated, non-identifiable, and yield 
generalisable results no Institutional Review Board approval was required to conduct this survey. 
The Medical Research Council Health Research Authority checklist confirmed this (See Section 7.9).  
 
The design of the survey background was intended to be nonintrusive with a muted watercolour 
stock image of a green meadow and blue sky without clearly identifiable details. The survey 
contained several stick-figure and other single-color stock art images chosen to make the survey 
appear ‘fun and inviting’ (See Sections 4.7 and 7.10). The survey was designed with four sections: 
 
The first section collected demographic information about the respondents’ age, sex, education, 
economic status, and home city. The second part of the survey was designed to collect information 
about the respondents’ knowledge of the wildlife origins of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, 
SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV, avian influenza, and Ebola and whether they were aware that 60% of 
infectious diseases emerge from human contact with wildlife (Taylor et al. 2001; Jones et al. 2008). 
 
The third section collected information about the types of contact the respondent had with wildlife. 
The respondent could select one or more of the following options: wild animal market visit; 
ownership of wildlife as a pet; slaughter of wild animals; hunting of wild animals; eating wild 
animals; use of wildlife as medicine; use as a decorative product; or none. A follow-up question 
collected information about whether these activities had occurred within the past year. 
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Table 13. Wildlife and You! online surveyEnglish language version, below. See Appendix B: Surveys, Survey Protocols, and 
Consent Forms for the Online, Chinese language version (sojump.com/jq/6232786.aspx).Wildlife and You! -  Online Survey 
People keep talking about the wildlife trade, but what does that have to do with me? Let’s find it out together! You will just need five minutes to find 
out the answers. Responses are completely voluntary and confidential. 
Please tell us about yourself! 
1. Your Age? 
• Under 15 
• 15-24 
• 25-39 
• 40-59 
• 60 or older 
 
2. Your monthly income? 
• Less than RMB2,000 
• RMB 2,001- RMB 4,000 
• RMB 4,001- RMB 6,000 
• RMB 6,001- RMB 8,000 
• Above RMB 8,000 
 
3. Where do you live? 
(Drop-down option to select Province) 
4. Highest level of education completed 
• Primary school 
• Secondary school/Polytechnic 
• College/University 
• Graduate School and beyond 
 
Quiz Time: you can see if you get the correct answers after selecting and clicking ‘next’!  
5. Which of these diseases come from animals? 
• HIV/AIDS 
• SARS 
• MERS 
• Avian Influenza 
• Ebola 
• SARS and Avian Influenza 
• All of them 
 
6. Now you know about some infectious diseases that come from 
animals, what percentage of all infectious diseases do you think 
comes from contacting wildlife? 
• 20% 
• 40% 
• 60% 
• 80% 
 
Let’s learn more about the wildlife trade! 
7. Have you ever done any of the activities below? Check 1 or more: 
• Visited a wildlife market 
• Used wildlife products for decoration? 
• Bought wildlife from live animal market? 
• Kept a wildlife pet? 
• Used wildlife as medicine? 
• Eaten wild animals in a restaurant or at home? 
• Hunted wild animals? 
• Slaughtered wild animals? 
• None 
8. Did you conduct any of the activities you selected in #7 in the 
past 12 months? 
• Yes 
• No 
 
 
Wildlife trade is any sale or exchange of wildlife animal and plant resources by people, there is always a value chain from the capture or harvesting 
of wildlife to transportation and marketing to consumers. Did you realize how much you are involved in the links in this chain and how many 
opportunities you have in to come into contact with wildlife?! 
Let Us Hear Your Voices and Opinions! 
9. Do you think wildlife trade will lead to (check one or more) … 
• … wildlife extinctions? 
• … environmental degradation? 
• … zoonotic disease emergence? 
• I don’t know 
 
10. Do you think people should stop hunting, selling or buying 
wildlife and wildlife products for food, pets, medicine, or 
handicraft? 
• Yes 
• No 
 
11. If wildlife trade stops, rank which would be the most likely 
cause? 
• Laws becoming stricter with strict enforcement 
• Non-wildlife products are cheaper and as good 
• Protecting wildlife and the environment 
• Preventing diseases like Ebola and SARS 
• Public opinion against wildlife and wildlife products 
12. Which groups do you have the highest confidence and trust in to 
stop/reduce the wildlife trade in China? (check one or more) 
• Relevant government organisations (forestry, health, 
agriculture, etc.) 
• Local community and people 
• Non-governmental organisations 
• Business community 
• Academia/Researchers 
• Other 
Your responses help us to make policy recommendations to the government and take effective action to protect wildlife and human health. Click 
here to share this survey. Thank you for promoting conservation and preventing epidemics! 
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Before the fourth and final section, a few sentences provided a definition of wildlife trade as the 
“sale or exchange of wild animal or plant resources” and respondents were informed that there is a 
connection or “chain” from the capture of wild animals to the end-consumer. The respondents were 
then asked to consider whether they are involved in this ‘chain’ and how often they come into 
contact with wild animals along the chain. The final section of the survey had four questions and 
asked if the respondents felt that wildlife trade: 
 
Question 9:  will lead to diseases, environmental degradation, and extinctions? 
Question 10:  or the use of wild animal products should be stopped? 
Question 11: if it were stopped, would be most due to legislation and enforcement; public 
health and disease prevention; availability (or competition) of cheaper non-
wild-sourced products; or societal awareness and pressure against wildlife 
consumption? 
Question 12: would be most likely reduced or stopped by researchers; businesses; 
nongovernmental organisations; local community groups; or governmental 
agencies (departments of forestry, health, agriculture, etc.)? 
 
Questions 9 and 12 permitted respondents to select as many answers as they felt suitable. Question 
10 was a yes/no question. Question 11 required respondents to rank their choices. 
 
Consistent with high internet uptake in China, particularly among urban residents, an online survey 
platform Sojump (https://www.sojump.com) was selected to distribute the finalised online survey. 
Sojump has been utilised by published online survey studies of behaviour in China (Li et al. 2012; Bai 
et al. 2014; Lien & Cao 2014; Wu & Wang 2016), provides survey research services to Chinese 
Universities (e.g. Peking University, Chinese University Hong Kong) and also provides commercial 
survey services to businesses such as McKinsey & Company, BMW, and Walmart. Sojump has a 
database of 2,600,000 individuals across all 31 of the province-level administrative units of China 
(Figure 21) and can target surveys by city. The target population was middle class Chinese nationals 
or millennials at Tier 1 and Tier 2 cities. China has an official system of urban classification by GDP, 
political autonomy, and population (PRC 1982). Although the PRC constitution does not define the 
cities, only the classification system, Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen are usually listed 
at the Tier 1 cities (Burns 2003). There are 30 Tier 2 cities and all other cities are classed as Tier 3 and 
Tier 4, all of which are ranked depending upon categories such as real estate, retail, public health, or 
telecommunications (Daemmrich 2013; Chivakul et al. 2015; Liu et al. 2016a).  
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Figure 21. Map of Online Survey Respondants. Chinese Provinceswith provinces shaded in red indicating origin of most 
(83.5%) respondents and illustrating how they are distributed mostly along the costal and highly urban areas of mainland 
China. 16.2% of respondents were from the interior and relatively less urban regions of China. Xizang, Hong Kong, and 
Taiwan were not surveyed and are indicated in white fill, n = 2,238. 
Using Sojump’s proprietary software a random distribution of survey notifications was sent via direct 
emails to the specific social media instant messaging platforms. All recipients had the option to 
respond or not. Only active users across Tier 1 and Tier 2 cities were targeted and these were 
defined as users who had sent or posted one message in the past 30 days. A target sample size of 
1,500 was calculated based upon a conservative estimate of a population of 100 million millennial 
users of social media in China with a 95% confidence level and a 2.5% margin of error. The online 
survey was distributed for one month from 15 December 2015 to 15 January 2016 electronically via 
direct emails from Sojump to both its user base and via the Chinese social media instant messaging 
platforms QQ and WeChat (im.qq.com, Tencent Holdings Ltd.) as an inserted advertisement. 
Distribution was irrespective of user preferences including wildlife trade, activism, public health, or 
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conservation. Surveys were sent out to 31 of the province-level administrative units of China. Hong 
Kong, Xizang, and Taiwan were not surveyed, since they are outside of the Sojump database. Sojump 
directed the survey to 5,448 online users.  
 
The collected data were statistically analysed by Wizard 1.9.2 and Microsoft Office Excel 15.29.1. 
Standard statistical analyses were used to summarise the respondents’ data. Independent sample t-
test was used to compare sample means of normally distributed continuous variables. A Pearson Chi 
square test (DF = 1, Fisher’s exact test, two- tailed) was used to analyse the differences between 
respondents who had some knowledge and experience of wildlife and those who did not. A 95% 
confidence level (p = 0.05) was used. The software IBM SPSS 16.0 (IBM SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA) 
was used to conduct the analysis. 
 
4.8 Results 
During the one month of the survey, 2,106 survey responses were received with a response rate of 
38.7%. An additional 132 unsolicited or indirect responses were received in the same time period 
totalling 2,238 individual respondents from 31 of the provincial level administrative units of China 
(Figure 21).  
 
The average time to complete the survey was 3 minutes and 52 seconds. There were daily responses 
during the survey month except for three days: 28, 30, and 31 December 2015. Of respondents, 
65.4% were between the ages of 25 and 39 years (Table 14, Figure 22). More than half (1,250; 
55.9%) were from only six eastern, coastal province-level administrative units: Zhejiang, Jiangsu, 
Shandong, Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangdong. Beijing (254, 11.3%) and Guangdong (343,  
 
Table 14. Age classes of online survey respondents, n = 2,238.
 Age Class (years) % (No. Respondents) 
≤15 0.5 (10) 
15 - 24 15.2 (339) 
25 - 39 65.4 (1,463) 
40 - 59 18.1 (404) 
60 ≥ 1.0 (22) 
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Figure 22. Survey population demographics for education, age, income, and location. See Figure 21 for map further 
illustrating the east-west split in respondents, n = 2,238. 
15.3%) had the highest number of respondents each. Gansu, Xinjiang, Ningxia, Macao, Qinghai, and 
Hainan had the least (6 or fewer) respondents each (total 0.7% of respondents). 
 
Of the respondents, 83.5% (1,868) were from eastern China; 16.2% (362) were from western China 
(Figure 21). Most (92%, 2,060) of respondents had completed a university education and 75.7% 
(1,694) reported earning more than RMB4,000 per month. Despite the east-west split in 
respondents there were no significant differences in age (t(30)= 1.029, p > .05) and education (t(29)= 
0.983, p> .05) across this geography and throughout the population. There was a significant 
difference in income between the east and west groups with higher income being in the east (t(29)= 
2.089, p = .046). 
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4.9 Awareness of Zoonotic Diseases 
Of the 2,238 respondents, 62% (1,395) were aware that SARS-CoV and avian influenza were diseases 
emerging from wildlife (Figure 23). Fewer respondents were aware of the wildlife origins of Ebola 
(38.9%, 871), HIV/AIDS (30.6%, 685), and MERS (23.7%, 531); only 14.2% (318) of respondents were 
aware that all of these zoonotic diseases originated in wildlife. Only 20.1% (450) were aware that at 
least 60% of all infectious diseases have an animal origin and 71.4% (1,598) thought that 40% or less 
infectious diseases have an animal origin. When just these data are corrected (no overseas 
responses nor any >40 yrs or <15 yrs) and compared across the east-west gradient in China there are 
no statistically significant differences in all of the remaining survey response categories except for 
MERS-CoV (t(29) = 2.465, p = 0.020). Up to 28% (522) percent of eastern respondents were aware 
that MERC-CoV has a wildlife origin, but only 13.6% (49) of western respondents were aware of this 
same fact. 
 
 
Figure 23. Responses to, Which of these diseases come from animals? , n=2,238. 
4.10 Involvement in Wildlife Trade 
In response to the question about their direct involvement with wildlife, (Figure 24) 72.1% (1,614) of 
respondents had some interaction with wildlife and more than half (50.2%) claimed they had visited 
a wild animal market. Only 28.2% (630) claimed to have eaten wildlife and 2.6% (58) had both 
hunted and slaughtered wildlife. Of all these interactions with wildlife, only 37.8% (846) respondents 
had engaged in them within the past year. Most respondents (62%, 1,392) had no interactions with 
wildlife in the past 12-months. Similar numbers of respondents reported having used wildlife for 
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All of them
MERS-CoV
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Ebola
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SARS-CoV and Avian Influenza
Avian Influenza
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medicinal purposes (391, 17.5%) or having wild animals as a pet (381, 17.0%) and only 5.5% (119) 
reported having done both, and of these most (74, 62.1%) had done so in the past 12-months. 
 
 
Figure 24. Responses to, Have you ever…? , n=2,238. 
4.11 Respondents’ Attitudes and Knowledge 
After reading the brief text defining wildlife trade, respondents were asked what they felt were the 
impacts of wildlife trade: environmental degradation, species extinctions, or disease emergence. 
Respondents were able to select as many of these answers as they thought appropriate as well as an 
“I don’t know” option. Most respondents (88.3%, 1,977) believed that wildlife trade would lead to 
species extinctions, 84.9% (1,902) believed that wildlife trade would lead to environmental 
degradation, and 74.8% (1,674) understood the link between wildlife and zoonotic disease 
emergence. A total of 63.2% (1,415) respondents said that they now believed that wildlife trade 
would lead to all three: extinctions, environmental degradation, and zoonotic disease emergence. 
The majority (2,155, 96.3%) stated that they believed “people should stop hunting, selling or buying 
wildlife for food, pets, medicine, or other products”. 
 
4.12 Respondents’ Thoughts about Stopping Wildlife Trade 
Respondents were then asked to rank the most likely reasons that they felt wildlife trade would be 
stopped (Figure 25). A total of 47.7% (956) felt that legislation and enforcement would be the most 
effective means of stopping wildlife trade and 29.4% (659) felt that protection of wildlife and the 
environment would most likely cause wildlife trade to be stopped. Only 13.4% (300) felt that non-
wildlife products would mostly likely cause the demand for wildlife to stop. Fewer still, 8.2% (184) 
and 6.2% (139) respectively felt that disease prevention and public opinion would be most effective 
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reasons for stopping wildlife trade. Respondents were then asked about which group or organisation 
would be most effective at stopping or reducing wildlife trade (Figure 26). Most respondents (1,950, 
87.1%) believed that relevant governmental agencies (departments of forestry, health, and 
agriculture) would be most effective in reducing or stopping wildlife trade and 1,491 (66.6%) 
respondents felt that local communities and people would be the most effective groups to stop 
wildlife trade. Non-governmental organisations (56.1%, 1,256), research (21.8%, 489) and business 
(37.6%, 842) were considered less effective means.  
 
 
Figure 25. Responses to, Which could be the most Important reason or motivator to stop wildlife trade? , n=2,238. 
 
Figure 26. Responses to, Which group would be most effective in stopping wildlife trade in China? , n=2,238. 
 
A comparison between the proportion of respondents who (a) claimed to have not had any 
interactions with wildlife at all and (b) those who had interactions with wildlife in the past 12 
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months showed no statistically significant difference in response to the question of whether wildlife 
trade should be stopped (X2 (N = 1470) = 2.20, p = .138). Over 95% of respondents believed that 
wildlife trade should be stopped; this was consistent across all strata (Table 15) with the exception 
of the group of respondents (n = 25) who did not know what the effects of wildlife trade may be. The 
percentage (68%, 17) in this group to say ‘yes’ to wildlife trade being stopped was not significantly 
different from the percentage of respondents saying ‘yes’ in other categories. 
 
4.13 Discussion 
The results from this study suggest that education campaigns around the health-related aspects of 
wildlife trade may be effective in reducing demand if targeted to Chinese millennials. Firstly, most 
(86.6%) respondents were aware of the impact of wildlife trade on biodiversity loss and 
environmental degradation. Secondly, this population is involved in wildlife trade despite 
understanding of its impact. Finally and importantly, while a majority of the millennials and others in 
this study realised the link between wildlife and SARS-CoV, they did not yet know about the links to 
other zoonoses. This suggests that educating this influential group of millennials about the disease 
impact of wildlife trade, may lead to them reducing their activities further and spreading the 
information among their own social networks. If this created the appearance of a movement to 
resist eating wildlife among this visible and influential population of Chinese citizens, it may 
effectively reduce consumption over the whole of China via viral dissemination and activism (Wang 
2002; Moore & Chang 2014). 
 
A total of 2,106 primary respondents filled out the survey sent initially from Sojump. An additional 
132 secondary respondents also filled out the survey. These secondary respondents most likely 
received the survey from primary respondents who opted to pass along the survey to contacts and 
other members in their social networks. The secondary response rate may not be calculated since 
there was no way to record how many primary respondents forwarded their surveys. Although 
indisputably faster and less expensive, online sampling has been criticised as (a) having the potential 
to be much-reduced (and therefore not representative) from a random selection of an offline 
population, (b) self-selecting, and (c) without data about non-respondents (Mehta & Sivadas 1995; 
Kwak & Radler 2002). Most of these issues have been mitigated or negated through technological 
advances and careful survey design (Cook et al. 2000; Evans & Mathur 2005). Although caution  
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Table 15. Surveyed population in response to, Should Wildlife Trade be Stopped or Not? Columns provide number of those 
surveyed by response to this question (yes, no, total, and percent). Responses are grouped by age class, income, education, and 
involvement with wildlife as the three questions listed in the table. There was no significant difference between any group (p> 
0.05), n = 2,238.
 
Yes No Total Respondents % Responding Yes 
Age Class         
Under 15 10 0 10 100% 
15-24 322 17 339 95% 
25-39 1415 48 1463 97% 
40-59 387 17 404 96% 
Over 59 21 1 22 95% 
Income (RMB)         
Less than 2000 175 13 188 93% 
2001-4000 561 21 582 96% 
4001-6000 662 26 688 96% 
6000-8000 411 13 424 97% 
More than 8000 346 10 356 97% 
Education         
Primary School 8 0 8 100% 
Secondary School 157 13 170 92% 
University 1796 62 1858 97% 
Graduate 194 8 202 96% 
Involvement with Wildlife         
Visit to Wildlife Market 1093 37 1130 97% 
Wildlife Decoration 419 12 431 97% 
Bought Wildlife 556 29 585 95% 
Kept Wildlife as Pet 366 15 381 96% 
Used Wildlife as Medicine 374 17 391 96% 
Eaten Wildlife 604 26 630 96% 
Hunted Wildlife 124 5 129 96% 
Slaughter Wildlife 112 8 120 93% 
None 609 15 624 98% 
Activities in last 12 Months 814 32 846 96% 
What are the Impacts of Wildlife Trade?         
Extinction of Wildlife 1857 45 1902 98% 
Environmental Degradation 1924 53 1977 97% 
Emerging Diseases 1625 50 1675 97% 
Do Not Know 17 8 25 68% 
What is the most important reason to stop Wildlife Trade?     
Legislation from Government 927 29 956 97% 
Cheaper non-Wildlife Products 286 14 300 95% 
Protection of Environment 635 24 659 96% 
Prevent Disease Emergence 171 13 184 93% 
Social Pressure 136 3 139 98% 
Which Group can best stop Wildlife Trade?         
Government 1896 54 1950 97% 
Local Community 1445 46 1491 97% 
Non-Government Organisations 1215 41 1256 97% 
Businesses 816 26 842 97% 
Scientists 472 17 489 97% 
Others 28 0 28 100% 
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should be applied to the representative nature of results from online surveys (Lee et al. 2015), the 
principle of random choice can still be maintained, since all active users of an online platform have 
equal chances of responding (Ilieva et al. 2002). For selected populations, online surveys have been 
demonstrated to yield comparable results to traditional (off-line) results (Krantz et al. 1997; 
Buchanan & Smith 1999; Evans & Mathur 2005; Lindhjem & Navrud 2011).  
 
Online and offline surveys report wide ranges in response rates depending upon type of survey and 
access the target populations may have to the internet (Kaplowitz et al. 2004). This study’s response 
rate (38.7%, 2,106/5,448) was within the range of similar studies (Cook et al. 2000; Sills & Song 2002; 
Kaplowitz et al. 2004) providing confidence in the methodology employed here. In two recent, 
offline studies of attitudes towards wildlife trade, between 31.1% (n = 1,352) (Zhang et al. 2008) and 
29.6% (n = 315) (Zhang & Yin 2014) of respondents in China said they had consumed wildlife. These 
percentages are not statistically (X2 = 3.50, p=0.17) different from this study’s result of 28.2% of 
respondents reporting wildlife consumption. 
 
The population targeted in this study was Chinese millennials. The online survey format here was 
specifically selected to efficiently target Chinese millennials. The population surveyed in this study 
matched the target group in income, geography, education, and age. By demographic data, the 
respondents conformed to the definition of millennials in that they were (a) well-educated (92% had 
university or higher education), wealthy (56.7% reported annual salaries 20% higher than the urban 
average) and urban dwelling, i.e. the urban middle class (Zhang & Shaw 2015). Since only social 
media users were targeted, the population was already online, familiar with technology to the 
extent that installation and use of a web-based application would require, and active users, defined 
as having posted on their respective accounts or responded to any other survey or campaign within 
30-days. Analysis of the data demonstrated that there was no significant variance in responses to 
questions between any age, geographic cluster, or other grouping and so confidence may be high 
that the results reported here represent the larger population. 
 
Although the millennials surveyed here may not represent the poorer rural demographic that is 
more likely to come into contact with wildlife and domestic animals with frequency (Webster et al. 
2016), they do represent the demographic that is currently driving the demand for wildlife products 
as food, ornaments, or medicine (Zhang et al. 2008; Zhang & Shaw 2015). In other countries, 
populations putting highest pressure on wildlife (hunters, poachers, and consumers) can sometimes 
most effectively apply pressure to government and society to conserve the endangered wildlife 
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(Gibson & Marks 1995; Paulson 2012). Once consumers of a wildlife resource are invested in 
ensuring its maintenance (as a resource), then often they become conservationists (Leader-Williams 
2001; Lindsey et al. 2006). 
 
As they, and especially their children, become wealthier or expand the middle class, it seems likely 
that Chinese millennials will become more invested in improving their environment, conserving 
wildlife, and importantly in reducing the risk of zoonotic disease emergence (Zhang et al. 2008; 
Zhang & Shaw 2015). The surveyed population in this study confirmed this hypothesis with 96.3% of 
respondents saying that wildlife trade should be stopped, although not unanimous as to why. One 
target of behaviour change intervention in China is to convert this population from consumers of 
wildlife into more savvy protectors of their environment who are also aware of potential public 
health risks inherent in wildlife trade (Wong 2003). This study presented here strongly suggests that 
Chinese millennials are already very much aware of conservation or environmental reasons to stop 
wildlife trade, and there is potential for them to become more aware of the health reasons. 
 
From before and after reading the definition of wildlife trade in the survey, most respondents did 
not alter their view that protection of wildlife and the environment was the most important reason 
to stop wildlife trade. As expected, this suggests that (a) the duration of a 5-minute survey was not 
sufficient to alter perceptions, but it is sufficient to provide an increased level of education around 
the targeted issue. It would be illustrative to revaluate results after this demographic is exposed to a 
targeted campaign on wildlife trade and emerging disease risks. 
 
During the survey, respondents did exhibit an increased awareness of some importance of emerging 
infectious diseases as a reason for stopping wildlife trade. While the population surveyed was mostly 
aware that SARS-CoV, Ebola, and avian influenza emerge from wildlife, they did not seem to make 
the connection that wildlife trade may then present very real risks to health. This may be due to 
most respondents (62.2%) saying they had not had contact with any wildlife in the past 12 months, 
which would have influenced their valuing disease risk lower than conservation. Actual disease 
occurrence or outcomes of the surveyed population were not assessed in this study due to the 
limited response time in the online survey format. Potential future studies could examine whether 
awareness and attitude regarding disease risks from wildlife trade vary among those having contact 
with wildlife (including any potential risk factors such as bites or scratches) and any associated 
infectious diseases. 
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The emphasis on elephant ivory in anti-wildlife trade messaging in China has helped to shape public 
awareness of conservation risks. In fact, at the end of 2016, the Chinese government announced a 
ban on all commercial processing and sale of ivory and ivory products effective by the end of 2017 
(PRC 2016a). This legislation has been attributed not only to international pressure, but to education 
and awareness campaigns within China (Wong & Gettleman 2016). SARS-CoV already has emerged 
from the local trade in wildlife in China and a similar anti-wildlife trade messaging to promote 
awareness of health risks is urgently needed and may prove as effective. This study suggests that a 
dual approach involving both local level and online community education along the lines of IFAW’s 
campaign may work towards mitigating future health and conservation impacts of wildlife trade in 
China.   
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5 Behavioural Surveillance and Risk 
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5.1 Introduction 
Determining what causes the emergence of pandemics, and in what context, is the subject of much 
research and debate (Morse et al. 2012). In many cases, this work has involved analysing the causes 
of specific diseases that emerge, and determining the risk behaviours and environments that are 
involved in initial spillover of a virus from wildlife (Cleaveland et al. 2007; Han et al. 2016a). One of 
the key, high-risk circumstances in which humans and wild animals interact is via wildlife trade and 
in areas where rural and often poor communities abut wild or forested areas (Cleaveland et al. 2007; 
Grace et al. 2012). Different stages of the wildlife trade have been implicated in the emergence of 
severe acute respiratory syndrome caused by Coronavirus (SARS-CoV), human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV), avian influenza (AI), Ebola (EVD), monkeypox, and a series of other high-profile emerging 
infectious diseases (Hahn et al. 2000; Leroy et al. 2004; Sejvar et al. 2004; Webster 2004; Woo et al. 
2006a; Ellis et al. 2012). 
 
Trade in wildlife originates with wild-sourced animals that are then transported to consumers 
primarily in urban centres and may include transit through animal markets of all sizes, animal 
warehouses, animal farms, restaurants, and processing sites or abattoirs (Kruse et al. 2004; FAO 
2011). In southern China wildlife has long been utilised for food, medicine, pets and as raw material 
(Zhang et al. 2008; Chow et al. 2014). Recent globalisation of trade and increasing wealth have 
resulted in higher demand for wildlife foods, particularly in the wealthier urban centres, both for 
nutritional purposes and for traditional medicine (Yiming & Wilcove 2005). Large live animal markets 
selling legal and illegal wildlife such as those in Guangdong Province grew to accommodate this 
demand (Li et al. 1996; Yiming & Dianmo 1998). In these markets and all along the wildlife trade 
routes, there are many opportunities for zoonotic emergence as wild animals come into frequent 
contact with each other, domestic animals, and humans (Morse 1995; Karesh et al. 2005; Lau et al. 
2005). Amongst the diverse species traded are bats, rodents, other small mammals such as civets, 
cats, and dogs, reptiles, amphibians, and nonhuman primates, many of which are reservoirs for 
zoonotic diseases (McFarlane et al. 2012). 
 
The practice of consuming and handling wildlife represents a substantial risk for zoonotic disease 
spillover, especially given the diversity of wildlife traded as well as the density of the human 
population in southern China (Cleaveland et al. 2007; Yin et al. 2016; NBSC 2017). This was 
highlighted by the emergence of SARS-CoV in 2003, which can be traced back to a series of putative 
first recorded infections or index cases among restaurant workers and wildlife traders in Guangdong 
province (Xu et al. 2004). The markets from which those infected individuals had purchased wildlife 
  
102 
were found to sell SARS-CoV infected civets, and have evidence of prior circulation of SARS-CoV (i.e. 
antibodies to SARS-CoV) when animals were sampled following the outbreak (Li et al. 2005). SARS-
CoV has not re-emerged in human populations globally or in China since the last recorded outbreak 
in early 2004 despite the continued operation of wildlife trade that was implicated in its emergence 
(Reuters 2004). Wildlife trade routes in southern China have been documented (Yiming & Dianmo 
1996; Zhang et al. 2008). However, the behaviours and motivations of those involved in the wildlife 
trade have not been explored in much detail, and understanding these may be key to preventing 
high-risk behaviour in the future. 
 
5.2 Southern China Rural Communities 
Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong provinces were targeted in this study because they have diverse 
wildlife populations, a large rural population, numerous live animal markets, and wildlife found to 
harbour viruses with pathogenic potential for humans (Field 2009). These three provinces along with 
bordering Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar are known hotspots for faunal diversity (Myers et al. 2000) 
and have long been integral to trading routes to southern China, and especially to Guangdong 
Province (Yiming & Dianmo 1998). This region is also home to protected forests and other areas 
where wildlife has been traditionally hunted and captured (Yiming & Wilcove 2005). 
 
Rural communities in south China primarily cultivate rice, and manage orchards, swine, and poultry 
on small farms of around 0.7 hectares (Huang et al. 2012). These farms are usually located in rural 
and poorly developed areas proximate to natural protected forests, parks, or wetlands. The region is 
densely populated, and like much of China, urban centres are spread throughout, with farmers often 
relying on swill from urban restaurants to feed their animals (Wang et al. 2016). Rodents are 
ubiquitous in the rural communities due to the abundance of crops and domestic animal feed 
(Singleton 2003). This mixed landscape brings humans and domestic animals in close contact among 
dense populations, and via the wildlife trade, creates an interface of potential high-risk for zoonotic 
emergence. This study will examine the hypothesis that the populations in these rural communities 
have direct and frequent contact with their own animals as well as with commensal species and 
wildlife, and that these associations result in zoonotic spillover. 
 
The Chinese Ministry of Health provides annual national reports of morbidity and mortality of 
communicable and noncommunicable diseases, and these provide some trends on disease incidence 
(MOH 2017). For example, the annual number of morbidities due to viral haemorrhagic fever and 
diseases of unknown aetiology has fluctuated over recent years, with an overall decline from 2003 to 
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2016 (Figure 27). This may reflect improved diagnostics beginning in 2008 with national healthcare 
reform (Yip et al. 2012), so that the trends are difficult to accurately assess. However, these data 
show that there are around 10,000 cases of viral haemorrhagic fever and disease of unknown 
aetiology in China each year. Some of these cases may represent novel emerging diseases such as 
bat SARS-like Coronavirus (SL-CoV) or a member of several viral families known to harbour viruses 
that cause haemorrhagic fever such as the Filoviridae (Ebola and Marburg), Flaviviridae (Dengue, 
Yellow fever, Kyasanur forest disease virus), Bunyaviridae (Rift Valley fever virus), or Arenaviridae 
(Lassa fever virus) (Hammon et al. 1960; Kuhn et al. 2016). Diverse viral species from all of these 
families have been found in bat and rodent reservoirs in China and likely many more remain as yet 
undiscovered (Wang et al. 2009; Li 2013b; He et al. 2015; Li et al. 2015). This speculative hypothesis 
that there may be regular viral spillover yielding diseases of unknown aetiology in rural populations 
in China could be tested by taking samples from people and testing them for evidence of infection 
by wildlife viruses, e.g. using serology specific to wildlife viruses. In the absence of serological data, 
conducting behavioural surveillance of individuals with known exposure to wildlife and self-
reporting incidence of diseases of unknown aetiology may provide a measure of risk of contact with 
wildlife and therefore a proxy of spillover risk. Correlation of exposure data with the prevalence of 
self-reported, (a) undiagnosed severe acute respiratory infections (SARI), (b) influenza-like illnesses 
(ILI), and (c) encephalitis symptoms may provide a mechanistic understanding of the potential for 
zoonotic disease emergence in the region. The goal of the current study was to conduct human 
behavioural surveillance to provide a baseline understanding of the risk of spillover in these 
communities, which could then be used to identify both the potential for and the drivers of the 
emergence of novel zoonoses. 
 
Figure 27. Morbidities from viral haemorrhagic fever and disease of unknown aetiology in China. Source: Ministry of 
Health, People’s Republic of China (MOH). Data range is from 2003 to 2016. The increase in morbidities from 2009 to 2012 
may have been due to the emergence of the avian influenza H1N1 A virus and associated cases of fever with haemorrhage 
(Fugate et al. 2010), which were most likely reported at that time as diseases of unknown aetiology due to difficulties in 
accurately diagnosing H1N1 (Hussain et al. 2012).Guangdong Wildlife Markets 
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Taiping Market and Foshan Market in Guangdong Province in the greater Guangzhou City area 
(Figure 28) were selected for this study due to their reported size and centrality in the wildlife trade 
in China (PGGM 2006; Hu & Chen 2007). Towards the end of the SARS outbreak in late July 2003, the 
Guangdong Provincial Government passed a new health regulation requiring that people stop wild 
animal consumption to prevent zoonotic diseases (China Daily 2003). This was the first such 
regulation at a provincial level in policy around consumption of wild animals in China, but it did not 
address the wild animal markets (Luo 2003). By the end of the SARS epidemic in late 2003 and early 
January 2004 and as soon as SARS-like Coronaviruses (SL-CoV) had been detected in civets (Paguma 
lavarta) in a Foshan market, thousands of these and other market animals were culled, banned from 
all markets, and civet farms shut down (Watts 2004; Cheng et al. 2007). Within a week and before 
the end of January of 2004, all the wildlife markets in Guangdong province were closed by the 
Provincial Government working with the Forestry Department (Guan et al. 2003; Luo 2003; Zhong 
2004; Zhao 2007). By early March, Guangdong Provincial Forestry Department officials were 
reported to be discussing plans to reopen wild animal markets (Reuters 2004). In May 2004, when 
the World Health Organization announced that for over three weeks there had been no cases of 
human or human transmitted SARS, wildlife markets were already open and operating again in 
Guangdong Province (WHO 2004; Zhong 2004). 
 
 
Figure 28. Guangdong Province. The cities of Foshan, Taiping, Guangzhou, Hong Kong, and Shenzhen are indicated. The 
two markets observed in this study were located in Foshan and Taiping cities respectively.In November 2006 about 
four years after the initial outbreak of SARS in China, it was announced on the official Guangzhou 
City website that the largest wildlife wholesale market in Guangdong Province, and possibly in 
China, was being relocated from Guangzhou City to Taiping Town in the suburbs of Chonghua City 
about 60km to the northeast (PGGM 2006). The reason for the move was due to the human 
population density of Guangzhou City and the potential health risks in the wake of SARS (PGGM 
2006). The Taiping City Wildlife Market that opened in 2006 is the same market observed in this 
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study, and was set up jointly by the Guangzhou City Forestry Department, Conghua City Forestry 
Bureau, and the Taiping Township Forestry Station with an investment of RMB30 million 
(approximately £2.5 million at 2017 RMB to GBP exchange rates) (PGGM 2006). The purpose of the 
new market was to permit the wholesale selling of licensed wildlife, and it would be under strict 
inspection and checks (PGGM 2006). No verifiable reports exist, but claims are made that the 
Taiping City Wildlife Market is the largest in China and if not, it is a major centre for illegal wildlife 
trade (Hu & Chen 2007; Anon 2012; Hancock 2014). Starting in 2012 through to the present, there 
have been many publicised raids followed by repeated closing and reopening of the Taiping Market 
throughout which period the market continued to sell wildlife species (Xie 2012; GDPPP 2014; GDFN 
2016). The Foshan Market about 20km to the southwest of Guangzhou expanded in size around the 
same time as the official closing of the Guangzhou City wildlife market (Hu & Chen 2007). This 
market also experienced multiple closures starting in 2007, with some raids confiscating almost 
100,000 illegally traded wild animals (Hu & Chen 2007; Huang 2007; Tan 2014).  
 
5.4 Interdisciplinary Disease Surveillance 
A growing number of studies has investigated the connection between humans and non-human 
animals and how this relationship affects health (Daszak et al. 2001; Daszak et al. 2007; Johnson et 
al. 2015). As the rate of emerging zoonotic diseases increases, a holistic or one health understanding 
of this interface will become more important to preventing disease emergence (Karesh & Cook 2005; 
Jones et al. 2008). Examining the factors motivating the consumption and use of wild animals 
requires first an understanding of how humans relate to animals in their shared environment (Hurn 
2012; Liu et al. 2014). By combining anthropological and ecological methods to evaluate the diverse 
ways in which human and animals interact (Frake 1962; Abel 1998), effective solutions to the 
problem of emerging zoonoses may be discovered (Daszak et al. 2000; Wood et al. 2012).  
 
In this study, both qualitative and quantitative surveys were conducted. The goal of qualitative 
research is to present an account of activities people conduct in their natural settings and what 
these actions mean to them (Britten et al. 1995; Erikson 2017). A qualitative approach is used in this 
study to understand the social and environmental context in which infectious disease spillover may 
occur, i.e. the reason ‘why’ risk behaviour occurs. The two distinct qualitative methodologies were 
utilised in this study: observational research and ethnographic or one-on-one interviews. The goal of 
quantitative research is to empirically investigate data employing measurable evidence (Williams 
2007; Firmin 2008) . A quantitative approach was used to identify the types of contact, degree of 
contact, frequency of contact, and other parameters, i.e. ‘what’ risk behaviours occurred. 
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5.5 Ethnographic Approach 
Southern China has a history of over 100 years of ethnographic study primarily due to its cultural 
diversity (Osgood 1963; Guldin 1994; Wang 2005). An ethnographic approach is holistic and 
integrates different data collection methods such as participant observation, unstructured or semi-
structured interviews, and questionnaires to systematically describe perceptions of a community of 
interest (Bernard 2006). Observations including drawings, notes, photographs, and audio recordings 
are used to add context to data collection and analyses, particularly in sample site selection (Gray 
2009). Drawings of markets are invaluable tools to aid recollection and provide supplemental details 
during analyses. Ethnographic semi-structured interviews are a series of pre-scripted and open-
ended questions to be asked of a participant permitting discussion around a topic, and from which 
additional information may be gleaned (Bernard 2006). By integrating ethnographic interviews, 
observations, and quantitative data research the motivations that drive consumption of wildlife and 
identify the highest risk activities or interactions may be revealed. 
 
In the live animal markets of southern China, the high degree of contact between people and a 
diversity of animal species due to a high volume of handling, butchering, and other activities may 
result in conditions that allow viruses like SARS-CoV to emerge and spread. Additionally, contact and 
exposure to wildlife in rural communities is thought to be frequent and to put this population at risk 
of infection. To test these assumptions, this study reports on results of surveys of two live animal 
markets in Guangdong province and the behaviour and attitudes of humans in rural communities 
with exposure to wildlife. Behaviour and potential for zoonotic spillover to humans with high 
occupational exposure to bats and other wildlife are also evaluated. 
 
5.6 Research Question, Hypotheses, and General Approach 
The general methodology and design employed in this study is visualised in Figure 29. As explored in 
Chapter 4 on Wildlife Trade, the demand and large-scale consumption of wildlife comes from urban 
centres, but there is also likely high exposure to wildlife, and among wildlife, domestic animals and 
people at the interface with wild regions and in rural areas (Webster et al. 2016). To better 
understand the risks of zoonotic emergence, research in this chapter explores the following four 
areas: 
 
• the types of wildlife exposures experienced by people living and working in an environment 
known for wildlife trade 
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• the socioeconomic drivers of the local wildlife trade, as well as the classification and value 
placed upon different wild animals 
• the potential risk factors for zoonotic disease transmission associated with exposure to wild 
animals particularly bats, rodents, and nonhuman primates 
• reported incidences of unusual illnesses. 
 
 
Figure 29. Diagram of methodology and design of field components of this study. Original research from this thesis (See 
Chapter 3) as well as other published studies and personal observations yielded a pool of sites designated as high-risk for 
zoonotic viral spillover. Scoping visits were conducted along with observational surveys and based upon criteria detailed in 
Section 5.9, study sites were selected. Ethnographic surveys were then conducted, transcribed, translated, and coded. 
Following analyses of the coded surveys, a quantitative survey or structured questionnaire was developed and conducted 
at a subset of the selected sites. The final step is analyses of the observations and questionnaires. 
 
It is expected that rural Chinese farmers and residents would have the highest exposure to wildlife 
and given this constant exposure would also be most likely to contract illnesses of unknown 
aetiology, and likely from pathogens of wild or domestic animals. By combining (a) observational 
surveys, (b) ethnographic interviews, and (c) structured interviews, the research in this chapter aims 
to 1) identify biological, behavioural, and ecological factors influencing the risk of viral spillover and 
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2) determine potential targets for intervention based on high-risk human behaviours and practices 
that amplify disease transmission. By addressing these aims, the research conducted here will build 
upon the current understanding of the drivers of zoonotic disease emergence and host-pathogen 
dynamics. 
 
5.7 Methods 
Qualitative and quantitative methodologies were conducted with individuals living in the provinces 
of Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan in rural southern and southwestern China. The methods 
consisted of (a) observational surveys, (b) one-on-one ethnographic interviews, and (c) behavioural 
surveillance consisting of structured surveys. Eligible sites were identified by the presence of virus-
positive non-human animal samples (primarily bats and rats) surveyed during the study. The proxy 
for risk of spillover was the likelihood of human, domestic animal, and wildlife interaction 
determined following scoping visits and observational surveys.  
 
Community sites were selected based on the following eligibility criteria and following confirmatory 
scoping visits and initial observational surveys:  
• research from this thesis (Chapters 3) and other work (Zhang et al. 2009a; Ge et al. 2012; Ge 
et al. 2013; He et al. 2014) had confirmed large bat populations in caves and other natural or 
manmade roosting sites 
• bats and other animals including humans found to be positive for Paramyxoviruses or 
Coronaviruses in this study (Chapter 3) or in other studies (Li et al. 2005; Li et al. 2010; Ge et 
al. 2012; Yuan et al. 2014) 
• regular contact observed among wildlife, domestic animals, and humans in previous 
research (Chapter 3) 
• wild animal farming, consumption, and trade was known or observed to occur (Li et al. 1996; 
Yiming & Dianmo 1996; Li & Wang 1999) 
 
If interactions were observed among humans, domestic animals, and wildlife at a site, then it was 
scored highest and considered a ‘high-risk site’, and added to a pool of potential field sites for this 
study. Accessibility was also a determining factor as some sites were prohibitively distant from other 
research conducted for this thesis. The terrain, poor road conditions, and adverse weather patterns 
such as rain storms and flash flooding make long distance travel prohibitive and can isolate certain 
regions particularly in southern Yunnan and Guangxi provinces (Davies 2014; Meixian et al. 2014; 
Anon 2015; Luan 2016). Duplicate conditions or sites were eliminated and a final list of ‘high-risk’ 
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sites was determined consisting of 18 rural communities (towns or villages) in Guangdong (4), 
Guangxi (5), and Yunnan (9) Provinces in southern China (Figure 30, Table 16). 
 
 
Figure 30. Southern China field sitesindicated by concentric circles. Field sites were in Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong 
Provinces. Behavioural, observational, and quantitative surveys were conducted at all sites in Yunnan Province (indicated 
by green circles). Only behavioural and observational surveys were conducted at other sites in Guangxi and Guangdong 
(indicated by black circles).
 
Figure 31. Farmland at Zijiadeng villageLat. 25.499607, Long. 100.529432) in Xiangyun county in Yunnan Province. This 
photo details highly managed or human dominated landscape of terraced rice paddies, houses (white and beige 
structures) and farms (brick red with black roofs), and small tree plantings. In the back left, some strip mining is visible 
(grey patch on hills) and orchards are planted on the hills to centre and left immediately above the rice paddies. The 
vegetation on the hilltops is secondary forest. Some hills in the mid foreground (centre of photo) have evidence of 
anthropogenic or natural erosion (bare earth patches). The hills on the far right are pine (Pinus yunnanensis) plantations. 
The blue roof in the foreground is the cover of a cement walled shed housing civets (Paguma larvata) and Malayan 
porcupine (Hystrix brachyura) at the compound of one of the wildlife farmers interviewed for this study. 
Community sites in each province were in a mixed-use rural agricultural landscape containing 
secondary forested patches abutting croplands that surround villages and towns (Figure 31). 
Population data were not available for each site, but estimates from local Centres for Disease 
Control and Prevention were approximately 1,500 individuals within the sprawling village or 
township with approximately 200-250 individuals per each community site, which was a clustering of 
  
110 
several farm houses surrounded by agricultural fields (personal observations). Villages or town areas 
included the following: 
 
• small live animal markets (5-30 animals) where wildlife was also sold 
• farms that bred domestic and wildlife species for consumption and trade 
• hunting areas; restaurants butchering and serving wildlife 
• facilities where wildlife and domestic animals were housed before being transported to 
larger markets 
• caves where people collected guano 
• caves used by tourists 
• residential areas with bat roosts 
 
5.8 Targeted Demographic for Human Surveillance 
Participants were recruited primarily through local contacts that were cultivated during previous 
research for this thesis. Local contacts included biologists and researchers from provincial 
universities or institutes, personnel from local Centres for Disease Control, and wildlife farmers. 
These contacts facilitated introductions and provided referrals to local residents and community 
leaders. Individuals who were 18 years of age or older and who were able to provide informed 
consent were eligible to participate. All participants received a token gift of a bottle of cooking oil 
valued at US$10 in appreciation of their time. 
 
For the ethnographic interviews and to achieve representation of participants with exposure to 
wildlife, purposive sampling was employed. In this method, participants were selected because they 
met predetermined criteria relevant to addressing the research question (Saumure & Given 2008). 
For the behavioural surveillance, an adaptive cluster sampling method was utilised (Thompson 1990) 
following identification (by observational surveys and ethnographic interviews) of clusters or 
communities of highly exposed individuals. Both ethnographic and behavioural surveys were 
conducted on humans selected based upon the following criteria: 
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live in or near (4km or less) a bat cave 
hunt or farm wildlife 
work in markets that sell wildlife 
work in or eat at restaurants selling wildlife 
work in a nature reserve or other protected wildlife habitat 
 
5.9 Field Sampling Methodology, Biosafety, Security, and Approvals 
All field team members were trained in correct use of personal protective equipment (PPE) as well 
as hygiene and safety to minimise potential exposure or injury. All team members were required to 
pass the Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) Research Team Member training 
modules in Human Subjects Research, Healthcare Ethics Committee, and Biosafety and Security 
(about.citiprogram.org). Field team members received a 2-day long interactive training on 
qualitative and quantitative approaches to human behavioural surveys including ‘mock’ or trial 
ethnographic interviews and recording sessions. 
 
The methodology and human sample collection protocols in this study (See Chapter 2. Methods and 
Appendix 7.7 and Appendix 7.8) were approved by the USA-based Hummingbird Institutional Review 
Board and the Institutional Review Boards of two Chinese institutions: Wuhan University School of 
Public Health and the Yunnan Institute for Endemic Disease Control and Prevention. Three types of 
field sampling methodology were conducted for this research: observational, ethnographic 
interviews, and quantitative surveys.  
 
5.9.1 Observational Methods 
Observational surveys were conducted at all identified high-risk locations as part of scoping visits 
(Figure 29). Once field sites were determined (Figure 30) additional observational surveys were 
conducted concurrent with ethnographic and quantitative surveys. Site observations were general, 
open ended, and conducted to (a) identify appropriate field sites and (b) provide supplemental data 
for the quantitative results. An Observational Checklist (See Appendix 7.5) modified from Gray 
(2009) was developed to determine if (a) there were evidence of human-animal interaction and (b) 
observed potential for spillover and transmission of zoonotic diseases from wildlife.  
 
Observations were recorded on paper and digitally (audio) on site whenever possible. If timing or 
sensitivity of residents to recording activities (e.g. note taking or photographing) did not permit on-
site recording, then observations were made immediately upon exiting the location. For site scoping 
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visits two or more team members recorded observations. After recording the information, the 
observations were pooled by visit. Since all sites were selected based upon the interaction of wild 
animals, domestic animals, and humans, the following guidelines were developed for observational 
research conducted in the field: 
 
• Assess human population (customer and vendor in markets or restaurants; inhabitants or 
area residents elsewhere): age, sex, ethnicity, and relationships. 
• Assess facilities and condition, e.g. toilets; hand washing areas; waste disposal method and 
locations; and drainage. Are there signs of health department inspections or notices about 
health and safety or regulations? Are permits or licenses displayed? 
• Observe if people use any personal protective equipment (PPE), e.g. masks or gloves. 
• Observe ventilation conditions and infrastructure including number of floors, exits, and how 
people, animals, and vehicles move through the site. 
• Is there any evidence of butchering activity? E.g. feathers, offal, etc. 
• Assess conditions of animals. Estimate the number of cages or holding areas; number of 
animals in each cage or holding area; and total number of animals in the market. Observe 
how cages and animals are arrayed, e.g. stacked, spaced, in shade/sun, etc. 
• Vehicles: note arrivals and departures. Check license plates to see if vendors or customers 
are local or from another province. 
• Map: sketch an overview of the site including all buildings, roads, activities, and other 
features 
 
To be as unobtrusive and inconspicuous as possible while maintaining accuracy, animal count 
estimates in markets and warehouses were always made by the same two members of the field 
team, recorded immediately upon leaving the market, compared, averaged, and then summarised. 
 
Observational surveys were conducted in two settings: (a) villages and towns and (b) at two of the 
largest known and operating wildlife and animal markets in China (Zhang & Jiang 2010; Anon 2012). 
After sites were selected, observational surveys at towns and villages were conducted 
opportunistically and concurrently with ethnographic and quantitative surveys. Observational 
surveys at markets were conducted twice per year at six-month intervals each at Taiping Market and 
Foshan Market. These markets were located in the greater Guangzhou City area. Southwest of 
Guangzhou City (Lat. 22.640484, Long. 112.258051) in Foshan, Foshan Market is predominantly a 
seafood market, a parking lot, and a section (approximately 0.5 hectares) of 80-100 covered and 
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connected two-story stalls selling wildlife and domestic animals. Taiping Market is located (Lat. 
23.548852, Long. 113.586605) northeast of Guangzhou City in Conghua City and is currently the 
largest known live animal and wildlife market in China. It consists of up to 160 covered and 
connected two-story stalls, a parking lot, and two restaurants sprawled across approximately 2 
hectares (Figure 32) (PGGM 2006). Above the stalls in each market are living quarters where vendors 
sleep, wash clothing, care for children, and conduct other activities that are also carried out on the 
ground-level stalls amongst the caged animals. 
 
 
Figure 32. An observational survey diagram of Taiping market in Guangdong Province of China. Initial site survey visit on 05 
April 2015. This type of observation supplements other quantitative data following site visits. Two field team members 
make observational drawings such as the one here and then compare notes for consistency. Cf. Figure 8 with more legible 
annotations.Ethnographic Survey Methods 
In-depth ethnographic surveys were conducted at 15 field sites in Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan 
Provinces (Table 16). All sites were selected as per the observational survey site-selection criteria. 
Surveys were conducted by 3 trained interviewers from regional Centres for Disease Control and 
Prevention and were designed to last no more than 60 minutes. Interviews were audio-recorded,  
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Table 16. Field sites. Table presents observational (Obs.), ethnographic (Ethno.), or quantitative (Qnt.) surveys that were 
conducted in Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan Provinces of China along with corresponding latitude and longitude 
coordinates.  
Obs. Ethno. Qnt. Latitude Longitude 
Guangdong Province 21 27 0  
  
Conghua City      
  
Taiping Market 6 0 0 23.548852 113.586605 
Dongxing Village 3 8 0 23.733328 113.827509 
Foshan City        
Foshan Market 6 0 0 22.640484 112.258051 
Huidong City      
  
Lianghua Town 2 15 0 23.093938 114.812583 
Zengcheng City      
  
Xiaolou Town 2 3 0 23.369907 113.806924 
Zijing City      
  
Wenquan Village 2 1 0 23.440845 115.165036 
Guangxi Province 12 25 0 
  
Lipu City      
  
Licheng Town 3 5 0 24.486367 110.392084 
Fu Village 3 1 0 24.512104 110.334425 
Xin'an City      
  
Gaozhai Village 2 9 0 25.367259 110.364042 
Lengshuitang Village 2 3 0 25.289080 110.379661 
Yanqian Village 2 7 0 24.534267 110.515207 
Yunnan Province 22 35 685  
  
Anning City      
  
Wenquan Town 2 2 130 24.914012 102.478181 
Jinning County      
  
Xiyang Town 2 0 137 24.457291 102.322778 
Lufeng City      
  
Zhong Village 3 5 80 24.986802 102.108419 
Xiang Qing Town 3 1 66 25.074788 102.086933 
Xiangyun County      
  
Banqiao Village 3 4 27 25.705578 100.153770 
Midian Village 2 10 50 25.680951 100.753154 
Zijiadeng Village 2 13 58 25.499607 100.529432 
Xishuangbanna County      
  
Mengla Town 3 0 65 21.486666 101.570706 
Jinne Town 2 0 72 21.695760 100.050267 
TOTAL 55 87 685 
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transcribed, and then translated into English. A total of 10% of the interviews were selected for 
secondary transcription and translation for quality control. Analysis of themes provided a framework 
with which to code and analyse data from the ethnographic surveys (Braun & Clarke 2006). 
 
Five core themes were used (Table 17) to form the basis for analysis of the ethnographic interview 
data. The five themes were: (1) human movement and travel, (2) socioeconomics and daily life, (3) 
biosecurity in human environments, (4) unusual illness, death, and medical care, and (5) human-
animal contact. Individual interviews and field notes were studied to ensure familiarity with the data 
and to confirm narrative consistency within individual interviews prior to coding. A coding keyword 
guide (See Section 7.15) permitted consistent coverage of the themes that were the focus of the 
interviews. Qualitative data were re-examined to develop additional theoretical categories. Central 
to this analysis was an assessment of the participants’ perceptions (including observed changes over 
time) and participation in the wildlife trade. The data were coded for factors associated with wildlife 
consumption, the socioeconomic drivers of the local wildlife trade, conservation and legal efforts, 
the prevalence and types of wildlife observed, and wildlife exposures that could transmit disease to 
humans. All coding and qualitative data analyses were performed using Quirkos (2017), Microsoft 
Word, and Excel (2016). 
 
Table 17. Core themes for ethnographic interviewers. These were used as general guides in semi-structured interviews. 
Checklist for Core Themes for Ethnographic Interviews 
☐ Human movement  
 Home  
 Work  
 Travel 
 Observed environment 
 
☐ Socioeconomics  
 Daily routine 
 Animal responsibilities  
 Education 
 Economics  
 
 
☐ Biosecurity in human environments  
 Water and food  
 Sanitation 
 Hygiene  
 
☐ Illness, medical care/treatment and death  
 Household illness 
 Illness from animals 
 Medical care/treatment 
 Death 
 
☐ Human-animal contact 
 Indirect contact 
 Direct contact 
 Animal products/rituals 
 Animal health 
 Perceptions/knowledge 
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5.9.3 Behavioural Surveillance Methods 
A structured behavioural questionnaire (See Section 7.20) was designed to measure exposure or 
behavioural risk to examine the potential mechanisms of zoonotic viral spillover and build on the 
data acquired via the ethnographic interviews conducted in this study. The questionnaire assessed 
animal exposures and incidences of illness of unknown aetiology over the respondent’s lifetime and 
during the prior 12 months including contact with animals, travel, health, disease, and hygiene. 
Standardised syndromic case definitions were used to design questions about experience of illnesses 
of unknown aetiology, e.g. severe acute respiratory infections (SARI), influenza-like illness (ILI), 
febrile symptoms, and encephalitis. Each respondent was assessed for undiagnosed illness 
symptoms in the past year, over his or her lifetime, as well as in respective families. The 
questionnaire examined the respondent’s contact with animals, type of exposure, and the species 
involved. These data were then evaluated to determine whether there were any correlations 
between species and types of contact and reported symptoms. The full questionnaire was designed 
to take no more than 30 minutes. Quiet and private locations were identified before the interviews, 
which were conducted without other individuals present. To be representative of the larger 
population, the target sample size was estimated at 132 (95% confidence level ±5) given the local 
population estimate of a maximum of 250 individuals in each cluster of potential respondents. 
 
5.10 Results 
5.10.1 Observational Results 
From 11 March 2014 to 2 October 2016, a total of 55 observational surveys were conducted in 20 
sites that included 2 large animal markets with wildlife and 18 rural farming towns or villages in 
Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan Provinces (Table 16). From 24 March to 10 December 2015, 87 
ethnographic interviews were conducted in 16 towns or villages with an average of 29 ethnographic 
interviews in each of these same three provinces. During the months of April, May, and July of 2016, 
behavioural surveys consisting of 685 quantitative questionnaires were conducted in only Yunnan 
Province in a total of 9 towns or villages.  
 
5.10.1.1 Observational Survey Results 
Initial site selection scoping visits and observational surveys were carried out at 27 towns, villages, 
and markets across Guangdong, Yunnan, and Guangxi Provinces. Seven locations were considered 
unsuitable due to limited evidence of contact between humans, wildlife, and domestic animals or 
site accessibility. A total of 20 locations were selected for this study based upon evidence of human-
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animal interaction and observed potential for zoonotic pathogen spillover (See Section 5.9). For all 
20 sites, at least one additional, post-site-selection observational survey was conducted concurrently 
with either ethnographic interviews or quantitative behavioural surveillance. 
 
5.10.1.1.1 Town and Village Observational Survey Results 
Written observations and details recorded in the Observation Checklist were used to confirm the 
suitability of each field site based upon evidence of interactions between humans, domestic animals, 
and wild animals: 
We entered the community through a gate post. At the top of a rise, we exited the car and went down a flight of 
rough brick steps to a gated compound. Behind and below were rice paddies and fields of broad beans and rape. 
Above was a walled area of newly turned and mounded earth. Entering through the gate, I could smell civets 
immediately. Along the cement path were caged areas each about 2 x 3 meters and about 3 or more meters high. A 
lot of room, since only the first three contained different dogs. Most were barking. I was not entirely certain if these 
were guard dogs or for food, but if for food they were not very healthy looking and of different variety than those 
that I usually see sold for eating. The first and third cage had adult dogs - one each. The second cage held two young 
dogs that were barking and whining. The last two cages past the dogs were open and empty. Straw and dirt or dried 
faeces were on the floors some from chickens…. Perpendicular to the aforementioned cages was a rectangular 
cement house or enclosed area. The owner opened the door, which was locked. Inside the smell of civets and 
porcupines was quite strong. There were metal stacked cages of civets - about 10 or fewer. Porcupines were in 
cement enclosures -one or two each - and about the same number. A red bucket of dried corn was on the ledge as 
food for the porcupines. 
– observation at a wildlife farmer’s compound in Xiangqing Town, Lufeng, Yunnan (26 March 2014) 
 
Other observations addressed issues around hygiene and facilities, and permitted rapid assessment 
of conditions of animals in farms and markets including estimates of the number of cages or holding 
areas, number of animals in each cage or holding area, and total number of animals in the market or 
farm such as in the following observation at a nutria (Myocastor coypus) farm: 
 
We visited another wildlife farm where nutria were raised. The area was not far from town but was much more 
rural. The facility was a modern looking house with a cement wall about 10 feet high surrounding it. We were told 
this was to protect against thieves. An older woman was burning weeds out front. There were sheets and clothes 
drying on a line as we entered the compound through solid metal gate-doors. There were four rows of pens, with 
pens on both sides of a row and 10 to 12 pens per side. The first row and one side of the next was empty. The rest of 
the rows all had nutria. They had orange teeth, webbed feet and adults probably weighed 5-7kg. The farmer told us 
that they reproduce rapidly. I saw 10 pens with only females and 5 to 8 babies each. The farmer told us that nutria 
are oilier than bamboo rats and he did not like the taste of them as much. The pens were spotless. The animals were 
being fed something that looked like lettuce. There were about 150 nutria at this farm – possibly more, since 
counting the juveniles and babies was difficult to do with our cursory inspection. A system of drains connected all 
the pens with gates at each one to create a swimming pool for the nutria in the front half of each pen. Some of the 
animals were in the water. They all seemed healthy and clean. The pens were in excellent shape and had roofs over 
each row, but the farm was entirely outside. There was a toilet room at one end that was clean. There were no large 
dogs. Two puppies and one cat were wandering freely about the place. 
– observation at a wildlife farmer’s compound in Fu Village, Lipu, Guangxi (01 November 2014) 
 
Other observations noted presence and shared use of the environment by humans, bats, and 
domestic animals: 
I saw bats at night-time exiting caves about 200 meters from houses in the village. Upon entering the next day, I 
saw bats roosting inside the cave. A stream flowed out of the cave in which I saw local residents washing vegetables 
and clothing, slaughtering chickens, and bathing. Many children were playing in the stream and nearby the cave. 
Dogs wandered about. Villagers told me that they eat bats and rats whenever they can catch them. 
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– observation at Lengshuitang Village, Xin’an, Guangxi (1 July 2014) 
 
As mentioned briefly above, surveys also captured details about human consumption of wildlife as in 
the following observation at a restaurant: 
I watched the chef quickly butcher the bamboo rat, put it in a gutter, and run water from a hose over it for a few 
minutes. He rinsed his hands with the water then rubbed his face. The kitchen was very dark, but well organised 
with several prep and cooking stations. Orders were stuck to the exhaust fan by grease. One of the prep cooks 
butchered two sparrows and threw all of the parts into a pot of water to boil. The walls were brown with grease and 
did not have the usual government approval ratings that were posted in all officially inspected restaurants. All 
cooking elements were fuelled by external gas canisters. There were both a refrigerator and a freezer in the kitchen. 
The menu had one page that exclusively listed wildlife including bamboo rat, cat, dog, badger, porcupine, and civet. 
When asked about whether that was legal or not, Wei Shangzheng pointed out that the restaurant owner would 
always say that all the animals were farmed even if they were not, since only farmable animals were listed on the 
menu. 
– observation at Lipu Restaurant, Lipu, Guangxi (21 September 2014) 
 
5.10.1.1.2 Market Observational Survey Results 
Two large animal markets in Guangdong Province at Foshan City and Taiping Town were selected 
and surveyed a total of 6 times each by the same two observers employing the same methodology: 
once per market every 6 months from 11 March 2014 to 2 October 2016. Foshan Market was the 
smaller of the two and characterised as more compact and with more species mixing by 
observational surveys. 
The market is very large but primarily focused on seafood. There is also a section where they sell poultry and 
mammals. There were approximately 60 stalls in this section and about 25 appeared to be open for business on the 
day we visited. It wasn’t clear why some were closed. The shops selling the animals were smaller than at Taiping 
Market. So too was the market. Also, instead of vendors focusing on one species or one type of animal, there was 
more variety per each vendor. For example, several vendors have stacked cages of chickens, ducks, wild boar, cats, 
civets, and bamboo rats. People were friendly here and not guarded like at Taiping Market. 
– observation at Foshan Market, Guangzhou (2 November 2014) 
 
Further observations were made about hygiene and species mixing and human interactions: 
All of the animals are mixed together in each stall. There was blood and faeces everywhere. Some of the animals 
looked quite sick, with the exception of the goats. All goats were in their own stalls with no other animals, but all of 
the goat stalls were spread throughout the market. The goats all had ear tags and appeared healthy and alert. 
Species were mixed in all of the other stalls. Shops seemed to specialize in having as large a variety as possible. 
Turtles and snakes were mixed in with poultry, boars, pigs, civets, nutria, bamboo rats, regular rats (that looked 
particularly ill). The stalls were bigger than in Taiping market probably 4x5m and packed with cages. There were no 
signs of running water, though there were lots of puddles. There were 2 stories of living space above the stalls 
instead of one. It was a well-constructed market with cement walls and new-looking blue plastic roofs. There were 6 
civets in the market. One in a stall with chickens, ducks, pigs, cats and snakes. Its fur looked matted and dirty. 
Another stall on a side row had at 5 civets in a cage, halfway back into the stall. There were 20 or 30 shoppers here. 
We saw one goat slaughtered and thrown into a basket on the back of a motorcycle. 
– observation at Foshan Market, Guangzhou (27 March 2015) 
 
Taiping Market was the larger and characterised with a greater diversity of vertebrate species, but 
with vendors that were very sensitive to presence of strangers. 
Only one man was actively cleaning out his stall that housed pigs and poultry. Everyone else was prepping lunch, 
eating or doing general cleaning. No one handling animals was wearing gloves or masks. Offal from a snake or 
another reptile was in the lane. There were many more men than women, though mostly women were cleaning the 
stalls. Most people wore open sandals. Some wore sneakers. There were no old people visible and few young 
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children though it seemed that most of the people selling at the market lived above or behind their stalls. One end of 
the lane of stalls had upstairs housing with ceramic tiles and fans and air conditioners plugged into the windows. 
People’s sleeping, living, food prep and slaughter areas were adjacent and without any barriers. There appeared to 
be 3-to-8 people per stall. People looked tired and thin, but no one appeared ill. Most men were smoking. One of the 
waiters at the restaurant nearby where we had lunch told us that the market had been shut down for two months 
following our last visit due to an article published in the paper regarding the unlicensed illegal wild animal trade 
there. 
– observation at Taiping Market, Guangzhou (15 October 2015) 
 
Vendors at the Taiping Market were overheard saying that they: 
 
… assumed we were looking for diseases in the animals. The presence of westerners definitely is a red flag for them 
as is the presence of non-local Chinese. Unless you speak the local dialect, vendors here are not willing to speak with 
you. 
– observation at Taiping Market, Guangzhou (11 November 2014) 
 
Observational surveys at Foshan and Taiping markets recorded a combined total of 3,315 (979 and 
2,336 respectively) individual, non-domestic wild or wild-farmed mammals of 21 species over the 
survey period (Figure 33) and 1,727 domestic animals (dogs, cats, goats, and sheep) were also 
recorded over the same time period. Reptiles, birds, fish, and other taxa were not recorded, but it 
was noted that all these animals were present in both markets during each observational period. 
Aquatic animals were mostly to be found in the Foshan Market. An average of 1,105 individual wild 
or wild-farmed animals were counted within each calendar year at both markets. Foshan Market 
averaged 326 wild animals per year and Taiping Market averaged 799 per year. Taiping Market 
primarily sold terrestrial animals and had more individuals per species and more species diversity 
than Foshan Market. Over the first year of the observation period, counts at both markets decreased 
by an average of 32.8% (Table 18). In the following year, counts at both markets increased by an 
average of 59.5%. 
 
Table 18. Percentage decrease or increase in annual count of wild animals at Foshan and Taiping Markets. These markets 
are located in Guangdong Province, China. Negative values indicate a percentage decrease. Only two years of data were 
recorded, so the first column shows the change from 2014-2015 and the second column the following year from 2015-
2016.
 
2015 2016 
Foshan Market -33.7 34.6 
Taiping Market -31.8 84.3 
Average -32.8 59.5 
 
Of all counted species at the markets only two (Table 31) Arctonyx collaris (hog badger) and Rusa 
unicolor (sambar deer) are listed on the International Union for Conservation of Nature’s Red List of 
Threatened Species as “vulnerable” (IUCN 2016). Only one, Cervus elaphus (red deer), is listed as a 
Class II threatened species on the China Endangered Species List (PRC 2006). 
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As of current published reports (Table 31), at least 143 different viruses from 26 viral families (Table 
19) have been reported in 18 (71.4%) of the wild animal species regularly observed in Foshan and 
Taiping markets. Most (80.9%) of these viruses have been reported in only three species observed in 
the two markets: Sus scrofa (wild boar), Rattus norvegicus (brown rat), and Cervus elaphus (red 
deer). SL-CoVs have been reported in three species observed in these markets: Paguma larvata 
(masked palm civet), Nyctereutes procyonoides (raccoon dog), and Melogale moschata (ferret 
badger). Of the viruses that may be found in the animals in these markets, 60 (42.0%) have also 
been reported in humans (Table 32). These include the following viral families and specific zoonotic 
viruses within them: Coronaviridae (SL-CoV), Paramyxoviridae (Menangle virus, Mumps virus, and 
Nipah virus), and Bunyaviridae (Rift Valley fever virus and Hantavirus). No bats were observed in any 
market during this period.  
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Table 19. Families of 26 viruses from species of animals observed in markets in Guangdong Province China. List is in order 
of number of viruses reported per viral family. Viral Families reported in prior publications as detailed further in Table 31. 
Two Guangdong markets were observed: Foshan and Taiping. 
 
Viral Family 
No. Viruses Reported in 
Species Observed in 
Markets 
Bunyaviridae 17 
Reoviridae 15 
Flaviviridae 13 
Herpesviridae 11 
Paramyxoviridae 10 
Poxviridae 8 
Caliciviridae 7 
Coronaviridae 7 
Parvoviridae 7 
Picornaviridae 7 
Togaviridae 7 
Adenoviridae 6 
Retroviridae 6 
Orthomyxoviridae 3 
Papillomaviridae 3 
Rhabdoviridae 3 
Arenaviridae 2 
Astroviridae 2 
Circoviridae 2 
Anelloviridae 1 
Arteriviridae 1 
Asfarviridae 1 
Bornaviridae 1 
Filoviridae 1 
Hepeviridae 1 
Pneumoviridae 1 
Total 143 
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Figure 33. Numbers of wild animals observed in Foshan and Taiping live animal markets. These animals were observed in the greater Guangzhou area in Guangdong province China between 
March 2014 and October 2016. Four species with a superscript ª are domestic animals. All other species are wild animals and except for Prionailurus bengalensis (Leopard cat) known to be 
both hunted and captive bred in China. 2015 animal counts are lower than 2014 and 2016 counts as indicated by the shorter red bars. 2016 counts at both markets were higher than either 
preceding year. 
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
Rhizomys sinensis (Chinese bamboo rat)
Felis catusª(domestic cat)
Erinaceus amurensis (Manchurian hedgehog)
Canis lupus familiarisª (domestic dog)
Ovis ariesª (domestic sheep)
Capra hircusª (domestic goat)
Hystrix brachyura (Malayan porcupine)
Lepus sinensis (Chinese hare)
Rattus norvegicus (brown rat)
Sus scrofa (wild boar)
Vulpes vulpes (silver fox)
Rhizomys pruinosus (hoary bamboo rat)
Marmota baibacina (grey marmot)
Paguma larvata (masked palm civet)
Melogale moschata(ferret badger)
Rusa unicolor (sambar deer)
Nyctereutes procyonoides (raccoon dog)
Myocastor coypus (nutria)
Mustela sibirica (Siberian weasel)
Mustela kathiah (yellow bellied weasel)
Arctonyx collaris (hog badger)
Muntiacus reevesi (Reeve's muntjac)
Cervus elaphus (red deer)
Petaurista petaurista (common giant flying squirrel)
Prionailurus bengalensis (leopard cat)
2014 2015 2016
  123 
5.10.1.2 Ethnographic Results 
A total of 35 (40.2%) of the 87 ethnographic surveys were conducted in Yunnan Province at six 
different sites; 25 (28.7%) in Guangxi Province at five different sites; and 27 (31.0%) in Guangdong 
Province at five different sites (Table 16). Interviews averaged 36 minutes (SD = 16 minutes) with the 
longest interview lasting 1 hour and 30 minutes and the shortest interview lasting only 13 minutes. 
Most (64.4%, 56/87) of respondents were between the ages of 36 and 55 (Figure 34) with an 
average age of 48. The respondents consisted of 28 women (32.2%, 28/87) and 59 men (67.8%, 
59/87). 
 
 
Figure 34. Histograms of ages and sub-themes of ethnographic survey respondents. Respontents (n=87) were from 
Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan provinces. (Upper) Age classes of respondents. (Lower) Number out of 20 possible sub-
themes (x-axis) such as work, travel, education, animal health, etc. (see Table 17) that respondents (y-axis) spoke about in 
ethnographic surveys. 
Educational levels varied among participants, but the majority (78.2%, 68/87) reported having a 
primary school education. Only three participants (doctor, accountant, and wildlife researcher) 
claimed to have progressed beyond a 4-year university level of education. Participants (42.5%, 37/87) 
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primarily identified as farmers (Figure 35). Five individuals identified as wildlife farmers stated that 
they raise animals such as bamboo rats (Rhizomys sinensis), civets (Paguma larvata), porcupine 
(Hystrix brachyura), or nutria (Myocastor coypus). Of the participants, 12 (13.8%, 12/87) identified as 
field personnel at Nature Reserves: 9 from the Nonggang Nature Reserve in Guangxi Province and 3 
from the Gutian Nature Reserve in Guangdong Province; and 4 (4.6%, 4/87) were employees of the 
Yunnan Endemic Center for Disease Control and Prevention in Dali.  
 
The open ended semi-structured ethnographic interviews were guided by core themes and sub-
themes (Table 17). Approximately one quarter of the respondents (28.7%, 25/87) spoke on all sub-
themes; 62 respondents (71.2%, 62/87) addressed at least 15 (75%, 15/20) of the 20 sub-themes 
(Figure 34). The sub-themes least addressed were death (59.8%, 52/87) and travel (69%, 60/87). 
 
 
Figure 35. Occupations of ethnographic survey participants in Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong provinces. The topmost 
horizontal grey bar labelled “Other” includes 11 individuals one each of whom reported the following occupations: Police, 
Accountant, Butcher, Cleaner, Construction Worker, Doctor, Driver, Hotel Employee, Hotel Owner, Handyman, and Wildlife 
Scientist.The majority (94.3%, 82/87) of participants stated that they had some exposure to wild 
animals in the past year. Only the policeman, three of the store owners, and one restaurant worker 
said they had no contact with wildlife. When asked to list wildlife species 49.3% (34/69) said they 
eat wildlife and most often reported consuming snakes, frogs, wild boar, and birds. Of those who 
reported eating wildlife, 67.6% (23/34) were over the age of 50 and there was a positive correlation 
between age and consumption of wildlife (p = 0.003). Men more than women reported eating 
wildlife (p = 0.022). Several spoke about what they said were infrequently seen animals such as 
monkeys, wild boar, deer, and bears. Two mentioned pangolin that they claimed were from 
Vietnam, Laos, or Myanmar. Of those who discussed it (58), 34.5% (20/58) said they had eaten bats. 
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Most (77%, 45/58) said that wildlife was more plentiful in the past than it was now and 26.4% 
(15/58) said they hunted wildlife either in the past or from time to time. Several (11.5%, 7/58) 
claimed to be aware that hunting wildlife without a license is illegal. While 34.5% (30/87) of 
participants said they had been bitten by either a dog, a rat, or a bat at some point in their lives, 
32.2% (13/87) specifically stated that they had been bitten by bats.  
 
5.10.1.2.1 Wildlife consumption  
Of respondents who reported eating wildlife (49.3%, 34/69,) 18 either were not directly asked or 
declined to address the issue. Respondents were cautious in answering the question and it was not 
always clear if the wildlife were consumed recently or in the past. Among those who reported eating 
wildlife, several (31.8%, 21/66) stated that it was not out of necessity for subsistence, but because 
wildlife was ‘tastier’ and ‘more delicious’ than domestic animals or simply that they enjoyed it. 
Snakes were most frequently reported as consumed for both the flavour as well as for purported 
health benefits. In the following transcribed and translated quotations both “Interviewer” and 
“Respondent” are abbreviated as “I” and “R” respectively. 
 
I: Do people eat bat? 
R: Yes, lots of people eat bat. Especially in the summer, when they’re easy to find. 
I: How do you cook bat? 
R: Skin it and cook it. Some people make soup with bat, but I don’t like bat soup. 
I: Do you think bat meat is delicious? 
R: Yes, of course…better than pork. 
– Male farmer, age 60, Lengshuitang Village, Xin’an, Guangxi 
 
I: Do you ever see bats?  
R: Yes, bats usually roost in the caves. Local people go to the mine tunnel to catch bats. Bats sometimes live in old 
houses. 
I: Do people here eat bats? 
R: Yes, some people eat bats. 
–Male Nonggang Nature Reserve employee, age 50, Gaozhai Village, Xin’an, Guangxi 
 
R: People kill rat to eat. 
I: How do you eat rat? 
R: You don’t know? We cook rat meat with hot pepper. It is more delicious than pork, duck and chicken. 
I: When is a good season to eat rat? 
R: If you come here in the winter, we can easily catch rats in the field. Winter is a good season to catch and eat rat. 
I: Do you make money by catching rats? 
R: Nobody catches rats to make money; they catch rats to eat. Nobody could make money that way. 
– Male farmer, age 65, Wenquan Village, Zijing, Guangdong 
 
R: Two bats flew into the room, so we caught them and ate them. 
I: How did you kill the bats? 
R: Put them into boiling water. 
I: Did you eat bat skin? 
R: Yes. 
– Female wildlife farmer, age 60, Lengshuitang Village, Xin’an, Guangxi 
 
I: Who do you sell bamboo rats to? 
R: Middlemen or restaurants. 
I: Who is your main customer? 
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R: Middlemen. We sell animals to them. They sell to restaurants. 
I: Do local restaurants buy bamboo rats directly from you? 
R: Local restaurants still buy my farmed bamboo rats from middlemen. Traditionally, Chinese people love wildlife. 
They think it is more delicious. People think that the animals they buy from a middleman is wild. Animals you buy 
from farmers are definitely raised. Consumers cannot distinguish wild animals from raised animals...many people 
sell raised animals as wild one. It is a kind of marketing strategy. 
– Male wildlife farmer, age 50, Lengshuitang Village, Xin’an, Guangxi 
I: Can you buy wild animals? 
R: Yes. We can, because we know people who hunt in the mountains. 
I: What kind of animals? 
R: Wild rabbit, pheasant, muntjac, and other things. 
I: Is there a hunting season? 
R: No. 
– Male wildlife farmer, age 38, Midian Village, Xiangyun, Yunnan 
 
I: Does anyone hunt wildlife? 
R: Hunting animals is illegal. 
I: If people hunted and sold wild animals, they would do this quietly? 
R: Maybe they would sell quietly and in a village—not in a market—but in someone’s home. 
–Male Gutian Nature Reserve employee, age 40, Lianghua Town, Huidong, Guangdong 
 
R: Because the village is small, everyone knows each other. Everyone knows who likes to hunt. We all know as soon 
as the hunter catches wild boar and then we can buy some from the hunter. 
–Male wildlife researcher, age 47, Wenquan Town, Anning, Yunnan 
 
5.10.1.2.2 High-risk interactions with animals 
About 1-in-3 (34.5%, 30/87) of respondents reported being bitten by dogs, rodents, bats, and 
snakes. All respondents were aware of the importance of going to their local clinic to get an injection 
following any bite from dogs or wild animals. Despite this, when describing their personal 
experiences, most participants stated that they had not gone to the clinic and that they had been 
lucky the bite had not resulted in rabies infection. When asked to name some zoonotic diseases, 
participants mentioned Rabies and some mentioned Plague. Many explicitly were unaware that 
diseases could be transmitted from wild animals to humans: 
 
I: Have you ever heard of anyone being infected with a wild animal disease? 
R: No. 
I: What do people do if a dog or a snake bites them? 
R: Dog bites are common. People even get bitten by their own dogs. If that happens, they will get a shot for 
themselves. Vaccines for pets cost about RMB2,000, so they usually just kill their dog and eat it. 
–Male Nonggang Nature Reserve worker, age 50, Gaozhai Village, Xin’an, Guangxi,  
 
I: Do you know of any animal illnesses that infect humans? 
R: Dog? I don’t know. 
I: Has anybody gotten sick because of a rat or dog bite? 
R: No. I only know that sometimes people want to go get vaccinated. 
I: Do you know how animal diseases can infect humans? 
R: No. 
–Female restaurant cook, age 55, Licheng Town, Lipu, Guangxi 
 
I: Have you ever heard of anyone who was infected or died of a disease caused by an animal? 
R: I never heard of that happening. 
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–Male farmer, age 60, Lianghua Town, Huidong, Guangdong 
 
I: Do you know if people can get sick because of an animal infection? 
R: It seems no. 
I: Do you know how animal diseases can infect people? 
R: I have no idea. 
–Female small shop owner, age 48, Banqiao Village, Xiangyun, Yunnan 
 
Several respondents stated that they would no longer eat bats and birds because of the public 
information around SARS and avian influenza. 
 
R: People don’t eat bats anymore since CCTV reported that bats are natural reservoir of some kinds of diseases. Also 
fewer people eat birds for the same reason. 
–Male Nonggang Nature Reserve worker, age 45, Gaozhai Village, Xin’an, Guangxi 
 
The most commonly reported exposures to wildlife (31%, 27/87) were via rodent bites and hunting. 
All participants who reported hunting used slingshots or traps to capture wildlife, although not 
recently. The most commonly reported wildlife that respondents had hunted included rodents, deer, 
wild boar, and a variety of birds including silver pheasants (Lophura nycthemera). Few participants 
would describe hunting in any detail.  
 
I: How do you catch bats? With a gun? 
R: No. We hunt them with homemade brooms made of bamboo, at the narrow site in the cave when the bats fly 
out. 
–Male Nonggang Nature Reserve worker, age 45, Gaozhai Village, Xin’an, Guangxi 
 
I: What do they do with a slingshot? 
R: Hunt birds and rats. 
I: Why do they hunt birds and rats? 
R: To eat. 
I: Where do they go to hunt? 
R: Fields or trash collection sites. Rats are active there in the evenings. 
–Male farmer, age 60, Yanqian Village, Xin’an, Guangxi 
 
Other participants reported that rodents would access food stores and sharing water sources 
with animals. 
 
I: Do rats get into your food? 
R: Yes, frequently. 
I: How do you deal with that? 
R: Clean the food and eat it. 
–Female farmer, age 80, Yanqian Village, Xin’an, Guangxi 
 
I: Is there a possibility that wild animals or livestock also drink this water? 
R: Definitely! We see footprints of wild animals near the water source. 
–Male Nonggang Nature Reserve employee, age 30, Fu Village, Lipu, Guangxi 
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5.10.1.2.3 Self-reported illnesses of unknown aetiology 
Respondents reported annual colds and fevers. Many (42.5%) said they went to local clinics or health 
centres for treatment, but a few (25.3%) also reported self-treatment with medications acquired 
from nearby pharmacies. Hospitals were only visited with severe symptoms. Several farmers 
reported deaths of chickens and ducks. Several respondents reported that at some time in the past 
their rabbits, dogs, or chicken had all mysteriously died. Of those who discussed it, most felt that 
vaccination of livestock or pets was prohibitively expensive and it was easier to slaughter and 
consume or bury any sick animals. 
 
I: Do your chickens get sick? If yes, how do you deal with it? 
R: I don’t have many chickens, so I don’t have big problems. But I think if my chickens got sick, I would kill them 
before they die, and eat them. 
I: Don’t you worry about getting sick after you eat a sick chicken? 
R: No, I’ll kill them and eat them before they die. 
I: If your chickens died before you could kill them, what would you do then? 
R: It would not happen. I am sure I would kill them before they die. 
–Male farmer, age 60, Lianghua, Huidong, Guangdong 
 
I: Have you ever had a sudden death of animals? 
R: Yes. Rabbits in 2014. 
I: What was the reason? 
R: We did not find any reason for it. 
–Female farmer, age 80, Yanqian Village, Xin’an, Guangxi 
 
Participants reported disposing of sick or dead animals by dumping them into rubbish sites, burying 
them, or giving them to their dogs or other animals. Some mentioned that butchered meat from sick 
or dead animals could be in the markets and ways to avoid this. 
 
I: How do you deal with sick animals? 
R: My family does not eat sick animals. We bury them, but other people do not do this. For example, some use dead 
pigs to make bacon. They cut the pork into pieces, salt the meat, and hang it out to dry. 
–Male coal plant worker, age 23, Banqiao Village, Xiangyun, Yunnan 
 
I: Have you ever had problems to buying animals in the market? 
R: Yes. Sometimes vendors sell old or sick ducks or chickens. If you cannot tell, you might buy animals that have been 
dead for a long time. We usually go to the same vendor to buy our meat to prevent this. 
I: Why would they sell dead animals? 
R: If they can sell dead animals, they will make a profit.  
–Female farmer, age 60, Lengshuitang Village, Xin’an, Guangxi 
 
Among the participants who reported illnesses (19.5%, 17/87), few (12.6% 11/87) had illnesses that 
were unidentified by health professionals or by respondents themselves. Western medicine was the 
most (92.0%, 80/87) reported treatment for illnesses. Some participants (16.1%, 14/87) also said 
they supplemented this with Chinese traditional medicine. Illnesses of unknown aetiology were 
reported by few participants and only two connected this to contact with wild animals. 
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I: Do you know anyone who got sick from an animal bite? 
R: Once a bamboo rat bit someone on her hand. She was in hospital for a week. 
I: Did she recover? 
R: She recovered. 
–Male wildlife farmer, age 50, Fu Village, Lipu, Guangxi 
 
5.10.1.2.4 Respondent perceptions of a decline in local wildlife 
Although 85 out of 87 participants reported having some contact with wildlife (bats, birds, rodents, 
and primates) in the past year, 77% (67/87) noted a decrease in wildlife over time, which was 
attributed to many factors, but most frequently to development and construction that reduced 
forested areas. Some reported that the local government built new roads and buildings to increase 
local tourism.  
 
I: Has the village changed a lot since your parents’ time? 
R: Definitely, built more roads, more beautiful houses, more tourists. The population also increased. 
I: Did the area of forest and bamboo groves also increase? 
R: Not really. 
– Male Nonggang Nature Reserve Employee, age 50, Gaozhai Village, Xin’an, Guangxi 
 
Participants did not mention wildlife trade or the hunting and sale of wildlife as a cause of observed 
wildlife depletion. They attributed their own reduction in wildlife hunting and consumption to 
increased enforcement of laws protecting wildlife. Four Nature Reserve employees each related a 
story of a hunter who had killed a monkey and was caught. 
 
I: Do people still hunt? 
R: Several young people catch frogs and pheasants here. Nobody dares to catch monkeys because of a guy who was 
caught and sentenced. 
I: How long was the sentence? 
R: Three and a half years. 
– Male Nonggang Nature Reserve employee, age 42, Gaozhai Village, Xin’an, Guangxi 
 
Only 6 out of 23 (26.0%) participants who admitted to having hunted in the past also reported 
recently hunting. 
 
5.10.1.2.5 Part of the Wildlife Trade - Farming Wild Animals in South China 
Seeing neighbours or local businessmen engaged in farming wild animals, some respondents turned 
to wildlife farming as a way to supplement their income: 
 
I: Do you have a license to raise bamboo rats for breeding? 
R: No, but I have a wildlife business license and one for raising wildlife. 
I: Do you need any proof to sell bamboo rats for breeding to others? 
R: Yes, the licenses. 
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–Male wildlife farmer, age 42, Xiangqing Town, Lufeng, Yunnan 
 
I: How did your son and his wife learn how to raise and sell nutria? 
R: They learned from a book and also online. 
– Male wildlife farmer, age 70, Lengshuitang Village, Xin’an, Guangxi 
 
The entire process from acquiring licenses to methods to raise and sell animals is readily available 
online with whole websites dedicated to elaborate instructions with pictures, chat areas, and daily 
updated blogs (www.yangzhushu.com, www.nczfj.com/zhushu/20108009.html). Some farmers 
reported on difficulties in wildlife farming.  
 
R: Somebody raised bamboo rats in this village. Unfortunately, all of his bamboo rats died. 
I: Do you know the reason? 
R: It was not clear, but I think raising wild animals means that you have to learn how. It takes time. It is not an easy 
thing. 
–Female farmer, age 40, Dongxing Village, Conghua, Guangzhou 
 
The five wildlife farmers interviewed in this study were influential and respected entrepreneurs in 
their communities. They were involved in farming, real estate, and other activities aside from 
wildlife farming. They reported initially acquiring their wild animals from the wild. With a license 
from the Forestry Department it is legal to capture wildlife for the purpose of artificial breeding (PRC 
2016b). All five wildlife farmers reported that their customers were principally other wildlife farmers 
or people intending to start their own wildlife farms and middle men (see Section 5.11.2.6). 
 
I: Where did you get ‘seed animals’ when you started your farm? 
R: The government allowed us to catch some wild animals after our permit was approved. 
I: Did you catch wild bamboo rats by yourself? 
R: No. We hired local people to catch them for us. 
– Male wildlife farmer, age 50, Lengshuitang Village, Xin’an, Guangxi 
 
I: How do you sell your nutria? 
R: We post information online. 
I: Does your farm have all of the required certifications? 
R: Yes. 
I: What kind of people buy nutria? 
R: Mainly farmers. 
I: Why do they buy them? 
R: To start a new farm. 
– Male wildlife farmer, age 70, Lengshuitang Village, Xin’an, Guangxi 
 
One farmer in Guangxi was particularly forthcoming about his business, local renown, and had even 
published a book on bamboo rat (Rhizomys sinensis) husbandry (Figure 36). He had appeared on 
television and in newspapers. Locally, at least, he was something of a celebrity which may have 
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promoted not only his own wild animal sales (to other local residents interested in starting their own 
farms), but also the industry as a whole: 
 
I: When did you decide to start raising bamboo rats, porcupines, and other species? 
R: I started to raise bamboo rats in 2003. In 2009, I began to raise porcupine and civets. In 2013, I began raising 
nutria. 
I: What made you start raising these animals? 
R: I started to raise bamboo rats because I felt it was a good opportunity to make money. I saw there was a high 
demand for this, and little supply from the wild. 
I: How is raising these animals different from domestic animals? 
R: Raising these animals is unique and I had to find my own way to raise them by trial and error as there were no 
experts in raising these animals. Making sales is the biggest challenge. At the beginning, I was afraid not make a 
living, but I persevered to raise these animals and to try to make good sales and am now successful! 
I: Is it popular to eat these wild animals? 
R: Many people eat bamboo rat, civet cat, porcupine, and nutria all the time. Here we like to taste fresh killed meat, 
so supplying fresh meat always has a demand. 
I: Do you like raising these animals? 
R: Of course, I like them or I would not do this! I also make good money. I deal with these animals every day. I enjoy 
studying the problems and successes I encounter in the breeding process. I wrote a book about all these experiences 
to help other people who want to raise Bamboo rats and other wild animals. 
– Male wildlife farmer, age 50, Lengshuitang Village, Xin’an, Guangxi 
 
 
Figure 36. A Wildlife Domestication Series book on bamboo rat (Rhizomys sinensis) husbandry. Bamboo Rat: Domestication 
Techniques, (2nd edition) is self-published by a bamboo rat farmer also known as “Bamboo Rat King” (printed on the book 
cover) from Guangxi and also one of this study's ethnographic interview participants. Participant gave permission to 
reproduce the book cover image and display his name. 
From respondents’ statements, wildlife farmers vend their animals to middlemen who sell the same 
animals as farm raised wildlife or sometimes deliberately as wild-caught wildlife to restaurants, 
markets, hotels, and even other middlemen or farmers. Selling wildlife openly in markets in rural 
regions has become rare according to respondents: 
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I: Have you seen people selling wild animals at market? 
R: No, they will be in trouble if they sell wild animals at markets. The Department of Forest and Forest Police will 
arrest them. 
– Male Nonggang Nature Reserve employee, age 45, Gaozhai Village, Xin’an, Guangxi 
 
R: I heard about people selling wild animals, but have not seen that myself 
– Female physician, age 41, Banqiao Village, Xiangyun, Yunnan  
 
I: Did you see someone selling wild animals on this trip? 
R: Yes, but I am not sure if it was wild. 
I: Who do they sell to? 
R: I do not know…I often see people selling animals at the roadside. 
– Male driver, age 35, Zijiadeng Village, Xiangyun, Yunnan 
 
5.10.1.2.6 Middlemen and their Key Role in Transport of Wildlife to Markets 
Several farmers reported seeing non-local middlemen in the area and said they were there to buy or 
hunt rodents, cats, wild boars, and eagles. Respondents stated that these middlemen stockpile, 
transport, and sell farmed-raised or wild animals to big, wholesale markets like Taiping and Foshan 
in Guangdong Province. 
 
I: Do you know any middlemen who buy or sell wild animals? 
R: I used to know a guy who sold wild boar at the market. He used a gun to hunt. 
I: What other kinds of wild animals do the middlemen sell? 
R: They sell silver pheasant secretly. They also sell bear, deer, boar, snake and frog. They sell egret during migration 
season. Very few wild animals are traded in the market. Instead, buyers will contact middlemen directly. Most wild 
animals sold at the markets really are farmed by farmers. 
–Male Nonggang Nature Reserve Employee, age 50, Gaozhai Village, Xin’an, Guangxi 
 
R: If a middleman comes to town, local people will go to the field to catch birds. 
–Male wildlife farmer, age 50 
 
I: What are the kinds of wild animals that middlemen buy from local people? 
R: Flying squirrel, frog, snake, boar. 
–Male Nonggang Nature Reserve Employee, age 38, Gaozhai Village, Xin’an, Guangxi 
 
5.10.2 Quantitative Behavioural Surveillance Results 
Of the 685 participants in Yunnan province who completed the behavioural questionnaire (Table 20), 
402 (58.7%) were women and 283 (41.3%) were men with a mean age of 49 (range: 18-99) Most 
(81.5%) were over 35 years old. Almost three quarters (72.8%, 499) of the respondents only had a 
primary level of education or less. About half (43.2%, 296) of the participants had a monthly family 
income of less than RMB3,000 (£350). Most (98.2%, 673) had resided in their respective villages and 
towns over 5 years and were living with family (98.0%, 671). 
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Table 20. Demographic data on Yunnan Province residents living in proximity to bats, n = 685. 
No. (%) 
Sex     
Female 402 58.7% 
Male 283 41.3% 
Age (in years)     
Under 35 127 18.5% 
Over 35 558 81.5% 
Education     
None 220 32.1% 
Primary 279 40.7% 
Secondary 184 26.9% 
Post-Secondary 2 0.3% 
Income     
<3000 RMB 296 43.2% 
3000-10,000 RMB 250 36.5% 
>10,000 RMB  139 20.3% 
Length of Time in Current Home     
1 month 2 0.3% 
1-5 yrs 10 1.5% 
Over 5 yrs 673 98.2% 
Other Sociodemographic Data     
Lives with family 671 98.0% 
Children < 5 yrs old in household  199 29.1% 
No Travel (in past 12 months)  405 59.1% 
 
Only 29.1% (199/685) of participants reported having children under the age of 5 in their households 
and most (59.1%, 405/685) had not travelled outside their villages and towns in the past year. All 
reported multiple activities to earn their livelihoods, but most (99.1%, 679/685) reported having 
worked as farmers. Few participants 5.3% (36/685) also worked as migrant labourers and 1.8% 
(12/685) on construction. Five respondents also earned money as wildlife farmers or worked with 
buying or selling wildlife. Two were community healers or barefoot doctors (Zhang & Unschuld 
2008). 
 
In the 12-months prior to the survey, most respondents reported exposure to swine, poultry, 
rodents, dogs, cats, and birds (Table 21). Only 21.2% (145/685) reported any exposure to bats and 
8.5% (58/685) to non-human primates. Respondents reported on general and intimate (repeated, 
prolonged) exposures to animals (Table 22) with most reporting raising live animals (92.3%, 
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632/685), having animals in their houses (90.1%, 617/685), preparing slaughtered animals (77.4%, 
530/685), and handling live animals (63.9%, 438/685). 
 
Table 21 Animal exposures in the past 12 months among 685 Yunnan residents. Residents were observed living in close 
proximity to bats and other wildlife.
Taxa No. % 
Swine 582 85.0 
Poultry  562 82.0 
Rodents/Shrews 524 76.5 
Dogs  454 66.3 
Birds  448 65.4 
Cats 350 51.1 
Bats  145 21.2 
Cattle/Buffalo  135 19.7 
Carnivores  131 19.1 
Goats/Sheep  111 16.2 
Ungulates  69 10.1 
Non-human primates  58 8.5 
 
 
Table 22. Reported general and intimate exposures to animals. 685 Yunnan residents were surveyed for their general and 
intimate exposures to animals over the past 12 months. 
No. % 
General Exposures 
  
Raise live animals 632 92.3 
Animals come inside dwelling 617 90.1 
Handle live animals 438 63.9 
Live with pet 384 56.1 
Purchase live animals at market 175 25.5 
Share water source with animals 95 13.9 
Seen faeces in or near food 56 8.2 
Eaten food damaged by animal 43 6.3 
Intimate Exposures 
  
Cook or handle recently slaughtered animals 530 77.4 
Slaughter animals 368 53.7 
Eat raw, undercooked meat, organs, or blood 69 10.1 
Scratched or bitten by animal 39 5.7 
Hunt or trap animals 34 5.0 
Collect dead animals to eat, share, or sell 14 2.0 
Eat known sick animal 7 1.0 
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Different human types of human and animal contact were evaluated (Table 23) with the most 
frequently reported interactions being raising, handling, and slaughtering poultry, swine, and dogs 
or having dogs, cats, and birds as pets. Rodents, cats, dogs, birds, and bats were often reported in 
houses. Hunting and being bitten were among the least frequently reported human and animal 
interactions. 
 
Table 23. Type of human-animal contact by taxa for respondents surveyed. Values with more than 40% of respondents 
(274) reporting contact with specific taxa are shaded in grey, n = 685.
 Pets Handled Raised 
In 
House 
Cooked/ 
handled 
Eaten 
raw/ 
under-
cooked 
Eaten 
Sick 
Found 
dead 
collect
ed 
Scratched/ 
Bitten 
Slaughtered 
Hunted/ 
Trapped 
Rodents/Shrews 0 21 1 505 31 2 0 1 0 18 10 
Bats  0 5 0 125 8 0 0 0 13 5 11 
NH-Primates  4 19 2 5 4 0 0 9 0 22 5 
Birds  108 14 2 296 31 3 29 0 0 17 30 
Carnivores  2 7 1 39 12 5 0 0 4 72 26 
Ungulates  0 1 4 17 2 0 0 10 10 32 5 
Poultry  2 297 466 88 369 4 5 53 5 306 6 
Goats/Sheep 0 8 25 2 2 30 9 1 57 6 0 
Swine 
 
189 421 38 272 151 1 69 1 128 1 
Cattle/Buffalo 1 7 62 10 19 16 49 1 0 7 1 
Dogs  278 23 174 183 17 68 0 0 14 10 3 
Cats 133 4 93 213 50 0 0 0 6 8 0 
 
Severe acute respiratory infection (SARI) symptoms were reported by 61 (8.9%) respondents, 
influenza-like illnesses (ILI) symptoms were reported by 151 (22.0%) respondents; and encephalitis 
symptoms were reported by 77 (11.2%) respondents. When asked about the occurrence of the same 
types of symptoms only in the past 12-months, respondents also reported more incidences of ILI 
symptoms than they did SARI or encephalitis symptoms (Table 24). Additionally, 42.0% (63/148) of 
respondents who reported any of these symptoms in the past 12 months also reported the same 
symptoms in their family members (Table 24 and Table 25). 
 
Table 24. Severe acute respiratory infection (SARI), influenza like illness (ILI), and encephalitis symptoms. Self reported 
symptoms reported by respondents for themselves, family members, and for both from over the past 12-month period. 
Percentages are of all respondents, n = 865.
Symptoms Past 12 months % 
In Family 
Member % In Both 
 
SARI 37 5.4% 22 3.2% 16 2.3% 
ILI 66 9.6% 92 13.4% 31 4.5% 
Encephalitis 45 6.6% 26 3.8% 16 2.3% 
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Chi-squared tests of independence conducted to examine the relationships between (a) self-
reporting symptoms of severe acute respiratory infection (SARI), influenza-like illness (ILI), and 
encephalitis compared with (b) respondents’ responses to survey categories (Table 25) indicated 
that there were significant correlations between 8 survey categories and SARI symptoms; 11 survey 
categories and ILI symptoms; and 14 survey categories and encephalitis symptoms. Of the 
respondents who reported recent (past 12-months) SARI, ILI, and encephalitis symptoms, at least 
60% in each category reported raising animals, having pets and wild animals in their houses, and 
handling or cooking slaughtered animals. There was no significant correlation between age and 
symptoms in any category. 
 
Respondents were asked to say what they thought may have been the source of their SARI, ILI, or 
encephalitis symptoms. None reported any kind of animal exposure as a potential source of 
infection; 8.1% (12/450) thought bad food or water may have caused the symptoms; and 2.0% 
(3/148) each reported contact with sick people and spirits as possible sources. Most (87.2%, 
129/148) said they had no idea what may have caused their symptoms. 
 
Few respondents (25.5%, 175/685) reported purchasing animals from a live animal market in the 
past year. Almost half (46.9%, 321/685) of respondents were worried about disease or disease 
outbreaks in animals at live animal markets and about the same number (47.6%, 326/685) of people 
believed that animals can spread disease. When asked about changes in their behaviour at live 
animal markets in the last 12 months (Table 26), participants reported washing their hands (33.1%, 
58/176) and buying live animals less often (33.1%, 58/176), only buying farmed wildlife (44.6%, 
78/176), and sometimes buying meat at the supermarket (23.4%). Only 25.1% (44/176) stated that 
they no longer shopped at live animal markets. For the 39 participants who reported slaughtering 
animals and also having been scratched or bitten in the past year, when asked about medical 
measures taken post exposure, 38 (97.4%, 38/39) respondents said they had visited a clinic. 
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Table 25. Correlations of diseases of unknown aetiology and behaviour. Chi-squared tests of independence were performed to examine the relationships between (a) self-reporting symptoms 
of severe acute respiratory infection (SARI), influenza-like illness (ILI), and encephalitis compared with (b) respondents’ responses to survey categories including demographic details, 
exposure to animals and types of exposure, and activities (n = 685). Significant relationships are shown in this table with p-values less than 0.05 and shaded in grey. Survey categories 
compared with significant illness symptoms with p-values greater than 0.05 for all three types of symptoms are not shown. An alpha level of .05 was used for all tests.
  SARI ILI Encephalitis 
 
Positive Negative 
p-value 
Positive Negative 
p-value 
Positive Negative 
p-value 37 648 66 619 45 640 
Demographics No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) No. (%) 
Household member with same syndrome 7 18.9 15 2.3 <0.001 27 40.9 65 10.5 <0.001 10 22.2 16 2.5 <0.001 
Income <RMB3000 22 59.5 271 41.8 0.039 29 43.9 267 43.1 0.890 21 46.7 275 43.0 0.622 
Animal Exposures                               
Faeces in or near food 7 18.9 49 7.6 0.014 6 9.1 50 8.1 0.772 8 17.8 48 7.5 0.015 
Shared water source 8 21.6 87 13.4 0.159 8 12.1 87 14.1 0.669 12 26.7 83 13.0 0.010 
Pets 24 64.9 360 55.6 0.262 47 71.2 337 54.4 0.009 27 60.0 357 55.8 0.574 
Consume raw or undercooked 5 13.5 64 9.9 0.473 8 12.1 61 9.9 0.558 9 20.0 60 9.4 0.022 
Buy animals at animal market 9 24.3 166 25.6 0.865 12 18.2 163 26.3 0.151 3 6.7 172 26.9 0.002 
Hunt 2 5.4 32 4.9 0.897 5 7.6 29 4.7 0.302 6 13.3 28 4.4 0.007 
Taxa                               
Bats  14 37.8 131 20.2 0.011 21 31.8 124 20.0 0.025 22 48.9 123 19.2 <0.001 
Poultry  36 97.3 526 81.2 0.012 63 95.5 499 80.6 0.003 44 97.8 518 80.9 0.004 
Rodents and shrews 33 89.2 491 75.8 0.059 61 92.4 463 74.8 0.001 42 93.3 482 75.3 0.006 
Carnivores  3 8.1 128 19.8 0.08 9 13.6 122 19.7 0.235 2 4.4 129 20.2 0.010 
Dogs  23 62.2 431 66.5 0.595 53 80.3 401 64.8 0.011 28 62.2 426 66.6 0.562 
Activity                               
Handled live animals 25 67.6 302 46.6 0.013 40 60.6 287 46.4 0.027 31 68.9 296 46.3 0.003 
Raised live animals  33 89.2 456 70.4 0.013 57 86.4 432 69.8 0.004 43 95.6 446 69.7 <0.001 
Animals in house 34 91.9 501 77.3 0.036 58 87.9 477 77.1 0.041 43 95.6 492 76.9 0.003 
Cooked and handled slaughtered animals 27 73.0 404 62.3 0.189 52 78.8 379 61.2 0.005 31 68.9 400 62.5 0.384 
Found dead and collected animals 4 10.8 106 16.4 0.373 5 7.6 105 17.0 0.049 1 2.2 109 17.0 0.009 
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Table 26. Behavioural changes. Percentages of respondents who purchased animals at markets that sell live domestic and 
wild animals and their behavioural changes leading to increased biosecurity, n = 175.
Behaviour No. % 
Wash hands 58 33.1% 
Buy live animals less often 58 33.1% 
Buy only farmed wildlife 78 44.6% 
Sometimes shop for meat at supermarket 41 23.4% 
Wear gloves 5 2.9% 
Wear a mask 4 2.3% 
No longer go to wild animal markets 44 25.1% 
 
5.11 Discussion 
This research highlights the application of qualitative ethnographic and quantitative approaches to 
identifying risks of zoonotic disease transmission from wildlife to humans in rural southern China. 
Observational surveys were an efficient method to identify field sites, aided in development of both 
the ethnographic and behavioural survey questionnaires, and provided valuable secondary 
resources for data analysis. 
 
5.11.1 Observational Discussion 
Other than bamboo rats (Rhizomys sp.), nutria (Myocastor coypus), porcupines (Hystrix brachyura), 
hog badgers (Arctonyx collaris) and civet cats (Paguma larvata), wildlife was not found in live animal 
markets at any sites observed in either Yunnan or Guangxi. Even these species were infrequently 
observed and none since from February 2015 to present. Prior research visits from 2007 to 2013 to 
the same or similar communities noted in addition to the aforementioned species diverse rodents 
including squirrels, deer, several species of bats, and wild boar in the animal markets. When 
questioned, residents in Yunnan and Guangxi attributed the change to enforcement of the new 
wildlife protection laws and scarcity of wildlife in the surrounding area.  
 
In July of 2015, researchers in this study were informed of the sale of 24 unidentified bats in a wild 
and domestic animal market in the Cultural Square of Yunfu City in Luoding County in western 
Guangdong Province (Lat. 22.768611, Long. 111.570000), about 50km from the border of Guangxi 
Province. When researchers from this study conducted surveillance of Luoding County markets from 
August to October of 2015, neither bats nor other wildlife were reported in markets. This anecdote 
serves to support the observations, informal interviews, and ethnographic survey reports in this 
study that, since 2003 and the emergence of the SARS pandemic, wildlife in rural Chinese markets 
has become less frequently displayed or non-existent.  
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Upon scoping visits, observation surveys in markets by non-local Chinese field team members were 
met with apparent suspicion and photography was generally not permitted by market vendors and 
personnel. Both Taiping and Foshan live animal wildlife markets have repeatedly been closed down 
since 2007 (Hu & Chen 2007; Xie 2012; Tan 2014; GDFN 2016), yet as per this study’s observational 
surveys both still remain open and doing business. One of the Taiping Market vendors stated: 
 
Local politicians and police chiefs like to come with reporters and TV crews to shut down the market. It stays closed 
for 2 or 3 days and then reopens. None of them care about it beyond their own publicity. This is why we do not like 
you taking notes and pictures. 
 – Market worker at Taiping Market, Conghua, Guangdong (21 September 2014) 
 
Other vendors and local area restaurant workers corroborated the market closures. Generally, the 
Taiping market vendors were the most suspicious and unwilling to speak with strangers. This may 
have been due to the Taiping market being renowned as the largest legal and illegal wildlife market 
in China. Only a section of Foshan market was allocated to the sale of wild animals and was set back 
from the main area. Some venders in the Foshan market said they had been closed for a while after 
SARS, but none commented on any recent closures. 
 
Observational surveys in Taiping and Foshan markets in Guangdong province were opportunistic in 
that they were not conducted over 24-hour periods nor over a series of days. A fine scale 
observation of either market would illustrate market dynamics in ways that this study was not 
designed to encompass, but that would build upon the research detailed here and greatly expand 
current knowledge of wildlife trade and market dynamics. 
 
The animal counts in the two markets observed in this study do support an overall decrease in 
animals from 2014 to 2015 and a subsequent increase after 2015. Reports of a 2015 China-wide 
government enforcement crackdown primarily targeting ivory and international trade seems to have 
had some short-lived local effects in several Chinese provinces resulting in temporary closures of 
animal markets (CWCA 2015; TRAFFIC 2015). It may be that several market closures in 2015 reduced 
the volume of animals that vendors were willing to risk keeping in stock that year or more simply 
that fewer vendors had fewer animals on display. The animal count numbers in 2016 were higher 
with an 84% increase in animals over the observation period in 2016 at Taiping market. It would be 
informative to evaluate whether the actual volume of animals sold (in other words not the wildlife 
on display) in 2015 was subsequently diminished, remained the same, or increased to match the 
trend in counts reported here from 2016. The observational surveys reported here of these two 
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markets further support the hypothesis that current regulation efforts do little to reduce the overall 
supply and demand of wildlife in these southern China markets. 
 
One convincing theory is that the centre for illegal wildlife shifts repeatedly in response to each raid 
or market shutdown (Zhang & Jiang 2010). Once a market is raided and closed temporarily, the 
supply is shunted to another market, so the bulk of the illegal wildlife shift from the market in 
Guangzhou to Foshan and then to Taiping. Legislation and enforcement may have resulted in the 
supply of illegal wildlife moving underground, but the demand, as per the numbers of animals 
counted in this study, appears to increase. 
 
5.11.2 Ethnographic Discussion 
By using qualitative methods, this research illustrates both changes in drivers of wildlife trade and 
high-risk activities of rural populations in contact with wildlife. The sample size (n =87) was small and 
the results not generalisable due to purposive rather than random sampling, but the data here do 
provide a completely novel report of attitudes and behaviour around wildlife consumption and trade 
in the southern China region. Additionally, these qualitative data provided a framework for the 
development of the quantitative questionnaire in this study. By coding and examining these 87 
ethnographic surveys, an awareness of the types of questions, the vocabulary necessary, and how to 
ask them was generated so as to best generate quantitative data on human exposure to wildlife and 
high-risk behaviour. 
 
5.11.2.1 Participants’ Reporting of Wildlife Consumption 
Older male respondents were the primary consumers of wildlife, although younger and other 
demographic strata of respondents such as gender, education, or income were not evenly 
represented in this survey. Although (49.3%) of respondents did report having consumed or hunted 
wildlife either recently or in the past and 59.8% stated that they were aware of the legal protection 
of wildlife, it is possible that some were not comfortable speaking openly to strangers and the 
consumption rate may be higher. All of those stating they consumed wildlife primarily consumed 
frogs, snakes, and birds, which they or their family members trapped. Since they had Forestry 
Department issued licenses to raise wild animals, the five wildlife farmers all openly admitted eating 
bamboo rats and other farmed species. Of the individuals who did not identify as farmers (nature 
reserve employees, CDC employees, hotel employees, chefs, wildlife researcher, and doctor), most 
either stated they did not consume wildlife although some admitted to having tried wild species in 
the past or when they were young. Other wildlife such as pangolin, civets, bears, eagles, and 
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monkeys were not only considered rare, but also too expensive for respondents to consume. Several 
of the Nonggang Nature Reserve employees stated that area residents who hunt and trap animals 
have ‘a hard life’ and catch little wildlife. Local stories of those who were incarcerated and fined for 
violating the laws protecting wildlife may have had an impact on reducing hunting by local residents 
in these communities. Scarcity of wildlife, enforcement of wildlife protection laws (PRC 2016b), strict 
gun regulations, and required hunting licenses (PRC 1996) may make it more economical for rural 
residents to slaughter their own poultry and pigs rather than hunt pheasant and wild boar. 
 
Five respondents identified themselves as ethnically Han Chinese and one as Muslim. All six said 
they never had hunted or tasted wildlife, but that the indigenous ethnic minorities did hunt and 
consume wild animals. From this survey, some divides arise, although they are not testable. There 
was an apparent dichotomy between those who did and did not identify as local, ethnic minorities. 
The local people openly acknowledged consumption of wildlife in the past as well as in recent times, 
although usually frogs, snakes, and birds. The individuals identifying as Han, Muslim, and with 
university level or above educations all stated they would not consume wildlife although some 
admitted to having done so in the past or tried it at a restaurant at a meal hosted by someone else. 
Respondents report that wildlife is generally expensive to buy both directly and in restaurants. 
Those who might afford purchasing wildlife such as the educated and relatively wealthier individuals 
surveyed in these communities claim to eschew consumption of wildlife and are aware of the 
legislation prohibiting it, risks (SARS and avian influenza at least), and conservation implications 
(species extinction and habitat loss). This is in contrast to studies of the wealthier, younger urban 
males in Guangdong, Shenzhen, and other Tier 1 and Tier 2 Chinese cities who have recently been 
reported to be the primary consumers of wild animals and products in China (Zhang et al. 2008; 
Zhang & Yin 2014). These survey results emphasise that there are different types of consumers, 
attitudes, and motivating factors in and around the wildlife trade in China.  
 
5.11.2.2 High-risk interactions with animals 
These ethnographic data reported here provide some evidence of high-risk interactions through 
which zoonotic disease spillover could occur in rural communities in the three provinces surveyed. 
All participants who discussed rabies stated that they were aware that it could be contracted from 
dogs and cats, although one erroneously mentioned snakes as well. Many had some knowledge 
about bats and birds as the sources of SARS and avian influenza respectively, but contrastingly all 
were unconcerned about presence of rodents, bats, or birds or even the excrement of these same 
animals within their houses. This suggests that the older (average of 48 years) population surveyed 
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did not perceive wildlife with which they had frequent, daily contact as being a potential source of 
any type of zoonotic emergence. As discussed above, the more educated, urban, and wealthier 
respondents in this survey all stated that they have no or little contact with wild animals. Some 
reported consuming wild boar, bamboo rats, and other species. The Nature Reserve employees, 
wildlife researcher, Yunnan CDC employees, and wildlife farmers all had occupational contact and 
exposure to wild animals and most were aware of or had been trained in necessary safe handing 
techniques and precautions. 
 
Direct contact with rodents was reported by most participants with exposures including bites, 
scratches, capture, slaughtering, butchering, and farming. Respondents also reported indirect 
contact with rodents such as faeces in or around food. Indirect exposures to animals have been 
implicated in zoonotic disease outbreaks including Mojiang virus, Hantavirus, and Nipah virus (Chua 
2003; Zhang et al. 2009c; Wu et al. 2014b). Respondents did not express concern about raw food 
contaminated with rodent faeces nor any awareness that this could be an avenue of zoonotic 
spillover. 
 
Few respondents (14.9%) reported being bitten by bats and only when actively hunting or trapping 
them and even then, at some unspecified time in the past. None went to clinics after this exposure. 
Most reported being aware of bats in caves nearby. All individuals surveyed for this study do live in 
regions where multiple bat species feed and roost. Ebola, SL-CoVs, and other viruses of importance 
to human health have been identified in bats from the provinces of the respondents of this study. 
(Lau et al. 2010b; Yuan et al. 2012; Ge et al. 2013). 
 
5.11.2.3 Self-reported illnesses of unknown aetiology 
Unexpectedly few participants (12.6%) reported illnesses of unknown causes although potentially 
from zoonotic diseases. Illnesses were generally described by respondents as transitory fevers and 
colds and medical care was not sought unless the illness were debilitating or chronic. Given the 
impact that SARS had in China, there are surprisingly few serological or molecular assays of humans 
for SARS-CoVs and SL-CoVs after 2003 (CDC 2003). Those that have been conducted mostly focused 
on Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus in the Middle East and Africa (MERS-CoV) (Zaki et 
al. 2012; Liljander et al. 2016). It may well be that the illnesses reported as fevers and colds by the 
respondents in this study were not all caused by known viruses. Additionally, vaccination and 
veterinary care were described as unnecessary and expensive by respondents, which could increase 
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risk of exposure to domestic animal borne or amplified diseases such as leptospirosis, hepatitis, 
brucellosis, and others (Zheng et al. 2006; Zhang et al. 2010; Bao et al. 2011). 
 
5.11.2.4 Participants’ perceptions of a decline in local wildlife 
Given that most participants (54.0%) were over the age of 55 and reported to be local residents for 
most of their lives, they would have had opportunity to witness changes in their surroundings. Most 
(77.0%) did report witnessing a decrease in wildlife over time. Respondents stated that local 
government had invested in roads and local infrastructure with the intention of increasing tourism. 
According to participants, this reduced forested area. Hunting and selling of wildlife was also not 
mentioned by any participant as a cause of observed local wildlife depletion.  
 
Some (30%) remarked that wildlife was no longer available in local live animal markets. Fewer (12%) 
mentioned wild animals still being vended along roadsides or to visiting tourists, political leaders, 
and businessmen. Published reports from the past 10 years (Zhang et al. 2008; Zhang & Yin 2014) 
and corroborating observations made by this study’s researchers over the same period also have 
marked a reduction in markets selling wild animals. Although not tested in this study, perhaps 
national public awareness campaigns by nongovernmental organisations such as TRAFFIC China, 
IFAW, AITA, and others have contributed to an awareness of wildlife conservation in these 
communities (Liou 2007; Li 2013a; AITA 2015).  
 
5.11.2.5 Farming wild animals 
Despite recently amendments expanding and strengthening China’s legislation protecting wildlife 
(PRC 2016b) and increased enforcement of these laws (TRAFFIC 2015), wildlife trade is still an 
avenue for profit due to the sustained and increasing demand for legally and illegally sourced wild 
animals from Chinese cities (Zhang & Yin 2014). One strategy for rural residents to capitalise on this 
urban demand and avoid penalties is to farm wildlife. Over the past 20 years, wildlife farms have 
expanded across southern China in response to active encouragement by local and national 
government policies (PRC 1988; Ma 1992) and to growing demand for wildlife from cities (Zhang & 
Yin 2014). Wildlife farmers in this study reported raising bamboo rats (Rhizomys sinensis), nutria 
(Myocastor coypus), porcupines (Hystrix brachyura), civets (Paguma larvata), peacocks (Pavo 
cristatus), pheasants (Phasianus colchicus), and other animals. 
 
The sale of Forestry Department licensed farmed wildlife is legal anywhere in China (PRC 2016b), but 
accurately distinguishing it from wild caught wildlife is not easy. As required by law (PRC 1988, 
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2016b), licences are posted clearly in wild animal farms and in markets vending these species 
(personal observations). Recent investigations by Forestry Departments Officials in the Foshan 
Market and surrounding area reported that all vendors had current and valid licenses (GMAFFB 
2017). Yet without expensive and time consuming procedures including genetic testing, how can 
anyone, official, vendor, middleman, farmer, or buyer, know whether the animals are actually farm-
raised or from the wild? 
 
Some of the respondents in this study (12%) stated that wild caught animals are larger and tastier 
and others stated the opposite (8%). There is no clear consensus on differences in size or flavour of 
wild animals versus farmed wild animals even among the wildlife farmers interviewed. All five 
wildlife farmers openly stated that their founding stock were from the wild and that they would 
from time to time replenish their stock with wild species. Until recently, this was explicitly supported 
for licensed wildlife farmers by the Chinese Wildlife Law (PRC 1988). When questioned further about 
where and from whom they sourced their wild species, the farmers became vague either due to 
unwillingness to provide these details and risk any fines (for harvesting wild animals) or possibly 
because they did not know. It may be that their wild animals were purchased from other farmers, 
provided by local residents, or bought from middlemen all of whom could be motivated to present a 
farmed animal as wild or vice versa depending upon the situation. Empirically, there is variation in 
both farmed and wild-sourced wildlife and it would not be possible to distinguish by sight or flavour 
without some sort of inbreeding traits resulting from domestication as reported in Canis familiaris 
and even in Vulpes vulpes elsewhere (Trut et al. 2009). 
 
The inability to accurately distinguish the origin of animals in the wildlife trade is one of the 
arguments made by conservation organisations for stopping all wildlife farming and trade (Downes 
2015), but also economic and other assessments raise serious concerns as to whether farming has 
any net conservation benefits (Abebe 2003; Bulte & Damania 2005; Tensen 2016). Some of these 
analyses state that the only way effective conservation would benefit would be through highly 
regulated wildlife farming including (a) caps on numbers of farmers, (b) pricing controls, and (c) 
highly trained officials to monitor the system (Bulte & Damania 2005). Due to economic incentives, 
the farming of wild animals in China is unlikely to stop any time soon, so through education 
addressing the demand side of the supply-demand equation may be a more effective solution to 
unite both conservation and public health goals. 
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5.11.2.6 Middlemen transport wildlife to markets 
This study does not determine, nor are there published data on, whether middlemen have always 
operated and to what extent in wildlife trade in China. All wildlife farmers in this study reported 
vending their animals to middlemen and none said they sell directly to markets. Middlemen were 
reported by respondents to frequent villages and rural areas to both hunt and buy live wild animals. 
Some research shows that in other countries middlemen may be locals who are familiar with the 
social networks and enforcement efforts so as to generally avoid being apprehended (Broad et al. 
2003; Nijman 2010; McNamara et al. 2016). Whether local or from urban centres or as is likely a 
mixture of both, middlemen in China act as “fences” (Wyatt 2013) or agents who transport illegal 
products to legal markets. Respondents stated that middlemen conveyed wild animals from both 
wildlife farms and the wild to consumers in markets, restaurants, and hotels. Depending upon the 
source of the wild animal and their customers’ preferences, these “fences” also provide either a 
legal (licensed, farmed wild animals) or illegal provenance for the wild animals they bring to 
consumers. This may well be one of the reasons why no data exist on numbers of middlemen 
operating and their activities are largely unknown. Some research suggests that illegal wildlife trade 
functions precisely because of operators such as “fences” and corrupt officials (Broad et al. 2003; 
Wyatt 2013; Bennett 2015). This may explain how illegal wildlife trade has persisted in China despite 
legislation and enforcement efforts. From the perspective of public health, it is critical to know more 
about the operations of the middlemen, since they are key points in the wildlife trade networks 
where wild, farmed wild, and domestic animals of different species, perhaps in volume, are 
quartered in close contact and therefore potentially providing the possibility for zoonotic spillover to 
occur. From personal observations in the field, rural middlemen pile open cages of multiple species 
onto their vehicles, which permits spillover of pathogens from species to species as they sometimes 
come into direct and indirect contact with each other. 
 
This study was designed based around the hypotheses that viruses spillover from wild animal 
reservoirs into rural human populations where population may be relatively lower, but exposure is 
greatest. The World Health Organization principal case definitions (WHO 2014) for severe acute 
respiratory infection (SARI), influenza-like illnesses (ILI), and encephalitis symptoms were used as 
evidence of potential viral infections of zoonotic origins (Miller & Hagan 2017). More than half 
(54.5%, 373/685) of the rural populations surveyed in this study reported illnesses of unknown 
aetiology at some time in the past and only 5.54% (21/373) reported going to clinic or doctor when 
experiencing these or other symptoms. Correlating these illness symptoms with behaviour and 
exposures provided strong evidence that as expected the highest risk demographic was the rural 
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poor family units. Also, as hypothesised, highest-risk behaviours were those involving wild and 
domestic animals particularly rodents, bats, and poultry. Those with pets and who hunted or bought 
live animals at animal markets were at highest risk of these symptoms as well. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, some bat species can migrate across distances of 1,000km or more 
(Altringham 2011), so Coronaviruses circulating in bat reservoirs distributed throughout this region 
would have opportunity to potentially spillover to humans and other animals given the right 
conditions. The question remains as to what exactly are these right conditions? How are viruses 
spilling over from bat reservoirs and into humans? This study was not focused on serological or 
molecular assays for SL-CoVs, PMVs, and other viruses in the humans surveyed, but that would be a 
crucial next step and important future work. The high contact rates among humans, wild animals, 
and domestic animals recorded in this study call for surveys of SL-CoVs and other viruses in human 
populations in these rural regions of China where humans, domestic animals, and wild animals 
interface. It is highly likely that humans are being repeatedly infected through activities identified in 
this study or as yet unidentified involving wildlife or domestic animals. 
 
If antibodies to SL-CoV or other viruses of zoonotic origin were discovered within the human 
population surveyed in this study, this would build upon the work described here as well as provide 
the first evidence since 2006 that SL-CoV or other viral spillover is regularly occurring from animal 
reservoirs to humans exposed to wildlife in China (Woo et al. 2005; Wang et al. 2006). Identifying 
the specific high-risk activities resulting in SL-CoV spillover is key to preventing zoonotic emergence 
and re-emergence. 
 
5.11.3 Summary  
This study brings together novel data, both in quantity and geographic breadth, on rural populations 
in southern China that regularly come in contact with wildlife and therefore are at risk of zoonotic 
spillover. Additionally, surveys of two large centres of vending wildlife in China have provided some 
details on the diversity and consistency of wildlife traded in these venues. The findings here are 
summarised as follows: 
 
- 21 diverse mammalian wildlife species including two listed by IUCN as vulnerable and one on 
China’s endangered species list were observed to be maintained in circulation over three 
years in two of the largest live animal wildlife markets in south China. An overall increase in 
the volume of wildlife traded in the two markets was also observed. 
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- Exposure to wildlife is frequent in the rural areas surveyed, but primarily through 
environmental exposure and not activities such as hunting and consumption. 
- Rural populations of older farmers were not consistent on how to distinguish between wild-
sourced and farmed wild animals. These same populations seemed unaware of any activities 
that may place them, their families, or their domestic animals at risk of zoonotic spillover. 
- Rural demand for wildlife is low and wildlife in rural markets was not found in this study. 
Wildlife including bats and rodents were not observed nor reported in rural markets. 
- Farmed and wild-caught wildlife from rural areas are reported to be traded primarily via 
middlemen and brought to large, urban live animal markets. 
- Exposure to bats, poultry, and rats as well as handling, hunting, and raising animals were all 
positively correlated with symptoms of viral infections of unknown aetiology and potentially 
of zoonotic pathogens. 
 
Rural farms as well as wildlife farms, trading routes, and large urban live animal wildlife markets 
bring diverse wildlife species, humans, and domestic animals together in novel ways and frequencies 
that would not occur in their native habitats. These associations present multiple opportunities for 
viral spillover and zoonotic emergence. From observations, ethnographic surveys, and quantitative 
surveys of human behaviour, this study provides clues as to how to prevent zoonotic emergence in 
rural southern China. By building upon the local population’s awareness of the importance of 
conservation, knowledge of the health risks of zoonotic emergence may be distributed by forestry 
and public departments, but also by NGOs in the same ways that wildlife conservation campaigns 
have been conducted. The data reported here calls for future longitudinal surveillance for evidence 
of human infections of SL-CoVs and other viruses, so that mapping of areas of highest-risk of 
spillover as well as confirming high-risk behaviours may lead to effective ways to mitigate or prevent 
future zoonotic epidemics. 
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6 Discussion and Future Directions 
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6.1 Concluding Remarks 
With its rapid shift from an agricultural to urbanised and industrial society, China has experienced 
within the span of a few decades what many western countries experienced over the course of a 
century or more (Yang 2013). This rate of change has brought with it increased health risks 
particularly from emerging infectious diseases of zoonotic origin (Liu et al. 2014). With almost one-
fifth of the world’s population, epidemics affecting China can swiftly have global consequences (UN 
2015). The pandemic spread of SARS-CoV and highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) provided 
important lessons in how China’s public health issues became matters for global public health. 
Research on zoonotic disease emergence in China may greatly inform the country’s ability to 
respond to and prevent future pandemics. The identification of the wildlife trade as a key driver of 
zoonotic emergence in China highlights this pathway as a primary focus for disease surveillance in 
China (Bell et al. 2004; Fèvre et al. 2006). The research reported in this thesis on the ecology of host 
species and their pathogens, human behaviour driving the wildlife trade, and detailed analyses at 
the interface between wildlife, domestic animals, and humans provides data that may help in 
predicting and preventing zoonotic emergence in the region and globally. 
 
6.2 Risk of Emergence of Novel Paramyxoviruses and Coronaviruses in Chinese 
Bats 
A number of other researchers have identified novel Paramyxoviruses in bats (Amman et al. 2015), 
rodents (Brooks et al. 2014), and other species (Lau et al. 2013) and assessed the pathogenic 
potential of these new viruses (Zeltina et al. 2016). The research in this thesis provides the first 
evidence of a high diversity of Paramyxoviruses circulating in migratory bat populations that are in 
close contact with humans across a wide geographic range of China. Although the 82 potentially 
novel sequences identified here are not similar to known pathogenic Paramyxoviruses, they do form 
two clades (or possibly a super-clade) that is paraphyletic with the Henipavirus genus containing 
viruses known to be lethal such as Nipah virus and Hendra virus (Chua et al. 1999; Field et al. 2001). 
This raises the questions of whether the molecular mechanisms of host infection among the novel 
viral species identified in this study are similar to those in the Henipavirus genus, if they are able to 
infect humans, or if viral evolution would be required in market, farm, or other settings to result in 
pathogenic viruses? Recent analyses have indicated that zoonotic Paramyxoviruses are likely to be of 
bat origin (Drexler et al. 2012). The large diversity of Paramyxoviruses in Chinese bats as detailed in 
this thesis supports this hypothesis by further demonstrating that the order Chiroptera (bats) has an 
unusually diverse array of Paramyxoviruses, i.e. an evolutionary radiation that suggests prolonged 
coevolution over a significant time period (Drexler et al. 2012; Vidgen et al. 2015). 
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The Coronaviruses reported here may not be novel strains, but provide evidence that diverse viruses 
are circulating in bat populations in China. Several strains are closely associated with Coronaviruses 
known to be similar to Civet or Human SARS-like Coronaviruses (Ge et al. 2013; Hu et al. 2015). The 
results reported here support the hypotheses that bat Coronaviruses may still have the genetic 
potential to spill over into humans, if the right circumstances were to coincide, as probably occured 
in the SARS-CoV outbreak when bats, civets, and humans came into repeated contact with each 
other in live animal markets. 
 
The migratory nature of some of the bat species identified in this study as reservoirs of 
Coronaviruses and Paramyxoviruses likely adds to their potential to cause outbreaks. Very little has 
been published about their migratory patterns, but based upon species ranges and personal 
observations of absence/presence, it appears that most bat species sampled for this study (See 
Table 12) migrate from southern China to Myanmar, Vietnam, Lao, Thailand, and Cambodia (Nowak 
1994; Zhang et al. 2009a; Smith et al. 2010a). Only three species sampled for this study (Miniopterus 
schreibersii, Hypsugo alaschanicus, and Vespertilio sinensis) were found exclusively in northern China 
and have home ranges in northern Asia, Russia, or parts of Europe (Smith et al. 2010a). In China and 
these neighbouring countries hunting and consumption of bats and other wildlife occurs 
(Mickleburgh et al. 2009; Ripple et al. 2016), leading to a geographically extended interface among 
humans and wildlife. Previous studies have demonstrated that anthropogenic change and ecosystem 
disruption are linked to disease emergence in specific cases (Patz & Olson 2006; McKenzie & 
Townsend 2007) and in general (Myers & Patz 2009). Anthropogenic changes to land use and natural 
ecosystems likely influence bat migratory feeding and roosting patterns and may lead to increased 
risk of disease emergence. Localised climate changes resulting from urban heat islands, 
deforestation and reforestation, drought, flooding, pollution, and other driverss may also have 
effects on the duration that bats inhabit a region as well as the availability of food resources. Even 
rural agricultural pesticide reduction associated with the rise in genetically modified crops (Huang et 
al. 2015; Zhang et al. 2016) would be expected to result in the increase in bat food sources such as 
insects and could alter the human-wildlife interface. 
 
Longitudinal studies of Coronaviruses and Paramyxoviruses with their host species Chinese bats 
would enhance our understanding of disease risk. The region surveyed in this thesis is vast and 
contains a high diversity of host species. Surveillance, monitoring, and laboratory assays across this 
area would be costly and logistically challenging. Following the suggestions from other studies 
(Morse et al. 2012; Levinson et al. 2013), the research here has incorporated a more efficient 
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approach by targeting surveillance in regions where humans, bats, and other animals were known to 
interact. The surveys from this study could be supplemented by continuous or longitudinal sampling 
efforts in selected communities with evidence of exposure to bats. It would also be informative to 
investigate whether rodent Paramyxoviruses, which were not identified in the animals sampled in 
this study, might be identified in these regions using a similar approach. This would test whether 
there are specific regions, times, and activities with a higher risk for viral spillover as well as provide 
further insight into how viral pathogens circulate and evolve within animal populations. 
 
As Coronaviruses and Paramyxoviruses of bat, rodent, or other animal origin have been implicated in 
human diseases in China (Coleman & Frieman 2014; Wu et al. 2014b; Yang et al. 2014b) and 
elsewhere (Baker et al. 2013; Albariño et al. 2014; Ching et al. 2015), the findings in this study are a 
step towards evaluating the risks of zoonotic emergence not only in China, but globally. 
 
6.3 Changing the attitudes of Chinese millennials around wildlife trade and 
consumption 
Although prior studies have examined human attitudes toward conservation in China (Zhang et al. 
2008; Zhang & Yin 2014; Liu et al. 2016b), none have linked conservation with public health from the 
perspective of emerging zoonotic diseases in the region. The importance of this perspective has 
been proposed previously as a necessary approach in both predicting and preventing zoonotic 
spillover (Daszak et al. 2000; Daszak et al. 2004; Daszak et al. 2007). The main driver of wildlife trade 
in China has been identified as the newly wealthy, urban, and growing middle class (Zhang et al. 
2008; Zhang & Yin 2014) also known as Chinese millennials (Moore 2005; Fish 2015). There is every 
expectation that the population in urban centres and millennials in particular will expand 
dramatically in China in the next three decades (Peng 2011). Unless millennials’ attitudes can 
change, their demand for wildlife may also increase (Lau et al. 2010a; Wu et al. 2017). 
 
The online survey reported in this study is the first attempt to examine the attitudes and awareness 
of Chinese millennials to wildlife as an origin of diseases and the consequent implications to human 
health. The data presented here show that millennials have an awareness of the effects wildlife 
trade may have upon habitat loss or species extinction, but they less aware of any risks of zoonotic 
emergence driven by wildlife trade. This suggests that employing the same approach used to 
promote a conservation message may also be highly effective at conveying information about the 
health risks of wildlife trade and consumption to Chinese millennials. Today, campaigns launched via 
social media should reach a wider audience as not only millennials, but more Chinese are networked 
  152 
via popular social media applications. Although social networking is a relatively novel phenomenon 
and there are few studies evaluating its efficacy in affecting behaviour, there is agreement that 
social networking sites can increase awareness and positively motivate behaviour around health 
(Maher et al. 2014; Laranjo et al. 2015) and even social responsibility (Young et al. 2017). 
 
Utilising social networks as a means of distributing public health or public service messages about 
the health risks of wildlife trade and consumption could yield positive results and begin to effect 
change around consumption of wildlife in China. Non-governmental organisations such IFAW and 
AITA detailed in Chapter 4 as well as others could readily launch public awareness campaigns via 
social media platforms in coordination with public health, centres for disease control, and forestry 
departments. 
 
Rapidly reducing China’s consumption of wildlife and eliminating this as a potential avenue of 
zoonotic epidemic or pandemic emergence is vital to global health. As occurred with the emergence 
of SARS-CoV and highly pathogenic avian influenza, relatively localised outbreaks in China swiftly 
became costly and global public health concerns. Localised study of wildlife trade and zoonotic 
emergence risk reduction in China may be applied in other countries in Oceania, Asia, Africa, and the 
Americas in regions where wildlife consumption and trade are also potential drivers of zoonotic 
emergence. 
 
6.4 Integrated zoonotic disease surveillance to predict and prevent outbreaks in 
China 
During and following the emergence and spread of SARS in 2002-2004, China significantly improved 
its ability to respond to emerging infectious diseases (Feng et al. 2009). A system of mandatory 
reporting of ‘atypical pneumonias’ and other illnesses of unknown aetiology was instituted (Ahmad 
et al. 2009) and a centralised, web-based, and connected CDC system was set up (Hipgrave 2011). All 
of this enabled China to respond to the next emerging diseases such as avian influenza A H5N1 and 
H7N9 far more rapidly and effectively (Ma et al. 2016). Despite these improvements in public health 
response and communication, drivers of disease emergence such as wildlife trade were not 
addressed other than via unenforced legislation (See Chapter 5).  
 
It was reported that live, wildlife animal markets were briefly shut down in China during the SARS 
epidemic, but they reopened shortly thereafter (Reuters 2004). No published reports on this aspect 
exist, but the survey and observational data presented in Chapter 5 provide the first, strong 
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evidence that rural and urban market consumption of bats is now effectively non-existent in China. If 
this were further corroborated by broader surveys, then it would provide additional evidence that 
campaigns implicating bats as the origin of SARS and making wildlife consumption illegal are, at least 
for bats, having the intended effects in China. 
 
Future work may include further testing the hypothesis that bat consumption has reduced by 
surveying whether there is a demand in urban centres. If so, and urban participants confirm 
consuming bats, this would suggest that (a) wild populations of bats are still being accessed and 
possibly depleted and (b) there is an illegal market for bats. Confirming or rejecting the hypothesis 
will provide invaluable public health data about high-risk interactions with potential for zoonotic 
spillover between humans and bats as well as, assist in targeting future surveillance and improving 
response efforts in the event of any future zoonotic emergence.  
 
The population surveyed for this study provided foundational evidence that knowledge, attitudes, 
and practices around wildlife trade, and even what is and what is not considered wildlife, in rural 
China are changing. This has potential conservation benefits, but an awareness of the risk of 
zoonotic spill-over via contact with wildlife appears to be lacking in these populations. Campaigns 
and public service announcements about the health risks of wildlife trade particularly around 
sanitation and biosafety may be employed in the same ways that these were conducted for 
conservation efforts. Similar local campaigns around avian influenza A (H10N8) and directed at 
individuals with highest-risk of exposure have been successful in improving poultry market workers’ 
sanitation and biosafety awareness elsewhere in China (Chen et al. 2015). Other studies suggest that 
effective educational campaigns in these rural areas need to account for differences in knowledge, 
attitudes, and practices correlated with gender and levels of education (Wang et al. 2017). By having 
follow-up questionnaires with the same respondents or in the same communities, larger surveys 
could test the efficacy of wildlife trade and public health awareness campaigns. 
 
One component repeatedly illustrated in the interviews conducted for this study was the importance 
of middlemen in wildlife trade. Given the illegal nature of the activities of the middlemen, they are 
difficult to approach and survey. An indirect approach to these individuals may be via the rural 
wildlife farmer networks that sell to the middlemen. Further integrated behavioural and quantitative 
surveillance of the wildlife trade networks in China will improve understanding of how wild animals 
from remote naturally biodiverse regions are farmed, traded and brought in densely populated 
urban centres in southern China. Beginning to quantify how these animals are mixed, transported, 
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and handled will highlight how and where zoonotic disease spillover and amplification may occur 
and provide invaluable information for disease risk prevention measures.  
 
6.5 Future Directions 
The outbreaks of SARS demonstrated that wildlife trade can have dire consequences for global 
health as well as the global economy (Lee & McKibbin 2004). In the aftermath of the disease, many 
countries improved their national public health systems so as to better coordinate a rapid response 
in the event of the next pandemic (Koplan et al. 2013). In 2006, two organisations of the United 
Nations, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO), 
along with the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) coordinated in an effort to prevent 
pandemics. They established a Global Early Warning System for Major Animal Diseases in order to 
‘prevent, detect, control, eliminate, or reduce disease risk to humans originating directly or 
indirectly from domestic or wild animals and their environments’, (GLEWS 2017). This “One Health” 
approach was mirrored in a series of research, international development, and outreach programs 
for zoonotic disease prediction and prevention (Bogich et al. 2012; Morse et al. 2012; Mazet et al. 
2015). The research conducted in this study was funded by one such collaborative initiative and the 
questions raised in preceding chapters and immediately above will continue to be explored in the 
near future, including: 
 
• Serological and molecular surveys for CoVs, PMVs, and other viral pathogens in human 
populations in China that are exposed to wildlife both in rural areas (where individuals with 
undiagnosed illnesses were identified) and in large urban markets like Taiping and Foshan. 
• Using next generation sequencing techniques to conduct rapid and broad pathogen 
surveillance assays on bat and rodent samples from this region. 
• Longitudinal surveillance of bats and their migratory behaviour correlated to agricultural, 
population, weather, and anthropogenic factors that may influence bat feeding and roosting 
behaviour. 
• Defining and mapping the networks of wildlife trade in southern China starting from wildlife 
farmers and tracing both to middlemen and to sources of wildlife. 
• Full genomic sequencing and characterisation of the potentially novel strains of PMV 
discovered in this research. 
• Longitudinal behavioural surveillance of rural populations to see if public health and 
conservation public service announcements and campaigns are effecting changes in 
knowledge, attitudes, and practices around wildlife and high-risk behaviours. 
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Continued exploration along these lines into the factors affecting zoonotic emergence in China is 
critically needed to prevent future epidemics and pandemics and understanding the underlying risk 
of spillover events taking place. 
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7.1 Tufts University IACUC Field Sampling Protocol Approval Notice 
 
  
        
 
Amendment Approval Notice 
 
To:  Dr. Peter Daszak 
 
From:  Barry Goldin, Ph.D, Chair 
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee 
  136 Harrison Avenue 
   
Date:  September  27, 2010 
 
Subj:  Protocol #G968-08-Amendment #2 
  “Estimating the Risk of Viral Emergence from Bats” 
______________________________________________________________________  
 
The Amendment, change in animal numbers, to the above-named protocols were reviewed and Approved by this 
institution’s Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee on September 24, 2010.  Your signed agreement to 
abide by the animal care and use policies of this institution also covers the amendments as enclosed. 
 
Amendment #2:  Adds 6,000 Cat. C Megachiroptera,  6, 000 Cat. D Megachiroptera and 32,000 Cat. C 
Microchiroptera to the protocol.   
 
Any change in the species, number, or use of animals described in this protocol must be proposed in writing and 
obtain Committee approval before the change occurs. 
 
No live vertebrate animal may be obtained without specific permission from DTRR.  No live vertebrate animal may 
be removed from any DTRR facility unless such removal is accurately described in your approved protocol. 
 
Animal facility access and animal use privileges are granted only to those individuals named in the protocol or its 
amendments.  
 
* THIS APPROVAL LETTER IS NOT TO BE USED FOR A GRANT VERIFICATION LETTER. The 
approval needed by the grant agency requires verification with the grant to be funded. This process is performed 
upon request.  Please complete the Grant or Funding Proposal Review Form and submit the relevant documents to 
the IACUC office for each approval notice needed. 
 
PLEASE MAKE SURE THAT EVERYONE LISTED ON THE PROTOCOL HAS READ, OR IS AWARE, 
OF THE APPROVED PROCEDURE 
 
 
 
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee 
Tufts University  
136 Harrison Avenue 
Boston, Massachusetts 02111 
Phone: (617) 636-5612  Fax: (617) 636-8354 
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7.2 Bat and Rodent Handling and Sampling 
• Live bats should be placed into cotton bags (with draw-string mouths) and kept in a cool dry 
place until sampling time, not to exceed 6 hours. Rodents will chew through bags, so should be 
removed from cages or compounds and sampled immediately. 
• Animals should be weighed (in grams) in bags using a Pesola hanging scale or a tabl-top scale 
with or without a container (such as a cup). The container should be tared and both bat and bag 
should be weighed. Once the animal is removed from the bag for sampling, the bag should be 
re-weighed and subtracted from previous total. 
• The bat should be removed from the bag and urine should be collected and then duplicate oral 
and rectal swabs should be taken with fine aluminium swabs. Swabs should be cut on the shaft 
as close as possible to the end-swab without touching it and placed into VTM and in TRIzol. 
Scissors should be wiped with ethanol or isopropyl alcohol between each sample. 
• All sample cryovials should be clearly labelled and stored in a liquid nitrogen dry shipper or 
dewar and transferred to -80˚C freezer in the Laboratory as soon as possible. 
• Oropharyngeal Swabs: Using sterile, polyester-tipped swabs with either an aluminium or plastic 
shaft, rub the swab tip gently but thoroughly against the back of the animal’s throat, saturating 
the swab with saliva. Place duplicate swabs in a cryovials filled with 500µl of VTM and TRIzol 
respectively.  
• Faeces: Place duplicate 200 mg samples of fresh faeces in cryovials with 500µl VTM and TRIzol 
respectively.  
• Rectal Swabs: Dip sterile swab tips briefly into sterile saline solution before inserting gently into 
the animal’s rectum or (if too small) around the urogenital area. Place duplicate swabs in 
cryovials filled with 500µl of VTM and TRIzol respectively using a flame-sterilised scissors to cut 
the shaft of the swab above the tip. 
• Blood: For animals weighing more than 100gm, use a non-heparinised syringe to collect blood 
(not to exceed 1% of the circulating blood volume). Make 2 thin smears on glass microscope 
slides, fix with methanol or ethanol, and store in slide box. Place rest of blood into a serum 
vacutainer (red-top) tube containing serum-clotting factor. After allowing the blood to clot, 
either spin tube in a centrifuge or allow tube to stand vertically on ice overnight. Use a sterile 
pipette tip and pipette gun to draw off serum and place even aliquots into cryovials. The 
remaining blood clot should be divided between cryovials with 1.0 ml VTM and TRIzol 
respectively. For animals weighing less than 100gm, use the blood dilution technique as per 
Smith et al. (2010b). Animal is restrained in one hand and the wing or leg is extended. The radial 
artery or vein is punctured using the tip of a sterile 25G needle and a bleb of blood is allowed to 
form. Using a pipette or pipette gun draw up 12µl and place it into 108µl phosphate buffered 
saline (PBS) in a 1.2 ml Eppendorf tube. Continue to draw up blood in 12 µl aliquots and place in 
the same tube until the maximum amount of blood safely allowed (approx 6µl blood volume per 
gm of animal mass) is collected. Add an equal number of 108µl aliquots of PBS to maintain a 
1:10 dilution. Blood tubes can be centrifuged to separate dilute serum from blood cell pellet. 
Make sure to note the dilution of blood on data sheet. Collect cell pellet as above. 
• Urine: collect urine sample in VTM and in TRIzol as detailed for swabs, above. 
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7.3 Collection Protocol for microbats and small megabats 
• Date & Location are recorded using GPS along with temperature and weather conditions including time (or 
duration) of trapping and any other variables. All notes are written in a notebook and later transferred to an excel 
file. After sampling, photographs are taken of each note page to ensure against loss of hard-copy. 
• Pre-printed bar-scan labels affixed to all vials. Bat samples are coded with the following method: 
 
• 04.12.09      –    XRD 
• BZ – P. hypomelanus 
• Oral             XXX 
 
o From top to bottom, left-to-right: 
▪ Date in following format: DD.MM.YY 
▪ Location-specific Name; i.e. XianRenDong = XRDG; HaiKou GongYuan = HKGY 
▪ Laboratory to which the sample is intended; i.e. CH (for China) or US 
▪ Genus & Species in format of “G. species” 
▪ Sample Type – serum, whole blood, feces, oral or anal swab, &tc. 
▪ Bat-specific number given per site. Usually commencing with ‘001’ up to n with n being the 
highest-count per sampling effort of bat. 
 
• Bats are caught using mist-net, hand-net, or harp-trap and placed into cloth bags (with draw-string mouths). These 
cloth bags are then suspended from pole permitting air to circulate between each bat-with-bag. In warm months, 
someone must monitor captured bats’ local environment to ensure adequate ventilation and to prevent excessive 
humidity.  
• Bats are weighed (in grams) while still in bags. Scale with or without container or cup is tared and both bat & bag 
are weighed. Once bat is removed for biometry, bag is re-weighed and subtracted from previous total. 
• Bat is removed from bag, identified (genus, species, age class, and sex) and photographed. 
• The following biometrics (in centimetres) are taken: 
▪ Forearm length (‘elbow to wrist’) 
▪ Ear Length (most distal tip of ear to base) 
▪ Tragus length (top of tragus to base of ear) 
▪ Body Length (measured ventrally from top of nose to base of tail) 
▪ Hind Foot Length (‘ankle to toe’) 
▪ Tail Length (from base to tip) 
▪ Tibia (‘knee to ankle’) 
 
• 2 2mm wing punches are taken from each bat and placed in ethanol in a 0.5ml vial. 
• Oral and anal swabs are taken with fine aluminium-shaft swab. If any faeces or urine are clearly excreted directly 
from the bat as it is being handled, these excreta may be placed into separate vials of 500µl of VTM and 500µl of 
TRIzol and in 1ml cryovials (with internal O-ring washers). Care must be taken not to sample any loose faeces from 
bat-bag, unless no other bat has previously been kept therein since last laving of bat-bags. Oral and anal swabs are 
cut on the shaft as close as possible to the end-swab without touching it and dropped into duplicate tubes 
containing respectively TRIzol and VTM. The swab-tip and any sample must be completely submerged in the buffer. 
Shears or cutters are sterilised between bats with ethanol and flame. Sealed, labelled vials with samples are put 
into dry-shipper filled with liquid N2 or otherwise stored at -80˚C. 
• If bats must be bled with caution to maintain a ratio no greater than 1g of bat weight to 10µl of blood. For bleeding, 
bats are manually restrained and not sedated. Even with micro-bats, two people are preferred for these 
manipulations; one to safely manage the bat and the other to take and record samples. The bleed site is prepared 
with a pre-injection swab of ethanol and a 25 gauge ¾ needle is used to only pierce the saphenous, brachial, or 
propatagial veins. Which vein used will depend upon sampler’s experience and success with specific species. The 
saphenous vein permits the sampling site to be furthest from the bat’s head. 
• Blood beads on the skin surface and may be collected using a 100 µl pipette with sterile tip and added directly to 
PBS in a Eppendorf vial and mixed briefly with the pipette tip. NB, quantity of blood extracted from bat should not 
exceed a ratio of 1g of bat weight to 10µl of blood. Discard tips between bats. PBS formula: dissolve the following 
in 800ml distilled H2O. 8g of NaCl; 0.2g of KCl; 1.44g of Na2HPO4; 0.24g of KH2PO4; Adjust pH to 7.4; Adjust volume 
to 1L with additional distilled H2O; Sterilize by autoclaving 
• When the maximum permissible volume is collected, a cotton ball and pressure are applied until a clot has formed 
and bleeding ceases. If blood flow is difficult to stop, a styptic powder may be used. If excessive bleeding occurs 
repeatedly and clot is slow to form, puncture should be made more distally along the chosen vein. 
• Once all trapped bats are processed and returned to their respective bags, the collected blood in Eppendorf diluted 
with PBS is then spun in a micro-centrifuge briefly (1-3 mins) and allowed to settle overnight or for a minimum of 
one hour.  
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• Once the blood-plus-PBS in the Eppendorf tubes has settled, the serum is removed with a sterile pipette tip and 
put into duplicate, labelled 700µl vials without buffer for storage and later analysis. Serum vials may be stored on 
ice for up to 24 hours during transit and then at -80˚C or put directly into N2 for return to laboratory. 
• Remaining blood cells are pipetted into two vials and TRIzol (approximately equivalent to the serum fraction 
removed) is added to the remaining blood cells to maintain – at most - a 1:10 dilution and provide a haemostatic 
buffer. To maintain the viability of cellular DNA for further genetic analysis the diluted blood cell fraction is stored 
with oral/anal samples (above) in a dry-shipper filled with liquid N2 (in collar) until they may be deposited in a -
80˚C freezer. 
• Bats are released as close to their site of capture as possible. 
• If Avisoft or other sonic-detection device is available, bats’ calls upon release are recorded (optional). 
• For any euthanised bats, liver, kidney, brain, heart, spleen, reproductive tissue (testes & uterus), and lung will be 
sampled and frozen directly into vials with TRIzol. Each sample should be mashed briefly in the buffer solution. 
Salivary gland (not vital, if already swabbing for saliva). 
 
TOTAL NUMBER OF SAMPLES PER BAT: 8 
 
a) 2 x oral swab in approx. 0.5ml of TRIzol and VTM, respectively. Stored in Dry Shipper with N2 and transferred to -
80˚C freezer 
b) 2 x anal swab in approx. 0.5ml of TRIzol and VTM, respectively. Stored in Dry Shipper with N2 and transferred to -
80˚C freezer 
c) 2 x serum. For non-euthanised bats, whole blood from bats not to exceed 10µl per 1g of bat-weight. Blood to be put 
into Eppendorf tubes with PBS to dilute to a maximum ratio of 1:10 (minimum ratio of 1:3). Diluted blood is then spun 
and let sit for at least three hours, but no more than 24 hours. A minimum of 60µl or 200µl of diluted serum pipetted 
off, put into vials, and stored in Dry Shipper & transferred to -80˚C freezer. NB. MINIMUM WEIGHT FOR BAT WILL BE 6g 
to have at least 60µl of whole blood. 
d) 2 x remaining blood-cells after serum is removed. This remaining blood will be mixed with TRIzol at a ratio equal to 
or greater than one part blood to 3-parts buffer 
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7.4 CoV and PMV BLAST Results and Reference Sequences 
Table 27. A total of 39 positive Coronavirus sequences from Chinese bats. Sample numbers host species listed. Length of 
sequences in nucleotide base pairs (bp) is given. NCBI (ncbi.nlm.nih.gov) BLAST results record number, BLAST results host 
species, percent of nucleotides covered by BLAST results, and pairwise identities are in right-most columns. Discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4.
Sample Number Host Species Length (bp) 
BLAST 
Result 
BLAST Result 
Host Species 
Cover Identities 
15612NL131033 Hipposideros pratti 387 KP876528 Rhinolophus affinis 100.00% 93.30% 
15612NL13812 Rhinolophus rex 387 KP876528 Rhinolophus affinis 100.00% 93.30% 
15612NL13814 Rhinolophus rex 348 KP895492 Myotis daubentonii 100.00% 93.40% 
15612NL13815 Rhinolophus rex 349 KP895492 Myotis daubentonii 100.00% 93.40% 
15612NL13817 Rhinolophus rex 347 KP895492 Myotis daubentonii 100.00% 93.40% 
15612NL13813 Rhinolophus rex 387 KP876528 Rhinolophus affinis 100.00% 93.50% 
15612NL13816 Rhinolophus rex 354 KP895492 Myotis daubentonii 100.00% 93.50% 
15612NL13820 Rhinolophus rex 339 KP895492 Myotis daubentonii 100.00% 93.50% 
15610HNCM020 Miniopterus fuliginosus 383 DQ648852 Bat CoV 98.97% 94.80% 
15610HNYG063 Miniopterus fuliginosus 387 KP876519 Miniopterus schreibersii 100.00% 96.40% 
15610HNLS008 Miniopterus fuliginosus 385 KP876519 Miniopterus schreibersii 99.48% 96.60% 
15611YNMXR003 Miniopterus fuliginosus 384 KP876507 Miniopterus schreibersii 99.22% 96.60% 
15610HNLS007 Miniopterus fuliginosus 387 KJ020613 Miniopterus magnater 100.00% 97.40% 
15612NL13856 Pipistrellus pipistrellus 387 DQ648802 Bat CoV 100.00% 97.40% 
15612NL13847 Pipistrellus pipistrellus 387 KC522076 Pipistrellus sp. 100.00% 97.70% 
15612NL13849 Pipistrellus pipistrellus 387 KY432470 Pipistrellus abramus 100.00% 97.70% 
15612GXLZ006 Tylonycteris pachypus 367 KJ473822 Tylonycteris pachypus 100.00% 97.80% 
15612NL131015 Hipposideros armiger 387 KY009624 Eptesicus serotinus 100.00% 97.90% 
15612GXLZ009 Tylonycteris pachypus 367 KJ473822 Tylonycteris pachypus 100.00% 98.10% 
15610HNCM030 Miniopterus fuliginosus 387 KJ473802 Miniopterus fuliginosus 100.00% 98.20% 
15612NL13832 Ia io 387 KY009624 Eptesicus serotinus 100.00% 98.20% 
15612NL13845 Ia io 387 KY009624 Eptesicus serotinus 100.00% 98.20% 
15611YNMXR002 Miniopterus fuliginosus 387 KP876507 Miniopterus schreibersii 100.00% 98.40% 
15612GXLZ027 Tylonycteris pachypus 367 DQ648803 Bat CoV 100.00% 98.40% 
15612HZ13484 Rhinolophus sinicus 387 KJ473815 Tylonycteris pachypus 100.00% 98.40% 
15612NL13973 Rhinolophus sinicus 387 KJ473815 Tylonycteris pachypus 100.00% 98.70% 
15611YNMXR005 Miniopterus fuliginosus 362 KP876513 Miniopterus schreibersii 93.54% 98.90% 
15610HNCM033 Miniopterus fuliginosus 387 KJ473802 Miniopterus fuliginosus 100.00% 99.00% 
15610YNYJ028 Miniopterus fuliginosus 387 KP876523 Miniopterus schreibersii 100.00% 99.00% 
15612NL13953 Myotis ricketti 343 DQ648836 Bat CoV 100.00% 99.10% 
15612NL13937 Myotis ricketti 351 KY009616 Myotis ricketti 100.00% 99.40% 
15612GXLZ047 Tylonycteris pachypus 367 KJ473822 Tylonycteris pachypus 100.00% 99.50% 
15612GXLZ059 Tylonycteris pachypus 387 KJ473822 Tylonycteris pachypus 100.00% 99.50% 
15612NL13946 Myotis ricketti 387 DQ648826 Bat CoV 100.00% 99.50% 
15612NL13928 Myotis ricketti 359 DQ648844 Bat CoV 100.00% 99.70% 
15612NL13945 Myotis ricketti 348 DQ648844 Bat CoV 100.00% 99.70% 
15611YNSHC014 Rhinolophus sinicus 387 KF367457 Rhinolophus sinicus 100.00% 100.00% 
15612GXLZ001 Tylonycteris pachypus 367 KJ473822 Tylonycteris pachypus 100.00% 100.00% 
15612HZ13488 Rhinolophus sinicus 387 KJ473815 Tylonycteris pachypus 100.00% 100.00% 
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Table 28. Reference sequences used in constructing Coronavirus phylogenies. Downloaded from NCBI (ncbi.nlm.nih.gov). 
Discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
Genus Species NCBI Acession Number 
Alphacoronavirus Feline Coronavirus AB907634 
Alphacoronavirus Canine Coronavirus AB907633 
Alphacoronavirus Human coronavirus 229E KT253266 
Alphacoronavirus Human coronavirus NL63 KF530113 
Alphacoronavirus Miniopterus bat coronavirus 1 AY864196 
Alphacoronavirus Miniopterus bat coronavirus HKU8 NC010438 
Alphacoronavirus Porcine epidemic diarrhea virus NC003436 
Alphacoronavirus Rhinolophus bat coronavirus HKU2 NC009988 
Alphacoronavirus Scotophilus bat coronavirus 512 NC009657 
Alphacoronavirus Transmissible gastroenteritis coronavirus KX499468 
Alphacoronavirus Chinese Bamboo Rat CoV EF584902 
Betscoronavirus Bat Hipposideros pratti coronavirus KF636753 
Betacoronavirus Bat Ia io coronavirus KY770857 
Betacoronavirus Bat Myotis ricketti coronavirus KY009625 
Betacoronavirus China Rattus coronavirus HKU24 NC026011 
Betacoronavirus Human coronavirus OC43 KF572933 
Betacoronavirus Human coronavirus HKU1 KY674921 
Betacoronavirus MERS-CoV KP209313 
Betacoronavirus SARS-CoV NC006577 
Betacoronavirus Pipistrellus bat coronavirus HKU5 DQ249217 
Betacoronavirus Tylonycteris bat coronavirus HKU4 DQ074652 
Betacoronavirus Rousettus bat coronavirus HKU9 KY010629 
Betacoronavirus London1 novel CoV/2012 KC164505 
Betacoronavirus HCoV-EMC/2012 JX869059 
Betacoronavirus Bat SL-CoV-WIV1 KF367457 
Betacoronavirus Civet SARS CoV SZ3 AY304486 
Betacoronavirus Hipposideros Bat CoV KJ020601 
Gammacoronavirus Turkey coronavirus FN811146 
Gammacoronavirus Beluga whale coronavirus SW1 EU111742 
Deltacoronavirus Bulbul coronavirus HKU11 FJ376619 
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Table 29. A total of 114 positive Paramyxovirus sequences. Sample number and host species are shown from Chinese bats. 
Length of sequences in nucleotide base pairs (bp) is given. NCBI (ncbi.nlm.nih.gov) BLAST results, record number, BLAST 
results host species, percent of nucleotides covered by BLAST results, and pairwise identities are in right-most columns. 
Discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
Sample 
Number 
Host 
Species 
Length 
(bp) 
BLAST 
Result 
BLAST Result 
Host Species 
Cover Identities 
PAR-4274 R. affinis 572 GU128081 R. leschenaulti 100% 68% 
HD13632 M. schreibersii 533 KC692406 Bat PMV 99% 71% 
PAR1-141731 A. stoliczkanus 503 AB844425 Bat PMV 100% 73% 
PAR-5816 H. armiger 506 AB844425 Bat PMV 100% 73% 
141531 M. davidii 532 KP159805 Feline PMV 97% 74% 
PAR-3712 M. fuliginosus 513 KC599261 Bat PMV 99% 74% 
ZG13666 V. sinensis 533 KC578584 Bat PMV 96% 74% 
PAR2-141724 A. stoliczkanus 609 KJ641655.1 Bat PMV 99% 75% 
PAR2-141725 A. stoliczkanus 515 KC578584 Bat PMV 100% 75% 
PAR2-141727 A. stoliczkanus 511 KC599258 Bat PMV 100% 75% 
ML140073 A. stoliczkanus 471 KC154054 M. schreibersii 96% 75% 
PAR2-151431 H. pratti 497 KC578575 Bat PMV 73% 75% 
LD13759 P. ognevi 533 JN086951 Bat PMV 99% 75% 
JL035 R. pusillus 530 KC578584 Bat PMV 97% 75% 
PAR1-141747 T. melanopogon 530 KC599258 Bat PMV 98% 75% 
GL13561 T. melanopogon 520 KC599258 Bat PMV 100% 75% 
PAR-3131 H. armiger 512 JN086951 Bat PMV 100% 76% 
PAR-7260 H. armiger 499 KC578569 Bat PMV 100% 76% 
PAR-7261 H. armiger 305 KC578572 Bat PMV 100% 76% 
PAR-141582 H. pomona 491 KC578572 Bat PMV 99% 76% 
PAR2-151428-36 H. pratti 582 KC154054.1 Bat PMV 98% 76% 
PAR2-151393 H. pratti 535 KC154055.1 M. schreibersii 99% 76% 
PAR-141229 M. pilosus 520 KC599258 Bat PMV 99% 76% 
PAR-141247 M. pilosus 520 KC599258 Bat PMV 98% 76% 
LHS006R M. pilosus  518 KC578572 Bat PMV 96% 76% 
LD13763 P. ognevi 509 JN086951 Bat PMV 99% 76% 
PAR-4271 R. affinis 533 KC154054 M. schreibersii 97% 76% 
PAR1-8583 R. sinicus 536 KC599258 Bat PMV 100% 76% 
ZG13667 V. sinensis 448 JN086951 Bat PMV 98% 76% 
BX13776 H. alaschanicus 517 JN086951 Bat PMV 100% 77% 
PAR-3130 H. armiger 499 KC578572 Bat PMV 100% 77% 
PAR-141583 H. pomona 505 KC578572 Bat PMV 97% 77% 
PAR2-141401 H. pomona 505 KC599258 Bat PMV 100% 77% 
PAR-141578 H. pomona 508 KC154054 M. schreibersii 99% 77% 
PAR-141624 H. pomona 497 KC154056 M. schreibersii 100% 77% 
PAR2-151392 H. pratti 536 KC578579.1 Bat PMV 100% 77% 
PAR2-151407 H. pratti 535 KC578572.1 Bat PMV 99% 77% 
PAR2-151432-35 H. pratti 466 KC578584.1 Bat PMV 95% 77% 
PAR2-151436-4 H. pratti 520 KJ641655.1 Bat PMV 100% 77% 
PAR2-9016 H. pratti 495 KC578584.1 Bat PMV 100% 77% 
PAR-3979 M. magnater 600 KJ641655.1 Bat PMV 100% 77% 
PAR-4063 M. magnater 599 KJ641655.1 Bat PMV 99% 77% 
Positive Paramyxovirus sequences (ctd). 
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Sample 
Number 
Host 
Species 
Length 
(bp) 
BLAST 
Result 
BLAST Result 
Host Species 
Cover Identities 
NL13929 M. pilosus 540 KC599258 Bat PMV 98% 77% 
PAR-4272 R. affinis 610 KJ641655.1 Bat PMV 100% 77% 
PAR-4273 R. affinis 520 KJ641655.1 Bat PMV 99% 77% 
PAR-3772 R. sinicus 508 KC154054 M. schreibersii 99% 77% 
PAR1-141735 A. stoliczkanus 515 KC599258 Bat PMV 99% 78% 
PAR2-8764 H. armiger 490 JN086950 Bat PMV 99% 78% 
PAR2-9243 H. armiger 506 KC578584.1 Bat PMV 98% 78% 
PAR-141629 H. pomona 611 KJ641657.1 Bat PMV 99% 78% 
PAR-141627 H. pomona 533 KC154058 R. ferrumequinum 99% 78% 
PAR2-151394 H. pratti 522 KC578584.1 Bat PMV 99% 78% 
PAR2-151403 H. pratti 525 KJ641655.1 Bat PMV 99% 78% 
PAR2-151405 H. pratti 536 KJ641655.1 Bat PMV 100% 78% 
PAR2-151435 H. pratti 608 KJ641655.1 Bat PMV 94% 78% 
PAR2-8961 H. pratti 505 KJ641655.1 Bat PMV 100% 78% 
NL13838 I. io 476 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 100% 78% 
NL13841 I. io 513 KC599258 Bat PMV 99% 78% 
YX006 M. altarium 337 KC599258 Bat PMV 98% 78% 
PAR-3736 M. fuliginosus 482 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 94% 78% 
YX007 R. affinis 490 JN086950 Bat PMV 92% 78% 
LA131533 R. affinis 527 KC154058 R. ferrumequinum 99% 78% 
PAR2-151307 R. sinicus 535 KJ641655.1 Bat PMV 99% 78% 
FX037 R. sinicus 534 KC578572 Bat PMV 100% 78% 
PAR-3086 R. sinicus 529 KC578584 Bat PMV 95% 78% 
PAR-3112 R. sinicus 522 KC578584 Bat PMV 95% 78% 
YD13389 H. larvatus 535 KC578572 Bat PMV 99% 79% 
PAR-141595 H. pomona 531 KC154054 M. schreibersii 99% 79% 
PAR2-151396 H. pratti 535 KJ641655.1 Bat PMV 100% 79% 
PAR2-151432-31 H. pratti 585 KJ641655.1 Bat PMV 97% 79% 
PAR2-8972 H. pratti 477 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 100% 79% 
PAR-141594 H. pomona 519 KC154054 M. schreibersii 97% 80% 
PAR2-151426 H. pratti 557 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 92% 80% 
PAR2-151428-47 H. pratti 585 KJ641655.1 Bat PMV 97% 80% 
PAR2-8962 H. pratti 472 KC578584.1 Bat PMV 100% 80% 
PAR2-9015 H. pratti 502 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 97% 80% 
NL131077 M. davidii 515 KC578584 Bat PMV 99% 80% 
PAR-141217-32 M. pilosus 510 KC578584 Bat PMV 99% 80% 
HD13630 M. schreibersii 520 KC578584 Bat PMV 98% 80% 
PAR-4301 R. affinis 503 KC154054 M. schreibersii 98% 80% 
NL140372-1 R. pearsonii 514 KC578584 Bat PMV 99% 80% 
PAR-3362 R. sinicus 490 KC154054 M. schreibersii 98% 80% 
PAR2-9032 H. pratti 505 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 100% 81% 
PAR2-9257 H. armiger 505 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 99% 82% 
PAR2-9258 H. armiger 450 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 98% 82% 
PAR2-9259 H. armiger 501 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 99% 82% 
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Positive Paramyxovirus sequences (ctd). 
Sample 
Number 
Host 
Species 
Length 
(bp) 
BLAST 
Result 
BLAST Result 
Host Species 
Cover Identities 
PAR2-9260 H. armiger 498 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 100% 82% 
PAR2-9261 H. armiger 504 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 98% 82% 
PAR2-151421 H. pratti 489 KJ641655.1 Bat PMV 100% 82% 
PAR2-151425 H. pratti 513 KJ641655.1 Bat PMV 100% 82% 
PAR2-151428-40 H. pratti 585 KJ641655.1 Bat PMV 97% 82% 
PAR2-9033 H. pratti 505 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 100% 82% 
PAR-4300 R. affinis 505 KC154054 M. schreibersii 98% 82% 
PAR2-151296 R. pearsonii 525 KJ641655.1 Bat PMV 99% 82% 
ZG13665 V. sinensis 533 KC599258 Bat PMV 96% 82% 
PAR2-151399 H. pratti 512 KJ641655.1 Bat PMV 100% 83% 
PAR2-151406 H. pratti 558 KJ641655.1 Bat PMV 97% 83% 
PAR2-151432-32 H. pratti 663 KJ641655.1 Bat PMV 100% 83% 
PAR2-9011 H. pratti 501 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 100% 83% 
PAR2-8965 H. pratti 504 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 98% 85% 
PAR2-8975 H. pratti 499 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 99% 85% 
PAR2-8997 H. pratti 495 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 100% 85% 
PAR2-9000 H. pratti 497 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 99% 85% 
PAR2-9012 H. pratti 504 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 98% 85% 
PAR2-9018 H. pratti 489 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 100% 85% 
PAR2-9031 H. pratti 409 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 100% 85% 
PAR2-151436-6 H. pratti 520 KC599258 Bat PMV 99% 86% 
PAR2-8998 H. pratti 475 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 99% 86% 
PAR2-9269 H. armiger 507 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 98% 87% 
PAR-7254 H. armiger 518 KC599258 Bat PMV 99% 91% 
PAR2-9109 H. armiger 508 KC599258.1 Bat PMV 99% 92% 
YLD011 H. armiger 403 KC599258 Bat PMV 99% 92% 
FX006 R. sinicus 508 KC599258 Bat PMV 100% 92% 
PAR-4287 R. affinis 519 KC599258 Bat PMV 100% 99% 
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Table 30. Reference Sequences used to construct Paramyxovirus phylogenies. Downloaded from NCBI (ncbi.nlm.nih.gov). 
Discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
Genus Species NCBI Accession Number 
Avulavirus Newcastle Disease Virus AB854735 
Avulavirus Avian Paramyxovirus 6 AB759118 
Avulavirus Avian PMV 9 EU910942 
Avulavirus Avian PMV 5 GU206351 
Ferlavirus Fer de Lance PMV AF286043 
Henipavirus Hendra Virus JN255818 
Henipavirus Nipah Virus JN255818 
Morbillivirus Canine Distemper Virus KX371588 
Morbillivirus Phocine Distemper Virus PVU65446 
Morbillivirus Measles Virus AY037033 
Morbillivirus Rinderpest Virus AY954037 
Morbillivirus Cetacean Morbillivirus NC_005283 
Morbillivirus Peste des Petits Ruminants Virus AJ849636 
Respirovirus Bovine Parainfluenza Virus 3 AB770484 
Respirovirus Human Parainfluenza Virus 3 AB195610 
Respirovirus Sendai Virus AB005795 
Rubulavirus Human Parainfluenza Virus 1 AF117818 
Rubulavirus Porcine Rubulavirus AF416650 
Rubulavirus Mumps Virus AB904528 
Rubulavirus Human Parainfluenza Virus 2 AB176531 
Rubulavirus Parainfluenza Virus 5 AB853926 
Rubulavirus Mapuera Virus NC_009489 
Rubulavirus Simian Virus 41 NC_006428 
Rubulavirus Simian Virus 10 HM583801 
Rubulavirus Human Parainfluenza Virus 4a AB543336 
Unclassified Beilong Virus KX940964 
Unclassified Tupaia Paramyxovirus NC_002199 
Unclassified Tuhoko Virus NC_025348 
Unclassified Tioman Virus AF298895 
Unclassified Menangle Virus AF326114 
Unclassified Salem Virus JQ697837 
Unclassified Mossman Virus AY286409 
Unclassified J Virus AY900001 
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7.5 Observational Survey Checklist 
(English language version) 
 
 
I. Primary Activity (circle one or more) (1) Land use change (2) Animal production intensification (3) Animal value 
chain 
I. Environment (circle one) 
1. Urban (densely living population, little green space visible, eg, parks, cultivation or raising animals) 
2. Peri-urban (may still be dense population but more green space/scrub, could be used for cultivation or raising 
animals or fallow) 
3. Rural (could be abutting pristine, majority of land does not have dwellings, could be used for agricultural—crops 
or animals; may be fallow; may be extractive industry) 
4. Low disturbance (no obvious signs of human dwellings or established plantations, extractive industry, 
congregation sites for animal sales or slaughter, very few signs of human activity.) 
II. Type of site (circle one) 
III. Observed living animals and humans 
 
Is there indirect evidence of other animals not seen?  
Which animals can be directly or indirectly observed at this site? 
IV. Animal-
human mixing      
Observer Name: _________________________________________________________ 
Site Name & Location: _________________________________________________________ 
Date/Time of day/weekday or weekend _________________________________________________________ 
Season/weather conditions of the day: _________________________________________________________ 
1) Market (formal or informal) 4) Farm 
2) Dwelling 5) Natural habitat 
3) Extractive industry (eg, mining, logging, palm oil 
plantation) 
6) Restaurant (including street vendors, chop shops, 
informal or impromptu set-ups) 
 Yes     No     Total No. Obsv’d No. of species Obsv’d 
Livestock/domestic animals (including cats 
and dogs) 
Y         N       <10, 10-50, >50-1000, 
>1000 
1, 2-5, >5 
Wildlife/nondomestic animals (including 
rodents, non-farmed birds and farmed 
wildlife 
Y         N       
<10, 10-50, >50-1000, 
>1000 
1, 2-5, >5-15, >15 
Humans Y         N       1, 2-10, >10-50, >50 N/A 
Feces Y         N        Footprints Y         N       
Eaten fruit or other food Y         N        Chew marks Y         N       
Livestock Yes     No      Wildlife Yes     No     
Chickens Y         N        Rodents (rats/mice, porcupines, squirrels) Y         N       
Ducks Y         N        Bats Y         N       
Pigs Y         N        Nonhuman primates Y         N       
Cows Y         N        Civets Y         N       
Dogs Y         N        Non-farmed wild birds Y         N       
Cats Y         N        Farmed wildlife Y         N       
Goats/Sheep Y         N          
Camels Y         N          
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V. Sanitation and hygiene 
  
 Circle yes, no, or not applicable (N/A).  Yes     No    N/A 
Does the site have structures to limit animal movement (eg, cages, buildings, stalls, fencing)? Y         N      N/A 
Are different species observed sharing the same space or resources (eg, water, food, physical 
location, cages, stall, pasture)?      If “Yes”, select all that apply: 
Y         N      N/A 
a. Wild animal with wild animal Y         N      N/A 
b. Wild animal with livestock/domestic animal Y         N      N/A 
c. Livestock/domestic animal with livestock/domestic animal Y         N      N/A 
Are there any (wildlife or livestock/domestic) animals roaming freely? Y         N      N/A 
Do any animals appear to be sick? Y         N      N/A 
Is there any slaughtering of animals occurring on site? Y         N      N/A 
Is there any butchering of animals occurring on site? Y         N      N/A 
Are there any animals near food preparation or eating areas? Y         N      N/A 
Is there evidence that people live with their animals? Y         N      N/A 
Do any people appear to be sick? Y         N      N/A 
Are there any children at the site? Y         N      N/A 
 Circle yes, no, or not applicable (N/A).  Yes     No    N/A 
Does the site have structures to protect against the weather or other animals? Y         N      N/A 
Are the structures permanent? Y         N      N/A 
Is there a dedicated location for animal waste? Y         N      N/A 
Is there a dedicated location for human garbage? Y         N      N/A 
Quality of animal waste and garbage disposal (circle one) 
0. None observed 
1. Dedicated location, either not maintained or not used 
2. Dedicated location, well maintained and used 
 
Are there toilets, latrines or other public facilities/designated areas for human waste? Y         N      N/A 
Quality of human waste disposal (circle one) 
0. None observed 
1. Dedicated location, either not maintained or not used 
2. Dedicated location, well maintained and used 
 
Is there a central source of water? Y         N      N/A 
Quality of water (circle one) 
0. Fully unprotected: pond, uncovered well  
1. Rainwater harvesting, water trucking, open well  
2. Fully protected: water network with taps, covered well 
 
Access to water (circle one) 
0. >30 minutes walking 
1. 5-30 min 
2. 0-5 minutes walking 
 
Add Site Observations here (use additional pages as necessary):  
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行为风险调查表 
调查表的主要目的为以下两方面： 
1. 是否有人和动物互动的证据？ 
2. 人和动物互动这一背景是否潜在的促成了病毒的跨种传播？ 
观察者：        _________________________________________________________________ 
观察点&GPS：   _________________________________________________________________ 
观察日期/时间/是否工作日________________________________________________________ 
季节/调查日天气 _________________________________________________________________ 
I. 通路观察 （选择一个） (1)土地使用变化情况 (2) 动物产品集约化 (3) 动物价值链 
I. 环境方面（选择一个） 
1. 都市（高密度聚居人群，很少公园等绿地空间用来培植或者饲养的动物。） 
2. 城乡结合部（仍然有较多人群聚居但是具有更多绿地和灌木可以用来培植或者饲养动物，或者有较多的弃耕土
地。） 
3. 郊区（景观较为原始，大部分的地区没有定居居民，土地主要为种植庄稼、饲养动物等农业用途；或者有弃耕
田地；或者采摘农业。） 
4. 人烟稀少地区（没有明显的定居特征、植被特征、采摘农业特征，动物屠宰和动物买卖特征，极少人类活动。
） 
II 观察点类型（选择一个） 
III 观察到的人和活的动物 
有没有明显的遗漏其它动物数量和种类的特征？ 
在该观察点能够直接或者间接观察到的动物都有哪些？ 
1) 贸易市场(正规的 非正规的) 4) 农场 
2) 聚居点 5) 自然栖息地 
3) 采伐业 (例如,采矿业，石油勘探或者种植业) 6) 餐馆 (包括街头摊贩点, 地下贩卖点, 非正规的随
机设立摊点) 
 是 否 观察到的动物总数量 观察到的动物种类 
家畜和饲养动物（包括猫，狗） 是 否       <10, 10-50, >50-1000, >1000 1, 2-5, >5 
野生动物/非饲养动物（包括啮齿
类，非饲养鸟类和饲养野生动物 
是 否    
<10, 10-50, >50-1000, >1000 1, 2-5, >5-15, >15 
人 是 否    1, 2-10, >10-50, >50 不适用 
粪便 是        否        足迹 是            否 
吃剩的水果或者其他食物 是        否  咀嚼残渣 是            否 
家畜 是    否  野生动物 是    否 
鸡 是    否  啮齿类 (大鼠/小鼠,豪猪,松鼠) 是    否 
鸭 是    否  蝙蝠 是    否 
猪 是    否  非人灵长类 是    否 
牛 是    否  果子狸 是    否 
狗 是    否  非饲养野生鸟类 是    否 
猫 是    否  饲养的野生动物 是    否 
山羊/绵羊 是    否    
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IV 动物和人混居
情况 
V．卫生设备和卫生状况 
  
骆驼 是    否    
选择是、否或者不适用  是 否 不适用 
该观察点是否有限制动物活动设施 (笼子，建筑，篱舍，篱笆)? 是 否 不适用 
是否有不同种动物（混养，公用饮用水，食物，笼舍，畜栏，牧场）?       
如果有，选择所有存在的情况: 
是 否 不适用 
d. 野生动物和野生动物 是 否 不适用 
e. 野生动物和家畜/家养动物 是 否 不适用 
f. 家畜/家养动物和家畜/家养动物 是 否 不适用 
动物 (野生动物和家畜/家养动物)是否能够自由活动? 是 否 不适用 
是否有动物出现病症? 是 否 不适用 
在该点是否屠宰过动物？ 是 否 不适用 
有没有在这里屠宰动物？ 是 否 不适用 
是否有些动物离厨房很近? 是 否 不适用 
是否有人和动物一起生活的证据？ 是 否 不适用 
是否有人生病？ 是 否 不适用 
该观察点是否有小孩子活动？ 是 否 不适用 
选择是、否或者不适用  是 否 不适用 
该点是否有抵御天气和其它动物的设施? 是 否 不适用 
这些是永久性设施吗？ 是 否 不适用 
该点是否有专门地点收集动物排泄物，食物残渣等废弃物？ 是 否 不适用 
该点是否有专门地方存放生活垃圾？ 是 否 不适用 
动物废弃物和生活垃圾存放点状况 (选择 1 个) 
3. 未观察到 
4. 有固定存放点，既没有维护，也未使用 
5. 有固定存放点，维护很好，在使用 
 
是否有厕所，公共厕所或者其它指定存放生活垃圾的地方? 是 否 不适用 
生活垃圾存放点状况 (选择 1 个) 
3. 未观察到 
4. 有固定存放点，既没有维护，也未使用 
5. 有固定存放点，维护很好，在使用 
 
该地方是否有重要水源？ 是 否 不适用 
水源状况(选择 1 个) 
3. 完全无保护，池塘, 没有顶盖  
4. 雨水收集点, 运水车, 完全开放  
5. 完全保护: 水利系统 
 
到水源地时间(选择 1 个) 
3. >30 分钟步行 
4. 5-30 分钟步行 
5. 0-5 分钟步行 
 
写：  
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7.6 Taiping and Foshan Market Species and Associated Viruses 
Table 31. List of species observed in Taiping and Foshan markets in the greater Guangzhou area of Guangdong province China from 2014 to 2016. Information on IUCN and China Forestry 
Department endangered species classification as well as number of known viruses hosted by the species and associated references are also listed. China endangered species are from List of 
National Key Protected Wild Animals (PRC 2006). Class I lists critically endangered species and Class II lists endangered species (Cao 2015). The Red List of Threatened Species is from 
International Union for Conservation of Nature with the following terms: LC = Least Concern; NE = Not Evaluated; VU = Vulnerable (IUCN 2016).
Genus species Common Name IUCN 
China 
Endangered 
Species List 
Number of 
Viruses Known to 
Host 
Viruses Known to Host References 
Sus scrofa Wild boar LC NE 56 
African_swine_fever_virus 
Banna_virus 
Border_disease_virus 
Borna_disease_virus 
Bovine_viral_diarrhea_virus_1 
Classical_swine_fever_virus 
Encephalomyocarditis_virus 
Foot-and-mouth_disease_virus 
Getah_virus 
Hepatitis_E_virus 
Human_picobirnavirus 
Influenza_A_virus 
Influenza_C_virus 
Japanese_encephalitis_virus 
Menangle_virus 
Ndumu_virus 
Nipah_virus 
Norwalk_virus 
Ovine_herpesvirus_2 
Patois_virus 
Porcine_adenovirus_A 
Porcine_adenovirus_B 
Porcine_adenovirus_C 
Porcine_astrovirus 
Porcine_circovirus-1 
Porcine_circovirus-2 
Porcine_enteric_sapovirus 
Porcine_enterovirus_A 
ICTV database 
Tao et al. 2005 
Roehe et al. 1992 
Zhang et al. 2014 
Van Gennip et al. 1999 
Kosmidou et al 1998 
Tesh and Wallace 1978 
Ghoneim et al. 2010 
Attoui et al. 2007 
Taylor et al. 2001  
Banyai et al. 2008 
Kaden et al. 2008 
Kimura et al. 1997 
Nitatpattana et al. 2000 
Bowden et al. 2001 
Masembe et al. 2012 
Calisher et al. 2006 
Farkas et al. 2005 
Wessels et al. 2011 
Scherer et al. 1972 
Derbyshire et al. 1966 
Kasza et al. 1966 
Tuboly et al. 1995 
Indik et al. 2006 
Kim et al. 2001 
Petrini et al. 2009 
Martella et al. 2008 
Dunne et al. 1971 
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Genus species Common Name IUCN 
China 
Endangered 
Species List 
Number of 
Viruses Known to 
Host 
Viruses Known to Host References 
Porcine_enterovirus_B 
Porcine_epidemic_diarrhea_virus 
Porcine_hemagglutinating_encephalomyelitis_virus 
Porcine_parvovirus 
Porcine_reproductive_and_respiratory_syndrome_virus 
Porcine_rubulavirus 
Porcine_teschovirus 
Porcine_torovirus 
Porcine_type-C_oncovirus 
Reston_ebolavirus 
Rotavirus_A 
Rotavirus_A 
Rotavirus_B 
Rotavirus_C 
Rotavirus_E 
Sendai_virus 
Suid_herpesvirus_1 
Swine_norovirus 
Swinepox_virus 
Thiafora_virus 
Torque_Teno_virus 
Transmissible_gastroenteritis_virus 
Trubanaman_virus 
Vaccinia_virus 
Vesicular_exanthema_of_swine_virus 
Vesicular_stomatitis_Indiana_virus 
Wesselsbron_virus 
Moon et al. 2012 
Puranaveja et al. 2009 
Quiroga et al. 2008 
Cadar et al. 2012 
Dea et al. 1992 
Wang et al. 2007 
Prodelalova 2012 
Kroneman et al. 1998 
Armstrong et al. 1971 
Barrette et al. 2009 
Okadera et al. 2013 
Okadera et al. 2013 
Medici et al. 2010 
Medici et al. 2010 
Chasey et al. 1986 
Faisca et al. 2007 
Hahn et al. 2010 
Song et al. 2011 
Moorkamp et al. 2008 
Chastel 1989 
Martelli et al. 2006 
Morin et al. 1973 
Johansen et al. 2005 
Peres et al. 2013 
Smith and Latham 1978 
Fletcher et al. 1985 
Baba et al. 1994 
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Genus species Common Name IUCN 
China 
Endangered 
Species List 
Number of 
Viruses Known to 
Host 
Viruses Known to Host References 
Ovis aries Domestic sheep NE NE 47 
Akabane_virus 
Alcelaphine_herpesvirus_1 
Bhanja_virus 
Bluetongue_virus 
Border_disease_virus 
Borna_disease_virus 
Bovine_herpesvirus_1 
Bovine_herpesvirus_2 
Bovine_herpesvirus_4 
Bovine_respiratory_syncytial_virus 
Bovine_viral_diarrhea_virus_1 
Bovine_viral_diarrhea_virus_2 
Bunyamwera_virus 
Caprine_arthritis_encephalitis_virus 
Colorado_tick_fever_virus 
Crimean-Congo_hemorrhagic_fever_virus 
Dera_Ghazi_Khan_virus 
Dugbe_virus 
Foot-and-mouth_disease_virus 
Gan_Gan_virus 
Hepatitis_E_virus 
Ife_virus 
Jaagsiekte_sheep_retrovirus 
Louping_ill_virus 
Middelburg_virus 
Orf_virus 
Orungo_virus 
Ovine_adenovirus_D 
Ovine_astrovirus 
Ovine_herpesvirus_2 
Ovine_papillomavirus_1 
Palyam_virus 
Peste-des-petits-ruminants_virus 
Rabies_virus 
Davies et al. 1985 
Li et al. 1995 
Hubalek 2009 
Allepuz et al. 2010 
Valdazo-Gonzalez et al. 2007 
Vahlenkamp et al. 2002 
Kalman & Egyed 2005 
Kalman & Egyed 2005 
Kalman & Egyed 2005 
Karesh et al. 1998 
Pratelli et al. 2001 
Pratelli et al. 2001 
Tauro et al. 2009 
Leroux et al. 2010 
Emmons 1994 
Taylor et al. 2001 
Darwish et al. 1983 
Davies 1978 
Ghoneim et al. 2010 
Vale et al. 1991 
Meng et al. 
Ezefeika et al. 1989 
York et al. 1992 
Gao et al 1993 
Jupp et al. 1998 
Vikoren et al. 2008 
Brown et al. 1991 
Belak et al. 1980 
Herring et al. 1981 
Baxter et al. 1996 
Trenfield et al. 1990 
Aradaib et al. 2009 
Taylor & Abegunde 1979 
Lembo et al. 2008 
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Genus species Common Name IUCN 
China 
Endangered 
Species List 
Number of 
Viruses Known to 
Host 
Viruses Known to Host References 
Rift_Valley_fever_virus 
Rinderpest_virus 
Rotavirus_B 
Salehabad_virus 
Sheeppox_virus 
Suid_herpesvirus_1 
Thiafora_virus 
Thogoto_virus 
Torque_Teno_virus 
Trubanaman_virus 
Visna/maedi_virus 
Wad_Medani_virus 
Wesselsbron_virus 
Andriamandimby et al. 2010 
Rossiter et al. 1989 
Wani et al. 2004 
CDC Arbocat 
Mangana-Vougiouka et al. 2000 
Salwa 2004 
Chastel 1989 
Jones et al. 1987 
Leary et al. 1999 
Johansen et al. 2005 
Cortez-Romero et al. 2010 
Darwish et al. 1983 
Baba et al. 1994 
Capra hircus Domestic goat NE NE 34 
Akabane_virus 
Bhanja_virus 
Bluetongue_virus 
Border_disease_virus 
Borna_disease_virus 
Bovine_herpesvirus_1 
Bovine_herpesvirus_4 
Bovine_parainfluenza_virus_3 
Bovine_viral_diarrhea_virus_1 
Bunyamwera_virus 
Caprine_arthritis_encephalitis_virus 
Caprine_herpesvirus_1 
Crimean-Congo_hemorrhagic_fever_virus 
Dugbe_virus 
Epizootic_hemorrhagic_disease_virus 
Foot-and-mouth_disease_virus 
Goatpox_virus 
Hepatitis_E_virus 
Ife_virus 
Jaagsiekte_sheep_retrovirus 
Orf_virus 
Davies et al. 1985 
Hubalek et al. 2009 
Allepuz et al. 2010 
Kim et al. 2006 
Zhang et al. 2014 
Kalman & Egyed 2005 
Kalman & Egyed 2005 
Yang et al. 2008 
Pratelli et al. 2001 
Tauro et al. 2009 
Leroux et al. 2010 
Roperto et al. 2000 
Mourya et al. 2012 
Davies 1978 
Nol et al. 2010 
Ghoneim et al. 2010 
Tulman et al. 2002 
Meng et al. 
Ezefeika et al. 1989 
York et al. 1992 
Vikoren et al. 2008 
  175 
Genus species Common Name IUCN 
China 
Endangered 
Species List 
Number of 
Viruses Known to 
Host 
Viruses Known to Host References 
Orungo_virus 
Ovine_herpesvirus_2 
Palyam_virus 
Peste-des-petits-ruminants_virus 
Rabies_virus 
Rift_Valley_fever_virus 
Rinderpest_virus 
Sepik_virus 
Sheeppox_virus 
Suid_herpesvirus_1 
Trubanaman_virus 
Wad_Medani_virus 
Wesselsbron_virus 
Brown et al. 1991 
Jacobsen et al. 2007 
Aradaib et al. 2009 
Taylor & Abegunde 1978 
Kuzmin et al. 2004 
Andriamandimby et al. 2010 
Rossiter et al. 1989 
Olson et al. 1984 
Bhanuprakash et al. 2010 
Salwa 2004 
Johansen et al. 2005 
Darwish et al. 1983 
Baba et al. 1994 
Canis lupus familiaris Domestic Dog NE NE 30 
African_horse_sickness_virus 
Barmah_Forest_virus 
Borna_disease_virus 
Bunyamwera_virus 
Canid_herpesvirus_1 
Canine_adenovirus 
Canine_calicivirus 
Canine_distemper_virus 
Canine_minute_virus 
Canine_oral_papillomavirus 
Crimean-Congo_hemorrhagic_fever_virus 
Everglades_virus 
Hepatitis_E_virus 
Human_herpesvirus_4 
Human_norovirus-Alphatron 
Human_picobirnavirus 
Mammalian_orthoreovirus 
Mokola_virus 
Mumps_virus 
Murray_Valley_encephalitis_virus 
Rabies_virus 
Baba et al. 1993 
Kay et al. 2007 
Zhang et al. 2014 
Calisher et al. 1986 
Gadsden et al. 2012 
Ledbetter et al. 2009 
Matsuuraet al. 2002 
Frolich et al. 2000 
Binn et al. 1970 
Yhee et al. 2010 
Shepherd et al. 1987 
Coffey et al. 2006 
Vitral et al. 2005 
Choi et al. 2005 
Martella et al. 2008 
Costa et al. 2004 
Decaro et al. 2005 
Sabeta et al. 2007 
Stone 1969 
Calisher et al. 2006 
Lembo et al. 2008 
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Genus species Common Name IUCN 
China 
Endangered 
Species List 
Number of 
Viruses Known to 
Host 
Viruses Known to Host References 
Ross_River_virus 
Sandfly_fever_Sicilian_virus 
St._Louis_encephalitis_virus 
Suid_herpesvirus_1 
Vaccinia_virus 
Venezuelan_equine_encephalitis_virus 
Vesicular_stomatitis_Indiana_virus 
Wesselsbron_virus 
Digoutte et al. 1976 
Sakhria et al. 2014 
Lillibridge et al. 2004 
Eidson et al.1953 
Peres et al. 2013 
Estrada-Franco et al. 2004 
Webb et al. 1987b 
Baba et al. 1994 
Rattus norvegicus Brown rat LC NE 21 
Andes virus 
Cowpox_virus 
Crimean-Congo_hemorrhagic_fever_virus 
Encephalomyocarditis_virus 
H-1_parvovirus 
Human_picobirnavirus 
Kilham_rat_virus 
Lassa_virus 
Murid_herpesvirus_2 
Murine_pneumotropic_virus 
Rat_coronavirus 
Rat_minute_virus_1 
Rat_parvovirus_1 
Salehabad_virus 
Sendai_virus 
Seoul_virus 
Theilovirus 
Venezuelan_equine_encephalitis_virus 
Wad_Medani_virus 
West_Nile_virus 
Whitewater_Arroyo_virus 
Fernandez et al. 2008 
Wolfs et al. 2002 
Darwish et al. 1983 
Tesh & Wallace 1978 
Fregolente et al. 2009 
Easterbrook et al. 2009 
Kilham & Olivier 1959 
Nitatpattana et al. 2000 
Bruggeman et al. 1982 
Easterbrook et al. 2008 
Parker et al. 1970 
Wan et al. 2002, 2006 
Darwish et al. 1983 
Easterbrook et al. 2008 
Wang et al. 2000 
Easterbrook et al. 2008 
Theiler 1934 
Sudia & Newhouse 1975 
Darwish et al. 1983 
Gomez et al. 2008 
Bennett et al. 2000 
Felis catus Domestic Cat NE NE 17 
Barmah_Forest_virus 
Borna_disease_virus 
Encephalomyocarditis_virus 
Feline_astrovirus 
Feline_calicivirus 
Kay et al. 2007 
Kamnieh et al. 2008 
Smith et al. 1992 
Atkins at al. 2009 
Ohe et al. 2006 
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Genus species Common Name IUCN 
China 
Endangered 
Species List 
Number of 
Viruses Known to 
Host 
Viruses Known to Host References 
Feline_coronavirus 
Feline_foamy_virus 
Feline_immunodeficiency_virus 
Feline_leukemia_virus 
Feline_papillomavirus 
Human_herpesvirus_4 
Human_norovirus-Alphatron 
Mokola_virus 
Rabies_virus 
Racoonpox_virus 
Suid_herpesvirus_1 
Vaccinia_virus 
Kipar et al. 2010 
Winkler et al. 1999 
Fujimo et al. 2008 
Englert et al. 2012 
Terai & Burk 2002 
Milman et al. 2010 
Di Martino et al. 2010 
Meredith et al. 1996 
Nadin-Davies et al. 1994 
Yager et al. 2006 
Salwa 2004 
Peres et al. 2013 
Cervus elaphus Red deer LC II 13 
Bluetongue_virus 
Bovine_herpesvirus_1 
Bovine_herpesvirus_2 
Bovine_herpesvirus_4 
Bovine_viral_diarrhea_virus_1 
Caprine_herpesvirus_1 
Cervid_herpesvirus_1 
Deer_adenovirus 
Epizootic_hemorrhagic_disease_virus 
Ovine_herpesvirus_2 
Parapoxvirus_of_red_deer_in_New_Zealand 
Thiafora_virus 
Vesicular_stomatitis_Indiana_virus 
Ruiz-Fons et al. 2008 
Kalman & Egyed 2005 
Kalman & Egyed 2005 
Kalman & Egyed 2005 
Glawishnig et al. 2010 
Frolich et al. 2006 
Squires 2012 
Horner & Read 1982 
Nol et al. 2010 
Vikoren et al. 2006 
Horner et al. 1987 
Chastel 1989 
Webb et al. 1987 
Vulpes vulpes Silver fox LC NE 5 
California encephalitis virus 
Canine_adenovirus 
Rabies_virus 
St._Louis_encephalitis_virus 
Trubanaman_virus 
Parkin et al. 1973 
Thompson et al. 2010 
Nadin-Davies et al. 1994 
Artsob et al. 1986 
Johansen et al. 2005 
Myocastor coypus Nutria LC NE 3 
Encephalomyocarditis_virus 
Rabies_virus 
Vesicular_stomatitis_Indiana_virus 
Bollo et al. 2003 
Childs et al. 1997 
Aguirre et al. 1992 
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Genus species Common Name IUCN 
China 
Endangered 
Species List 
Number of 
Viruses Known to 
Host 
Viruses Known to Host References 
Nyctereutes 
procyonoides 
Raccoon dog LC NE 3 
Rabies_virus 
Rotavirus_A 
SL-COV 
(Kuzmin et al. 2006) 
(Abe et al. 2010) 
(Tu et al. 2004) 
Prionailurus 
bengalensis 
Leopard cat LC NE 2 
Feline_calicivirus 
Feline_panleukopenia_virus 
(O’Brien et al. 2012) 
(O’Brien et al. 2012) 
Paguma larvata Masked palm civet LC NE 2 
SL-COV 
Rotavirus A 
(Abe et al. 2010) 
(Tu et al. 2004) 
Lepus sinensis Chinese hare LC NE 1 Klebsiella pneumoniae (Du et al. 2014) 
Melogale moschata Ferret badger LC NE 1 SL-COV (Tu et al. 2004) 
Petaurista petaurista 
Common Giant flying 
squirrel 
LC NE 1 Kyasanur virus (Bhat et al. 1979) 
Muntiacus reevesi Reeve's muntjac LC NE 1 Gammaherpesvirus (Dick et al. 2012) 
Rusa unicolor Sambar deer VU NE 1 Foot-and-mouth_disease_virus (Barman et al. 1999) 
Mustela sibirica Siberian weasel LC NE 1 Hantavirus (Ge et al. 2016b) 
Marmota baibacina Grey Marmot LC NE 0 - - 
Rhizomys pruinosus Hoary Bamboo Rat LC NE 0 - - 
Rhizomys sinensis Chinese Bamboo rat LC NE 0 - - 
Arctonyx collaris Hog badger VU NE 0 - - 
Erinaceus amurensis Manchurian Hedgehog LC NE 0 - - 
Hystrix brachyura Malayan Porcupine LC NE 0 - - 
Mustela kathiah Yellow Bellied Weasel LC NE 0 - - 
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Table 32. List of 143 viruses reported by other research (See Table 31) to have been found in the same species that were observed in this study in Taiping and Foshan live animal wildlife markets in 
Guangdong Province. The third column from the left indicates the 60 viruses also reported to infect humans (+) as well as the 83 viruses not known to infect humans (-). The rightmost column lists the 
species observed in the two markets that have been reported carriers or hosts of the listed viruses. 
Viruses Reported in Same Species as Observed in Markets Viral Family 
Present in 
Humans 
Viral Host Species Observed in Markets 
African horse sickness virus Reoviridae  - Canis lupus familiaris  
African swine fever virus Asfarviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Akabane virus Bunyaviridae  - Capra hircus, Ovis aries 
Alcelaphine herpesvirus 1 Herpesviridae  - Ovis aries  
Andes virus Bunyaviridae  + Rattus norvegicus 
Banna virus Reoviridae  + Sus scrofa  
Barmah Forest virus Togaviridae  + Felis catus, Canis lupus familiaris 
Bhanja virus Bunyaviridae  + Capra hircus, Ovis aries 
Bluetongue virus Reoviridae  - Cervus elaphus, Capra hircus, Ovis aries  
Border disease virus Flaviviridae  - Capra hircus, Ovis aries, Sus scrofa 
Borna disease virus Bornaviridae  + Felis catus, Canis lupus familiaris, Capra hircus, Ovis aries, Sus scrofa 
Bovine herpesvirus 1 Herpesviridae  - Cervus elaphus, Capra hircus, Ovis aries  
Bovine herpesvirus 2 Herpesviridae  - Cervus elaphus, Ovis aries 
Bovine herpesvirus 4 Herpesviridae  - Cervus elaphus, Capra hircus, Ovis aries  
Bovine parainfluenza virus 3 Paramyxoviridae  - Capra hircus 
Bovine respiratory syncytial virus Paramyxoviridae  - Ovis aries  
Bovine viral diarrhea virus 1 Flaviviridae  - Cervus elaphus, Capra hircus, Ovis aries, Sus scrofa 
Bovine viral diarrhea virus 2 Flaviviridae  - Ovis aries  
Bunyamwera virus Bunyaviridae  + Canis lupus familiaris, Capra hircus, Ovis aries 
California encephalitis virus Bunyaviridae  + Vulpes vulpes 
Canid herpesvirus 1 Herpesviridae  - Canis lupus familiaris  
Canine adenovirus Adenoviridae  - Vulpes vulpes, Canis lupus familiaris 
Canine calicivirus Caliciviridae  - Canis lupus familiaris  
Canine distemper virus Paramyxoviridae  - Canis lupus familiaris  
Canine minute virus Parvoviridae  - Canis lupus familiaris  
Canine oral papillomavirus Papillomaviridae  - Canis lupus familiaris  
Caprine arthritis encephalitis virus Retroviridae  - Capra hircus, Ovis aries  
Caprine herpesvirus 1 Herpesviridae  - Cervus elaphus, Capra hircus 
Cervid herpesvirus 1 Herpesviridae  - Cervus elaphus 
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Viruses Reported in Same Species as Observed in Markets Viral Family 
Present in 
Humans 
Viral Host Species Observed in Markets 
Classical swine fever virus Flaviviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Colorado tick fever virus Reoviridae  + Ovis aries  
Cowpox virus Poxviridae  + Rattus norvegicus 
Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever virus Bunyaviridae  + Rattus norvegicus, Canis lupus familiaris, Capra hircus, Ovis aries  
Deer adenovirus Adenoviridae  - Cervus elaphus 
Dera Ghazi Khan virus Bunyaviridae  + Ovis aries  
Dugbe virus Bunyaviridae  + Capra hircus, Ovis aries 
Encephalomyocarditis virus Picornaviridae  + Myocastor coypus, Felis catus, Rattus norvegicus, Sus scrofa 
Epizootic hemorrhagic disease virus Reoviridae  - Cervus elaphus, Capra hircus 
Everglades virus Togaviridae  + Canis lupus familiaris  
Feline astrovirus Astroviridae  - Felis catus  
Feline calicivirus Caliciviridae  - Prionailurus bengalensis, Felis catus 
Feline coronavirus Coronaviridae  - Felis catus  
Feline foamy virus Retroviridae  - Felis catus  
Feline immunodeficiency virus Retroviridae  - Felis catus  
Feline leukemia virus Reoviridae  - Felis catus  
Feline panleukopenia virus Parvoviridae  - Prionailurus bengalensis  
Feline papillomavirus Papillomaviridae  - Felis catus  
Foot-and-mouth disease virus Picornaviridae  + Rusa unicolor, Sus scrofa, Ovis aries, Capra hircus 
Gammaherpesvirus Herpesviridae  - Muntiacus reevesi 
Gan Gan virus Bunyaviridae  + Ovis aries  
Getah virus Togaviridae  + Sus scrofa  
Goatpox virus Poxviridae  - Capra hircus 
H-1 parvovirus Parvoviridae  - Rattus norvegicus 
Hantavirus Bunyaviridae  - Mustela sibirica  
Hepatitis E virus Hepeviridae  + Canis lupus familiaris, Capra hircus Ovis aries, Sus scrofa 
Human herpesvirus 4 Herpesviridae  + Felis catus, Canis lupus familiaris 
Human norovirus-Alphatron Caliciviridae  + Felis catus, Canis lupus familiaris 
Human picobirnavirus Picornaviridae  + Rattus norvegicus, Canis lupus familiaris, Sus scrofa 
Ife virus Reoviridae  - Capra hircus, Ovis aries  
Influenza A virus Orthomyxoviridae  + Sus scrofa  
Influenza C virus Orthomyxoviridae  + Sus scrofa  
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Viruses Reported in Same Species as Observed in Markets Viral Family 
Present in 
Humans 
Viral Host Species Observed in Markets 
Jaagsiekte sheep retrovirus Retroviridae  - Capra hircus, Ovis aries  
Japanese encephalitis virus Flaviviridae  + Sus scrofa  
Kilham rat virus Parvoviridae  - Rattus norvegicus 
Klebsiella pneumoniae  Flaviviridae  - Lepus sinensis  
Kyasanur virus Flaviviridae  + Petaurista petaurista 
Lassa virus Arenaviridae  + Rattus norvegicus 
Louping ill virus Flaviviridae  + Ovis aries  
Mammalian orthoreovirus Reoviridae  - Canis lupus familiaris  
Menangle virus Paramyxoviridae  + Sus scrofa  
Middelburg virus Togaviridae  - Ovis aries  
Mokola virus Rhabdoviridae  + Felis catus, Canis lupus familiaris 
Mumps virus Paramyxoviridae  + Canis lupus familiaris  
Murid herpesvirus 2 Herpesviridae  - Rattus norvegicus 
Murine pneumotropic virus Pneumoviridae  - Rattus norvegicus 
Murray Valley encephalitis virus Flaviviridae  + Canis lupus familiaris  
Ndumu virus Togaviridae  + Sus scrofa  
Nipah virus Paramyxoviridae  + Sus scrofa  
Norwalk virus Caliciviridae  + Sus scrofa  
Orf virus Poxviridae  + Capra hircus, Ovis aries 
Orungo virus Reoviridae  + Capra hircus, Ovis aries 
Ovine adenovirus D Adenoviridae  - Ovis aries  
Ovine astrovirus Astroviridae  - Ovis aries  
Ovine herpesvirus 2 Herpesviridae  - Cervus elaphus, Capra hircus, Ovis aries, Sus scrofa 
Ovine papillomavirus 1 Papillomaviridae  - Ovis aries  
Palyam virus Reoviridae  + Capra hircus, Ovis aries 
Parapoxvirus of red deer in New Zealand Poxviridae  - Cervus elaphus 
Patois virus Bunyaviridae  + Sus scrofa  
Peste-des-petits-ruminants virus Paramyxoviridae  - Capra hircus, Ovis aries  
Porcine adenovirus A Adenoviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Porcine adenovirus B Adenoviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Porcine adenovirus C Adenoviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Porcine astrovirus Astroviridae  - Sus scrofa  
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Viruses Reported in Same Species as Observed in Markets Viral Family 
Present in 
Humans 
Viral Host Species Observed in Markets 
Porcine circovirus-1 Circoviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Porcine circovirus-2 Circoviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Porcine enteric sapovirus Caliciviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Porcine enterovirus A Picornaviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Porcine enterovirus B Picornaviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Porcine epidemic diarrhea virus Coronaviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Porcine hemagglutinating encephalomyelitis virus Coronaviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Porcine parvovirus Parvoviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus Arteriviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Porcine rubulavirus Paramyxoviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Porcine teschovirus Picornaviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Porcine torovirus Coronaviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Porcine type-C oncovirus Retroviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Rabies virus Rhabdoviridae  + N. procyonoides, Myocastor coypus, V. vulpes, Felis catus, C. hircus, O. aries, Canis lupus familiaris 
Racoonpox virus Poxviridae  - Felis catus  
Rat coronavirus Coronaviridae  - Rattus norvegicus 
Rat minute virus 1 Parvoviridae  - Rattus norvegicus 
Rat parvovirus 1 Parvoviridae  - Rattus norvegicus 
Reston ebolavirus Filoviridae  + Sus scrofa  
Rift Valley fever virus Bunyaviridae  + Capra hircus, Ovis aries 
Rinderpest virus Paramyxoviridae  - Capra hircus, Ovis aries  
Ross River virus Togaviridae  + Canis lupus familiaris  
Rotavirus A Reoviridae  + Paguma larvata, Nyctereutes procyonoides, Sus scrofa 
Rotavirus B Reoviridae  + Sus scrofa, Ovis aries 
Rotavirus C Reoviridae  + Sus scrofa  
Rotavirus E Reoviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Salehabad virus Bunyaviridae  - Rattus norvegicus, Ovis aries 
Sandfly fever Sicilian virus Bunyaviridae  + Canis lupus familiaris  
Sendai virus Paramyxoviridae  - Rattus norvegicus, Sus scrofa 
Seoul virus Bunyaviridae  + Rattus norvegicus 
Sepik virus Flaviviridae  - Capra hircus 
Severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus Coronaviridae  + Melogale moschata, Nyctereutes procyonoides, Paguma larvata 
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Viruses Reported in Same Species as Observed in Markets Viral Family 
Present in 
Humans 
Viral Host Species Observed in Markets 
Sheeppox virus Poxviridae  - Capra hircus, Ovis aries  
St. Louis encephalitis virus Flaviviridae  + Vulpes vulpes, Canis lupus familiaris 
Suid herpesvirus 1 Herpesviridae  + Felis catus, Canis lupus familiaris, Capra hircus, Ovis aries, Sus scrofa 
Swine norovirus Caliciviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Swinepox virus Poxviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Theilovirus Picornaviridae  - Rattus norvegicus 
Thiafora virus Bunyaviridae  + Sus scrofa, Cervus elaphus, Ovis aries 
Thogoto virus Orthomyxoviridae  + Ovis aries  
Torque Teno virus Anelloviridae  + Ovis aries, Sus scrofa 
Transmissible gastroenteritis virus Coronaviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Trubanaman virus Bunyaviridae  + Vulpes vulpes, Capra hircus, Ovis aries, Sus scrofa 
Vaccinia virus Poxviridae  + Felis catus, Canis lupus familiaris, Sus scrofa 
Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus Togaviridae  + Rattus norvegicus, Canis lupus familiaris 
Vesicular exanthema of swine virus Caliciviridae  - Sus scrofa  
Vesicular stomatitis Indiana virus Rhabdoviridae  + Myocastor coypus, Cervus elaphus, Sus scrofa, Canis lupus familiaris  
Visna/maedi virus Retroviridae  - Ovis aries  
Wad Medani virus Reoviridae  - Rattus norvegicus, Capra hircus, Ovis aries 
Wesselsbron virus Flaviviridae  + Canis lupus familiaris, Capra hircus, Ovis aries, Sus scrofa 
West Nile virus Flaviviridae  + Rattus norvegicus 
Whitewater Arroyo virus Arenaviridae  + Rattus norvegicus 
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7.7 Hummingbird IRB Behavioural Protocol Approval 
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7.8 Wuhan University IRB Behavioural Protocol Approval 
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7.9 Medical Research Council Online Survey Protocol Approval 
 
     
 
  
  188 
7.10 Online Survey – Wildlife Trade and You! (Chinese Version) 
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7.11  Qualitative Interview Guide (English) 
 
Core Themes 
1. Human movement  
2. Socioeconomics  
3. Biosecurity in human environments  
4. Illness, medical care/treatment and death of humans  
5. Human-animal contact 
 
HUMAN MOVEMENT 
GOAL: To understand living environment and ‘home range’ (e.g., how far people travel and why).  
Home  
Where do you live/what kind of dwelling? How many people are in the household? How many rooms? 
How many are children? Is everyone related? Sleeping arrangements? 
How often do you move? Any seasonality of movements?—eg, for work, for food, for safety (e.g., 
against flood, drought, conflict)?  
What are the things you do to protect your home (against predators, animals, outsiders, bad weather)? 
Work  
What kind of work or activities do you do? What do other household members do? Where do these 
activities happen? 
How do you protect your activities and business interests? (e.g., grazing or crop land, business 
competition, hunting territory, animal stock) 
Travel (*) 
How far do household members travel from home and why? (Follow up on animal related issues: 
shopping, selling/buying/trading, hunting, transport, etc)  
How travel (by foot, bike, cart, truck, plane)? Is it ever for overnight? Where stay? 
Why traveling? (work/migrant, family, religion, holidays, to sell/trade/buy animals) 
Other family members in other areas of the country? Visit often? 
Observed environment 
Have there been any changes in the environment: new roads, more boats or ports, fields, buildings, 
population movement (in or out), land clearing or abandonment, new houses, other new buildings 
Who is responsible for the changes? Are the changes good or bad? 
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SOCIOECONOMICS 
GOAL: To understand a typical day and how money and social standing impact opportunity and risk. 
Daily routine 
Tell me about your daily routine (get description of work on a usual day, include purchasing and 
preparing food, timing of types of meals, responsibilities/duties related to animals, any changes by 
season) 
How do people in the household contribute to earning money and getting food (and water)?  
Where do the children play? Who takes care of the children when you are at work? 
Animal responsibilities  
Describe the animal related jobs and responsibilities for people at every age (i.e., young children, older 
children, young adults, adults, elderly).  
What are the skills/knowledge needed before moving to the next stage of duties/responsibilities? 
Are there differences in responsibilities between boys and girls, men and women, by ethnicity or class? 
(*) 
Education 
How many children are currently in school? Until what age do your children go to school? (boys and 
girls?) 
What is your level of education? Why did you stop?  
Economics  
Do you make more money than other people who do the same things as you? Why do you think that is?  
Are there times of year when you make less money? What happens then?  
Are there times when food is more expensive than others? Tell me about that (eg, different food 
availability, seasonal, festival related). 
Do you think you and your household are better off than most people? Could you do things to make it 
better? 
 
BIOSECURITY IN HUMAN ENVIRONMENTS 
GOAL: To determine if any sanitation or hygiene factors could play a role in disease spillover  
Water and food  
Is there a central source of water? What is the source? (eg, pond, uncovered well, rainwater, taps, 
covered well) 
Is there a water source you like better? 
How far away is the water source? Do animals drink from the same source? 
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Do you do anything to your drinking water to clean it before you drink it? 
How do you store your food? (e.g., open containers, covered, hanging, refrigerate)  
Do you eat or drink things where you suspect animal contact? (e.g., teeth/scratch marks, feces or urine 
seen) 
Do you regularly clean your food prep station/kitchen and tools? How? 
Sanitation 
Are there toilets, latrines or other designated areas for human waste? Are these cleaned and used 
regularly?  
Are butchering and slaughtering areas separate? How often are they cleaned and how? Who does the 
cleaning? 
Are there any official rules or laws about human waste and garbage disposal? 
Are there any animal pest control laws? What do you do to control animal pests? 
Hygiene 
When are the best times to wash your hands? Do you use soap? How much does soap cost and where 
get it? 
Do you wash your hands at home? at work? 
How often and where do you and your household members bathe? 
 
ILLNESS, MEDICAL CARE/TREATMENT, DEATH 
GOAL: To identify any unusual disease experiences—signs, symptoms and sources 
Household illness 
Is anyone sick right now?  
What do you do when someone in the household gets sick? Who takes care of that person?  
The last time someone was seriously sick what happened (explore when, with what, how did they get 
sick, who told/consulted, anyone else get sick after, final outcome)? 
Has anyone ever had an sickness that people don’t usually get? What happened? Where did it come 
from? 
Illness from animals 
Do you know anyone who has gotten sick from an animal? What animal? What did they get? What 
happened? Do you know any other diseases/illnesses people can get from animals? How does the 
animal give the illness to the person? How often does it happen? 
Medical care/treatment 
How sick would you have to feel to stay home and not do normal routine?  
Where do you go when you are sick?  
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Do you prefer to use traditional medicine, western medicine or a combination? 
How sick would you have to feel to go to doctor/clinic/hospital? What does that cost? (in time, lost 
wages/business, transport costs, etc) How far away? 
Death 
What is the tradition when someone dies? (Explore if reported to authorities, differ by age or gender, 
what happens to the body, does the community come together or is it private.) 
 
HUMAN ANIMAL CONTACT 
GOAL: To gain knowledge about interactions with animals, animal health and animal perceptions and 
knowledge.  
Encourage but don’t lead discussion about which animals. Allow respondent to name the animals. If no birds 
or bats are mentioned, follow up by asking specific questions about birds and bats. 
Indirect contact 
What kind of meat do people in your household eat? How do you get it/where does it come from? What is 
furthest away an animal comes from? 
Is meat dead or alive when you get it?  If dead(/prepared), how to tell if good/fresh?  
If alive, how long are live animals kept before being sold or eaten? How do you get live animals home? 
How is meat prepared (raw/undercooked)?  Is meat prepared in the same place as other activities? (e.g., 
preparing vegetables, cleaning babies/changing diapers, where other food or drinking water is stored) 
Do animals come in or near the dwelling? How do you know animals are there? Which animals? 
Direct contact 
Do you or someone in your household handle live animals? In what context? (e.g. ranching/animal 
husbandry, hunting, wet markets, work, around dwelling/other building, pets) 
What are the animals that you keep/raise or sell? How many different kinds of animals? How many of 
each?  
For how long do you have the animals? 
Where do live animals come from? Where is the furthest away an animal comes from?  
Who buys/trades for your live animals? Where do the animals go? 
Have you been bitten, scratched or had bleeding after handling an animal? By a wild animal? 
Where are live animals slaughtered? butchered? Do people buy or sell parts? 
Do you travel with animals? Explore details of the process, specific routes and encounters (eg, with 
other animals, with animal transport supporting industries, such as holding areas, restaurants, hotels) 
along the way.  
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Explore for differences over time in animal handling, eg, seasonality, legal, religious, animal 
reproduction 
Animal products/rituals 
Other uses of animals—e.g., as pets, medicine, magic, fertilizer, for trading  
Rules for children around wild animals as pets, playing with wild animals or dead animals 
Animal health 
How do you care for your animals: how are they fed, what do they eat, where do they eat/graze and 
sleep? Are they segregated or all together? Differences by season? day/night? Does anyone live or stay 
with the animals? 
Is there a central area for animal waste? How often are animal cages, stalls, or penned areas cleaned? 
Who cleans them? 
Do the animals get veterinary care? Vaccinations? 
How do you know when an animal is sick? What’s the first thing you do about a sick animal? 
Have you seen an animal outbreak or die-off? What happened? 
Perceptions and knowledge  
What are the most unusual animals anyone can buy?—seasonal? Expensive? Who buys? 
Are there any animals you avoid eating? Why? Ever heard of anyone eating/selling dead or infected 
animals?  
Do people ever eat non-domesticated animals/wildlife? Where do they get them?  
Who usually buys wildlife products? Have there been changes over time?  
What do you do when you find a dead animal? 
What laws about animals do you know? (eg, limiting/outlawing hunting, reporting and culling of sick 
animals) 
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7.12  Qualitative Interview Guide (Chinese) 
 
 
人种学访谈向导 
核心议题 
1. 人的活动 
2. 社会经济学 
3. 人生活环境中的生物安全 
4. 疾病，医疗救助/诊治及人的死亡情况 
5. 动物和人的接触 
人的活动 
目标：理解人的生活环境和“家域范围”（例如：人活动范围有多远以及原因）。 
家 
你在哪里居住/房屋类型？家里有多少人？有多少间房间？其中有多少人是孩子？所有人都是亲戚吗？如何安排
睡觉？搬家的频率？是否季节性的搬迁？ 例如：为了工作，为了获取食物，为了安全(例如：为了防洪，防旱，
避免矛盾)？ 
工作 
你从事什么工作？家里其他成员都是做什么工作的？都在哪里工作？你如何保护你的活动和商业利益？(例如：
放牧或耕地，商业竞争，狩猎领地，畜牧) 
旅行 
家庭成员到多远的地方去旅行以及旅行的原因？（跟踪和动物相关的议题：购物，售卖，买动物，贩卖，打猎
，运输等等）如何旅行（步行，自行车，马车，卡车，飞机）？曾近在外面住宿吗？为什么住宿？旅行的原因
是什么？（工作原因/移居，家庭原因，宗教信仰原因，度假，买卖动物）有住在其他地方的家庭成员吗？他们
经常回家来吗？ 
观察环境 
当地有环境改变吗：新修道路，船和港口增多，田地，建筑物，人口流入流出，土地平整或者荒废，新建别墅
，其它的新建筑物 
谁管理这些环境改变？这些变化是好是坏？ 
社会经济学 
目标：了解典型的日常生活以及金钱和社会地位如何影响机会和风险。 
日常生活轨迹 
请讲述你的日常生活轨迹（描述日常的工作，包括购买准备食物，进餐时间，和动物相关的责任和职责，是否
有季节性的变化） 
家庭成员如何为家庭赚钱，获得食物和水？ 
孩子们在那里玩耍？当你工作的时候谁来照料孩子？ 
照顾动物的职责 
请讲述和动物相关的工作以及不同年龄阶段人群的职责分工（比如：小孩子，大孩子，青年，成人，老人）。 
  197 
随着成长，需要什么样的知识或者技能才能胜任下一阶段的工作职责？ 
男孩和女孩在照顾动物的时候有什么不同分工吗？男人和女人呢？ 
教育 
目前有几个孩子在读书？孩子几岁开始上学？（几个男孩，几个女孩？） 
现在孩子们都读到几年级了？你当时为什么不读了？ 
经济学 
和其它跟你从事相同工作的人比，你是不是挣得比别人多？你觉得是什么愿意？ 
有没有一些年你挣的比别人少？什么原因？ 
有没有一些时间食品比其他东西贵？请讲述（比如：不同食品供给不同，季节变化，春节原因） 
 你认为你和你的丈夫比大多数人都强？能否把事情做得更好变得更强？ 
人生活环境中的生物安全问题 
目标：确定是否有任何卫生或卫生因素可能在疾病蔓延的作用。 
水和食物 
这里有重要的水源吗？是什么水源？（例如：池塘，无盖水井，雨水，水龙头，带盖水井）你更喜欢哪个水源
的水？水源地离这里有多远？动物也在这些水源地喝水吗？你家里的水在饮用之前经过净化处理吗？你如何储
存食物？（例如：敞开的容器，封闭的容器，吊起来的容器，冰冻） 
你吃或者喝 你怀疑被动物接触过的东西吗？（例如;牙印，抓恒，粪便，可见尿液） 
你定期清理厨房，操作台和厨具吗？如何清理？ 
卫生设施 
这里有厕所吗？废物站或其他指定的地方？这些定期清洗和使用吗 ？ 
屠宰区和分割区分开吗？他们经常清洗吗？如何清洗？谁清洗？ 
有没有正式的关于人类的废物和垃圾处理规则或法律？ 
有什么动物病虫害防治的法律？你如何控制有害动物吗？ 
卫生状况 
什么时候是您洗手的最佳时间？您洗手时用香皂吗？肥皂多少钱，哪儿能够买到？ 
你在家吸收吗？在工作的地方洗手吗？ 
你的家庭成员在哪里洗澡，频率多高？ 
生病，医疗关怀/诊治，死亡 
目标: 发现不同寻常的疾病发生情况——迹象，症状和来源。 
生活疾病 
目前家里有人生病吗？ 
家里有人生病了怎么处理？家里谁来照料病人？ 
上次家里有人生重病是什么时候（什么时候，因为什么，怎么样生病的，生病后谁去询问最终的结果？） 
有人得过一般人平常不会得的病吗？发生了什么？这个病是从哪里来的？ 
动物源疾病 
你知道谁被动物传染疾病吗？什么种的动物？他生的什么病？发生了什么？ 
 你知道动物可能传染给人的其它疾病吗？动物如何把疾病传播给人类？这种事请多久发生一次？ 
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医疗关怀/诊治 
病的多重你会觉得不得不呆在家里，而不去做日常工作？ 
生病的时候你会去哪里？ 
生病的时候你会优先选择中医，西医还是中西结合？ 
病的多重你才会觉得需要去看医生/门诊/医院？看病要花费多少钱？（时间上，损失补贴/影响生意，交通成本
等），医院有多远？ 
死亡 
按照传统，人死亡后怎么处理？（探讨如果向当局报告，年龄或性别不同的死者，尸体如何处理，整个社区的
人都来参加葬礼还是仅仅是亲戚朋友） 
 
动物和人接触 
目标：了解人和动物相互行为，动物健康以及关于动物的观念和知识。 
鼓励但是不领导关于动物的讨论。允许发言者命名动物，如果鸟和蝙蝠没有提到，问问鸟和蝙蝠和人的接触情
况。 
间接接触 
你家里人吃什么肉？怎么得到这些肉？这些肉是从哪里来的？这些肉最远来自于哪里？ 
你得到的肉是活的动物的还是宰杀了的动物的？如果是死的动物的肉，怎么辨别是否新鲜？ 
如果是活的动物的肉，这些活的动物在被售卖或者吃掉前养多久？你如何在家里得到活动动物的肉？ 
肉怎么处理（生的/半生不熟）？有固定的地方处理肉吗（例如：处理蔬菜，清洗宝宝，请洗尿布的地方也都有
固定的水池吗）？ 
动物会进入居所或者居所附近吗？你怎么知道动物在哪里？那些种的动物？ 
 
直接接触 
你或者你家里人处置过活的动物吗？在什么环境下？（例如：牧场/畜牧场，打猎，市场，工作中，居所附近/
其它建筑，宠物） 
你养或者卖动物的原因是什么？有多少种不同的动物种类？每种有多少数量？ 
这些动物你已经养了多久了？ 
这些活的动物是从哪里引进的？最远的动物来自于哪里？ 
谁买/贩卖 你的活体动物？动物都销往哪里？ 
你处理过动物之后有过被咬伤，抓伤，或者出血的情况吗？就是被一个野生动物搞伤？ 
活体动物在哪里被宰杀？在哪里分割？人们买或者卖动物的分割的肉块吗？ 
你会带着动物旅行吗？揭示旅行的细节过程，具体路线和遭遇（例如：在动物转运部，在餐馆，酒店遭遇其它
动物） 
揭示不同时间维度上处理动物的不同，例如：季节性，法律，信仰，动物产品变化 
动物产品/宗教仪式 
动物的其它利用形式，比如：宠物，入药，魔术，蓄肥料，卖卖 
小孩子将野生动物作为宠物，和野生动物或者死的动物玩耍。 
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动物健康 
你怎么照看你的动物：怎么喂它们？它们吃什么？在哪里进食/放牧和休息？动物们是分开来的还是混合在一起
的？不同季节，昼夜之间有什么不同？有人和动物一起住吗？有专门的动物废弃物区域吗？动物笼舍多久清理
一次？谁清洗它们？ 
动物们接受兽医治疗吗啊？接种疫苗吗？ 
你如何能够发现动物生病？你对生病的动物采取的第一步措施是什么？ 
你遇到过动物突然爆发疾病吗？发生了什么状况？ 
观念和知识 
人们能买到的最不寻常的动物是什么？---季节的？昂贵的？谁会购买？ 
你有什么动物是不吃的吗？为什么？听到过有人吃/卖死的或者受感染的动物吗？ 
人们吃非家养动物吗？是野生动物吗？去哪里得到野生动物？ 
谁通常会买野生动物产品？随着时间推移这些情况有变化吗？ 
你发现死亡的动物时怎么处理？ 
你知道关于动物的法律有哪些？（例如：限制非法打猎，报告并且处死生病的动物） 
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7.13  Qualitative Interview Checklist (English) 
 
 
Participant ID: ____________________________ 
Interviewer: ______________________________ 
 
INTERVIEW CHECKLIST 
 
 
  
CORE THEMES 
 
☐ Human movement  
 Home  
 Work  
 Travel 
 Observed environment 
 
☐ Socioeconomics  
 Daily routine 
 Animal responsibilities  
 Education 
 Economics  
 
☐ Biosecurity in human environments  
 Water and food  
 Sanitation 
 Hygiene  
 
 
☐ Illness, medical care/treatment and death  
  
 Household illness 
 Illness from animals 
 Medical care/treatment 
 Death 
 
☐ Human-animal contact 
 Indirect contact 
 Direct contact 
 Animal products/rituals 
 Animal health 
 Perceptions/knowledge 
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7.14 Qualitative Interview Checklist(Chinese) 
 
受访人编号---------------------- 
访问人---------------------------- 
访谈清单 
 
  
核心议题 
 
☐ 人的活动  
 家  
 工作  
 旅行 
 观察到的环境 
 
☐ 社会经济学  
 日常活动路线 
 照顾动物职责  
 教育 
 经济学  
 
☐ 人生活环境中的生物安全 
 水和食物  
 卫生设施 
 卫生状况  
 
 
☐ 疾病，医疗关怀/诊治，死亡 
  
 家庭疾病 
 动物源疾病 
 医疗关怀/诊治 
 死亡 
 
☐ 人和动物接触 
 间接接触 
 直接接触 
 动物产品/宗教仪式 
 动物健康 
 观念/知识 
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7.15 Coding Keyword Guide for Ethnographic Interviews 
 
Human Movement 
 
Home  
Dwelling, living quarters, sleeping quarters 
Children, family  
Daily movement/travel 
Flood 
Drought 
conflict 
Protection from predators/ animals 
Safety 
 
Work  
Work activities 
Agriculture areas 
Grazing areas 
Hunting territories 
boundaries 
Livestock areas 
Markets 
Crops 
business 
 
Travel 
Traveling to Shop/buy/sell/trade 
Hunting trips 
Transporting animals 
Transportation: Walking, biking, cart, truck, plane, boat, trains 
Overnight trips 
Reasons for travel 
Travel destinations 
Border crossings 
Travel obstacles/issues 
Transportation of resources/moving  
 
Observed Environment 
Town roads/ports/ trains 
New buildings/roads/construction 
Route changes 
Abandoned land 
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Socioeconomics 
 
Daily routine  
Meal preparation 
Shopping 
Childcare 
Market trips 
Groceries 
Purchases 
Errands 
 
Animal responsibilities  
Animal duties/responsibilities 
Feeding/grazing 
Tasks/roles by age or gender 
Sick animals 
Slaughtering/Butchering 
 
Education 
School/education/graduation 
Reading/understanding numbers 
Dropping out 
 
Economics  
Livelihood 
Earning/earning changes throughout year 
Large purchases 
income 
Purchases for event/holiday 
Social standing (compared to neighbors/others) 
Number of jobs/activities 
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Biosecurity in Human Environments 
 
Water and food  
Water source (where does it come from?) 
Water taste/quality/purification 
Rain/rainwater/water taps/well 
Storing food/storing water 
Pests/rats/pesticides/cockroaches/insects 
Kitchen 
Cleaning  
Water usage 
 
Sanitation 
Waste management/garbage 
Toilets/latrines/bathroom 
Cleaning bathroom/kitchen 
Feces 
Urine 
Pesticides 
 
Hygiene 
Washing hands 
Showering/bathing  
Soap 
Leave shoes/footwear outside 
 
 
 
Illness, medical care/treatment and death 
 
Household illness 
Sick relatives 
Caretaking of sick 
Types of sickness 
unusual illness 
symptoms of illness 
Ebola 
SARS 
MERS 
(other endemic zoonotic diseases) 
dispensaries/medication 
 
Illness from animals 
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Illness from animals 
 
 
Medical Care and Treatment 
Doctor/clinic visit 
Medicine/Treatment 
Cost of medicine/doctor/treatment 
Professionals (doctor, nurse, religious leader, healthcare worker etc…) 
Traditional medicine 
Ethno botany  
 
Death 
Reporting death 
Burial/ burial rites 
Funeral tradition/rites 
Dead body/corpse 
Body preparation 
 
 
 
Human Animal Contact 
 
 
 
Indirect Contact/Food: 
Meat/animal consumption 
Acquisition of meat 
Preparing meat 
Meat/animal storage 
Butchering 
Animal taboos 
Infected animals 
Wildlife consumption 
Purchasing meat or wildlife 
Cleaning up after animals 
Meat/dead animal markets 
Animals around dwelling/pests 
Signs of animals (hear, smell) 
Faeces 
Animal tracks 
Garbage disturbance 
Observed animals 
 
Direct Contact 
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Ownership of animals 
Live animals 
Pets 
Playing with animals (wild or domestic, alive or dead) 
Animal caretaking 
Feeding animals 
Grazing animals 
Working with animals 
Live animal markets/wet markets 
Ranching 
Animal husbandry 
Buying/selling/trading live animals 
Bite 
scratch 
animal handling 
Killing live animals/slaughtering 
Handling of wildlife 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Animal products/rites 
Animal by-products (milk, leather, magic, medical) 
Magic involving animals 
Fertilizer 
 
Animal health 
Animals eating/sleeping/grazing 
Sick animals 
Animal caretaking activities/roles 
Animal waste 
Cleaning animal areas 
Veterinary care 
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Vaccinations 
Outbreak 
Die off 
 
 
Perceptions and knowledge 
Exotic or expensive animals 
Wildlife consumption 
Regulations/laws regarding animals (eg. Hunting, eating, poaching regulations) 
Danger from animals 
Conservation 
Taboos 
Special occasions/holidays/ feasts/ holy days
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7.16 Ethnographic Interview Informed Consent Form (English) 
 
Introduction: My name is__________and I work for a project called “Human and Animal Contact 
Study.” The project is funded by the US Government and conducted in collaboration with 
Wuhan University School of Public Health, the Chinese CDC and other local partners. We are 
studying how the health of wildlife, livestock and people affect each other and to better 
understand the patterns of local trade and consumption of meat and food animals. 
 
Interview: As part of this research we are speaking with all kinds of people to better understand 
the types of interactions people have with wildlife and their domestic animals, as well how people 
live their lives, do their jobs, and take care of their families and their animals. While you may not 
benefit directly from this research, the information you share with us may help to improve the 
health of other people who live near or work with animals. The main risk to you would come from 
a loss of confidentiality. To decrease any risk of someone else seeing your personal information, 
we give the information you share with us and the recording of the interview, a code number and 
use that instead of your name on all information that you provide. Your information is also kept 
secure in locked files and is considered confidential. We will use this information to better 
understand disease risks from wild and domestic animals to humans and share this with local and 
national leaders, non-governmental organisations and the scientific community. When we write 
about the study, we will not use your name or anyone else’s name, or anything about you that 
someone could recognise. At the end of the interview, we may ask you to refer other people to 
the study. 
 
I am here today to ask if you are willing to participate in this study by talking with me. Your 
participation is voluntary. You do not have to answer a question if you do not want to. The 
interview will take approximately 60 to 90 minutes of your time, and we will record the 
conversation. If you are not comfortable with your interview being recorded, you are free to 
decline to participate in this study. 
 
Additional information: An Institutional Review Board and an Ethics Board that is responsible for 
making sure that research subjects are protected from harm, has approved this project. If you 
have any questions now or in the future about your participation in this study or your rights as a 
research subject, you may contact Guanjian Zhu at zhu@ecohealthalliance.org or by phone at this 
number 13818140967. 
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7.17 Ethnographic Interview Consent Statement (English) 
Subject ID Number    
I have had a chance to ask questions about the study. If I do not want the interview 
recorded, I may say no to participating in the study. Also, someone has explained to me 
that: 
 
 My name will not appear on interview or other data collection forms: only a code number 
will be used; 
 
 The information I provide is confidential and will be kept in locked files that only the 
professional research staff can see; 
 
 All written and published information will not use my name, anyone else’s name, or 
anything about me that someone could recognise.  
 
 There is no punishment or disgrace with saying no to participating in this study. 
If you decide not to participate, your decision will not be used against you in any 
way. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Participant Signature Date 
 
 
 
Participant Name (please print) 
 
 
 
  
Interviewer Date 
 
 
 
 
If the individual declines to participate, thank them for their time. 
 
Reason for not participating 
 
Certified by Interviewer   
Initials Date   
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7.18 Ethnographic Interview Informed Consent (Chinese) 
 
人和动物接触研究项目 
采访知情同意书 
 
介绍：我的名字叫做_________我们现在研究的项目叫做“人和动物接触研究”，项目由美国政
府资助，和武汉大学公共卫生学院，中国疾病预防与控制中心及其他当地合作伙伴一起合作开
展。我们的项目研究野生动物，家畜和人的健康是如何相互影响的，更好地理解地区贸易和肉
类和动物的食物消费的模式。 
 
访谈：作为研究的一部分，我们采访各类人来理解这些饲养动物或者野生动物的人和动物之间
的关系，以及他们如何生活，工作，照顾家庭和饲养的动物。你可能无法直接从这个研究中获
益，但是你和我们分享的信息可能会帮助提高哪些和动物一起生活或者工作的人们的健康状况
。你的最大风险是失去保密性。为了降低其他人看到你个人信息的风险，我们会对你分配编码
，并用编码代替你所有信息。你的信息也将得到保密，我们仅仅会使用这些信息更好的理解野
生动物家和家养动物到人的疾病传播风险，这些研究结果将会和当地以及国家主管部门领导，
非政府组织以及科学团体分享。当我们撰写研究报告时将不会使用你或其他人的姓名，或者任
何别人可以识别的信息。在访谈结束时，我们可能会请你为我们的研究推荐其他的参与者。 
 
今天 ，在这里请问你是不是自愿和我交谈来参加这项研究。你不必回答你不想回答的问题。
访谈大约会持续 60-90 分钟。我们会对访谈录音。如果你不愿访谈被录音，你可以自由的退出
本研究。 
 
其他信息：负责确保研究对象不受到损害的审查委员会已经准许了这个项目。你在任何时候有
任何问题吗？如果你以后对于你在这项研究中的参与或者你作为研究对象的权利有任何问题，
可以通过电子邮件 zhu@ecohealthalliance.org 或者手机联系 13818140967 
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7.19 Ethnographic Interview Consent Statement (Chinese) 
研究对象身份编号_______________ 
知情声明 
 
我已经了解所有对我呈现的信息，我明白我的参与出自自愿，并且谈话将会被录音。研究相关
的所有问题，我都得到了满意的回答。 
 
我明白： 
我的名字不会出现在访谈记录或者其它数据收集形式当中：仅仅用一个编码来代替； 
我提供的信息将得到保密并且封存在只有专业研究人员能够看到的文件中； 
所有的资料和出版信息都不会使用我的名字，其他人的名字，或者别人可以识别的一切信息。 
 
________________________________  _________________________ 
 受访人签名     日期 
 受访人名字 (请打印) 
________________________________  _________________________ 
 访问人      日期 
 
 
 
如果有人不愿意参加，谢谢他们耗费他们的时间，并问问他们不愿意参加的原因 
 
 
不接受访问的原因:________________________________________________________________. 
 
 
 
访问人证明 _________________________  草签 __________ 日期____________________ 
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7.20 Quantitative questionnaire (English) 
Code Number：_________________        Today’s Date: ___ ___ / ___ ___ / ___ ___ 
                                           Month /   Day  /  Year 
 
 
SECTION A: Background Information 
  
 
SECTION B: Essential Information 
Consent Form Administered & Signed YES NO 
A1 Gender 
Female 1 
Male 2 
Other 3 
 A1 
A2 Age   A2 
A3 
Mother’s Last Name  
Respondents birth month 
Respondents birth day 
 
Name#### 
Example: Fisher 0222 
 A3 
A4 
Location 
Interviewer: Please collect GPS coordinates 
Village   _______________ 
Town/City _______________ 
Province  _______________ 
 A4 
A5 How long have you lived here? 
               < 1 month 1 
          1 month – 1 year 2 
           1 year – 5 years 3 
                      > 5 years 4 
 A5 
A6 
What is your family annual per capita 
income (RMB) 
<1000 1 
1001-3000 2 
3001-5000 3 
5001-10000 4 
10001-300000 5 
300001-500000 6 
>500000 7 
 A6 
B1 Your occupation level 
Owner/Manager 1    
Worker 2 
Student 3 
Live and work at home 4 
Other 5 
 
B1 
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SECTION C: Medical History 
B2 
Since this time last year, what type of 
activities have you done to earn your 
livelihood? Check all that apply 
1. Extraction of minerals, gas, oil, timber Y N 
2. Crop production Y N 
3. Wildlife restaurant business Y N 
4. Wild/exotic animal trade/market 
business 
Y N 
5. Rancher/farmer animal production 
business 
Y N 
6. Meat processing, slaughterhouse, 
abattoir 
Y N 
7. Zoo/sanctuary animal health care Y N 
8. Protected area worker Y N 
9. Hunter/trapper/fisher Y N 
10. Forager/gatherer/non-timber forest 
product collector 
Y N 
11. Migrant laborer Y N 
12. Nurse, doctor, healer, community 
health worker 
Y N 
13. Construction Y N 
14. Other  
YES/NO 
B2 
B3 
If more than one activity was selected, 
what is the activity on which you spent the 
most time since this time last year? 
Write down the activity number from the 
above list. 
  
B3 
B4 
What is the highest level of education that 
you completed? 
None 1 
Primary School 2 
Secondary school/Polytechnic school 3  
College/university/professional 4 
 
 
B4 
B5 
What is the highest level of education that 
your mother completed? 
None 1 
Primary School 2 
Secondary school/Polytechnic school 3 
College/university/professional 4 
 
 
B5 
B6 Do you live with your family? 
YES 
NO 
 
B6 
B7 
How many other people live in the dwelling 
where you live (not including you)? 
  
B7 
B8 
How many in the dwelling are children less 
than 5 years old? 
  
B8 
B9 How many in the dwelling are male?   B9 
B10 
How many rooms are there in the dwelling 
where you live (do not include bathroom or 
kitchen)? 
  
B10 
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In this section, I'm going to ask you about any illness or sickness that is not known or recognised in the community, 
including by medical or treatment providers. 
C1 
Where do you usually go to get treatment 
for illness or infection? Check all that apply. 
 
Clinic 1 
Hospital 2 
Mobile clinic 3 
Community health worker 4 
Traditional healer 5 
Pharmacy/dispensary 6 
Do not receive medical treatment 7 
Other 8 
 
C1 
C2 
Have you EVER had an unusual illness with 
any of the following symptoms? Check all 
that apply 
 
Note: READ ONLY SYMPTOMS—don’t read 
the illness 
 
 
1. Fever with headache and severe fatigue or 
weakness (encephalitis) 
 
2. Fever with bleeding or bruising not related to 
injury (hemorrhagic fever) 
 
3. Fever with cough and shortness of breath or 
difficulty breathing (Severe Acute Respiratory 
Infection) 
 
4. Fever with muscle aches, cough, or sore throat 
(Influenza Like Illness) 
 
5. Fever with diarrhea or vomiting  
6. Fever with rash  
7. Persistent rash or sores on skin  
8. Had symptoms, but none of these -describe 
___________________________ 
 
C2 
C3 
Since this time last year, have you had any 
of these symptoms?  
 
If NO, skip to C6, the question about people 
you lived with 
YES 1 
No 2   
 
C3 
C4 
If YES for C3, which ones 
Select all that apply. 
 
1. Fever with headache and severe fatigue or 
weakness (encephalitis) 
 
2. Fever with bleeding or bruising not related to 
injury (hemorrhagic fever) 
 
3. Fever with cough and shortness of breath or 
difficulty breathing (Severe Acute Respiratory 
Infection) 
 
4. Fever with cough and shortness of breath or 
difficulty breathing (Severe Acute Respiratory 
Infection) 
 
5. Fever with diarrhea or vomiting  
6. Fever with rash  
7. Persistent rash or sores on skin  
8. Had symptoms, but none of these -describe 
___________________________ 
 
C4 
C5 
What caused this sickness?  
Select all that apply. 
1. Contact with sick people  
2. Contact with wild animals  
C5 
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SECTION D: Travel 
 
 
SECTION E: Contact with Animals 
In this section, I’m going to ask you about the animals in your life since this time last year. 
 
Since this time last year... 
3. Contact with other animals  
4. Bad food or water  
5. Bad spirits/witchcraft  
6. Wound or injury  
7. I don't know  
8. Other: __________________________ 
 
C6 
Since this time last year, have any of the 
people you lived with had any of these 
symptoms?  
If NO, skip to Section D 
YES 1 
No 2   
 
C6 
C7 
If YES for C6, which ones 
Select all that apply. 
 
1. Fever with headache and severe fatigue or 
weakness (encephalitis) 
 
2. Fever with bleeding or bruising not related to 
injury (hemorrhagic fever) 
 
3. Fever with cough and shortness of breath or 
difficulty breathing (Severe Acute Respiratory 
Infection) 
 
4. Fever with muscle aches, cough, or sore throat 
(Influenza Like Illness) 
 
5. Fever with diarrhea or vomiting  
6. Fever with rash  
7. Persistent rash or sores on skin  
8. Had symptoms, but none of these -describe 
___________________________ 
 
C7 
C8 
Since this time last year, did anyone you 
lived with die from this illness? 
YES 1 
NO 2 
 
D1 
Since this time last year have you traveled 
outside of your village, town, or city? 
YES 1 
NO 2 
 D1 
D2 How many times have you traveled? Number of Times _______________  D2 
D3 
What is the farthest location you have 
traveled?  
Village   _______________ 
Town/City _______________ 
Province  _______________ 
 D3 
D4 How many kilometers away is that? #km _______________  D4 
E1 Has anyone that you live with had an animal as a pet? 
YES 
E1 
NO 
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E2 Have you handled live animals? 
YES 
E2 
NO 
E3 Have you raised live animals? 
YES 
E3 
NO 
E4 Have you shared a water source with animals for washing? 
YES 
E4 
NO 
E5 Have you seen animal feces in or near food before you have eaten it? 
YES 
E5 
NO 
E6 
Have you eaten food after an animal has touched or damaged it?  
For example, chew marks or scratches 
YES 
E6 
NO 
E7 Do any animals come inside the dwelling where you live? 
YES 
E7 
NO 
E8 Have you cooked or handled meat, organs or blood from a recently killed animal? 
YES 
E8 
NO 
E9 Have you eaten raw or undercooked meat or organs or blood? 
YES 
E9 
NO 
E10 Have you eaten an animal that you knew was not well /sick? 
YES 
E10 
NO 
E11 Have you found a dead animal and collected it to eat, share or sell?  
YES 
E11 
NO 
E12 Have you been scratched or bitten by an animal? 
YES 
E12 
NO 
E13 Have you slaughtered an animal? 
YES 
E13 
NO 
E14 Have you hunted or trapped an animal?  
YES 
E14 
NO 
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E15 
If the respondent has answered "yes" to any of the previous questions, select the animal taxa associated with 
the activity. Select all that apply. 
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Rodents/ 
Shrews 
           
Bats             
Non-human 
primates  
           
Birds             
Carnivores             
Ungulates             
Poultry             
Goats/ 
Sheep  
           
Swine            
Cattle/ 
Buffalo  
           
Dogs             
Cats            
 
E15 
E16 
The last time you were scratched or 
bitten by an animal or you cut yourself 
while butchering or slaughtering, what 
did you do? 
YES/NO 
1. Nothing Y N 
2. Rinse wound with water Y N 
3. Wash wound with soap and water Y N 
4. Covered wound with bandage Y N 
5. Visit doctor Y N 
 
E16 
E17 
Are you worried about diseases or 
disease outbreaks in animals at wet 
markets? 
YES 1 
NO 2 
 
 
E17 
E18 
Since this time last year, have you 
purchased live animals from a wet 
market?  
YES 1 
NO 2 
 
 
E18 
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Thank you for participating in this study. 
END 
Please return this completed questionnaire to the Project Coordinator 
  
E19 
If YES for E18, have you changed your 
behaviour when you go to a wet 
market?  
 
 YES/NO 
1. Wear a mask Y N 
2. Wear gloves   
3. Wash hands after  Y N 
4. Sometimes shop for meat at supermarket Y N 
5. Buy live animals less often Y N 
6. Buy only farmed wildlife Y N 
7. No longer buy wildlife at wet markets Y N 
 
E19 
E20 
Do you think that animals can spread 
disease? 
YES 
NO 
E20 
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7.21 Quantitative questionnaire (Chinese) 
 
社区居民健康管理状况调查t 
终版 2015年8月31日 
 
 
编号：_________________        调查日期: ___ ___ / ___ ___ / ___ ___ 
                                           月 /  日  /  年 
 
 
A 部分: 背景信息 
  
B部分: 基本信息 
签署/托管知情同意书 是 否 
A1 性别 
女性 1 
男性 2 
其它 3 
 A1 
A2 年龄   A2 
A3 
母亲的姓  
出生的月 
出生日期 
 
姓#### 
举例: 李 0222 
 A3 
A4 
地点 
调查者: 请记录GPS信息 
村    _______________ 
镇/市  ______________ 
省    _______________ 
 A4 
A5 您在这里住了多久? 
               < 1 月 1 
          1 月 – 1 年 2 
         1年– 5年 3 
                      > 5年 4 
 A5 
A6 家庭年均人收入 (人民币) 
<1000 1 
1001-3000 2 
3001-5000 3 
5001-10000 4 
10001-300000 5 
300001-500000 6 
>500000 7 
 A6 
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B1 您的职业身份 
老板/管理者 1    
工人 2 
农民 3 
学生 4 
企业或事业单位职工 5 
医生/兽医/医疗工作者 6 
个体经营（商贩/自由职业者）7 
其他 8 
 
B1 
B2 
去年这个时候开始，你都做过哪些工作
来维持生计，请选择所有符合的选项 
14. 采矿，提炼石油，开采燃气，砍伐 是 否 
15. 农业生产 是 否 
16. 经营野味餐馆 是 否 
17. 野生或者外国输入动物贸易或者在
市场上买卖 是 否 
18. 农牧场动物产品销售 是 否 
19. 肉类加工, 屠宰, 屠宰场 是 否 
20. 在动物园或者动物救护中心救助动
物 是 否 
21. 保护区工人 是 否 
22. 猎人/诱捕动物者/渔民 是 否 
23. 捕食/采集/非木林业产品采集 是 否 
24. 民工 是 否 
25. 护士,医生, 治疗师, 社区健康工作人
员 是 否 
26. 建筑 是 否 
14. 其它  
是/否 
B2 
B3 
如果从去年这个时候开始，您从事过多
项工作，哪项工作是从事时间最长的？ 
请在后面空格处标明从事时间最长的工
作的序号 
  
B3 
B4 请问您的受教育水平? 
没有 1 
小学 2 
中学/中专 3  
大专/本科/职业教育 4 
 
 
B4 
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C部分: 医疗历史 
在这部分内容中，我们将会问您一些不被社区居民普遍认知的疾病和不适症状，包括治疗药物和医治者信息 
B5 请问您母亲受教育水平? 
没有 1 
小学 2 
中学/中专 3 
大专/本科/职业教育 4 
 
 
B5 
B6 您和家人住在一起吗? 
是  
否  
 
B6 
B7 
和您一起居住的家庭成员有几个人 (不包
括您本人)? 
  
B7 
B8 
和您一起居住的成员中年龄小于5岁的成
员有几个人? 
  
B8 
B9 
和您一起居住的家庭成员中男性成员有
几人? 
  
B9 
B10 
在您家里有几间房间 (不包括厨房和卫生
间)? 
  
B10 
C1 
在生病或者感染后，您一般去哪里接受治
疗? 请核查所有列出选项 
 
诊所 1 
医院 2 
流动诊所 3 
社区健康工作人员 4 
传统治疗师 5 
药房/药店 6 
不接受医疗 7 
其它 8 
 
C1 
C2 
您是否有过不寻常的生病经历，有以下
列出的症状? 请核对所有列出的选项 
 
注意: 调查者在调查时只能读出症状不能
读出括号内的疾病名称 
 
 
8. 发烧并伴有头疼和严重疲劳或者是虚弱 (脑
炎)  
9. 发烧伴出血或与受伤不相关的瘀伤 (出血热)  
10. 发烧伴有咳嗽和气短或者呼吸困难(严重急性
呼吸道感染)  
11. 发烧伴有肌肉痛，咳嗽或者咽喉痛(流感样病
例)  
12. 发烧伴有腹泻或者呕吐  
13. 发烧伴有皮疹  
14. 皮肤持续出现皮疹或者溃疡  
8. 症状和上述所列项不同 
-请描述 ___________________________ 
 
C2 
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C3 
从去年这个时候开始，您是否有过某些
症状?  
 
如果没有请跳到问题 C6 
是 1 
否 2   
 
C3 
C4 
如果对问题 C3 的回答是是, 请选择符合
条件的所有选项. 
 
8. 发烧并伴有头疼和严重疲劳或者是虚弱 (脑
炎)  
9. 发烧伴出血或与受伤不相关的瘀伤 (出血热)  
10. 发烧伴有咳嗽和气短或者呼吸困难(严重急性
呼吸道感染)  
11. 发烧伴有肌肉痛，咳嗽或者咽喉痛(流感样病
例)  
12. 发烧伴有腹泻或者呕吐  
13. 发烧伴有皮疹  
14. 皮肤持续出现皮疹或者溃疡  
8. 症状和上述所列项不同 
-请描述___________________________ 
 
C4 
C5 
您的不适是由什么原因引起的?  
选择所有符合条件的选项. 
9. 接触病人  
10. 接触野生动物  
11. 接触其它动物  
12. 不干净的食物或者水  
13. 情绪不好  
14. 创伤或者损伤  
15. 不清楚  
16. 其它: __________________________ 
 
C5 
C6 
去年这时候开始，有没有和你同住的人
出现这些症状?  
如果没有，请跳转到 D 部分问题 
是 1 
否 2   
 
C6 
C7 
如果对问题 C6 的回答是是, 出现了哪些
症状？. 
选择所有符合条件的选项 
8. 发烧并伴有头疼和严重疲劳或者是虚弱 (脑
炎)  
9. 发烧伴出血或与受伤不相关的瘀伤 (出血热)  
10. 发烧伴有咳嗽和气短或者呼吸困难(严重急性
呼吸道感染)  
11. 发烧伴有肌肉痛，咳嗽或者咽喉痛(流感样病
例)  
C7 
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D部分: 旅行 
 
E部分: 接触动物 
在该部分我们将讨论的是去年这个时候起，您生活中接触到的动物 
 
自去年这个时候起... 
12. 发烧伴有腹泻或者呕吐  
13. 发烧伴有皮疹  
14. 皮肤持续出现皮疹或者溃疡  
8. 症状和上述所列项不同 
-请描述___________________________ 
 
C8 
去年这时候开始，和您同住的人有没有
出现过上述症状后死亡的? 
是 1 
否 2 
 
D1 
去年这个时候起，您有没有出村，镇和
市去旅行? 
是 1 
否 2 
 D1 
D2 您旅行了多少次? 次数 _______________  D2 
D3 你旅行到达过的最远地方村庄名?  
村庄名   _______________ 
镇/市 _______________ 
省  _______________ 
 D3 
D4 那个地方距离您家有多少公里? #km _______________  D4 
E1 有没有和你同住的人养动物作为宠物吗? 
是 
E1 
否 
E2 您有没有处理过活的动物? 
是 
E2 
否 
E3 您有没有养过活的动物? 
是 
E3 
否 
E4 您没有和动物共用水源用来洗漱? 
是 
E4 
否 
E5 在吃东西之前，你有没有在食物中或者食物附近发现动物粪便? 
是 
E5 
否 
E6 
你吃过动物碰过的食物吗?  
例如，咀嚼过或者抓过的实物 
是 
E6 
否 
E7 有没有什么动物进入过你居住的地方? 
是 
E7 
否 
E8 你有没有烹饪或者处理过刚杀的动物的肉，内脏或者血? 
是 
E8 
否 
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E9 您有没有吃过生的或者未煮熟的肉，内脏或者血? 
是 
E9 
否 
E10 您有没有吃过不健康或者生病的动物? 
是 
E10 
否 
E11 您是否把死的动物捡来吃或者将其送给别人或者出售给别人？ 
是 
E11 
否 
E12 您有没有被动物抓伤或者咬伤过? 
是 
E12 
否 
E13 你有没有屠宰过动物? 
是 
E13 
否 
E14 
你有没有猎杀或者诱捕过动物?  
( 如果该问题的回答是是，对受访对象调查 human 调查问卷中的猎人部分问题 18
页) 
是 
E14 
否 
E15 
如果受访者对上述任何问题的回答是"是", 请他选择动物种类和对应的行为活动. 选择所有符合条件的
选项 
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啮齿类/ 
鼩 
           
蝙蝠             
非人灵长类             
鸟类            
肉食动物             
有蹄类            
家禽            
山羊/ 
绵羊  
           
猪            
黄牛/ 
水牛  
           
狗             
E15 
  
225 
感谢您参与此项研究 
 
完 
请将完成的调查问卷发回给项目协调员 
猫            
 
E16 
上次当你被动物抓伤或者咬伤，或者
你在屠宰场割伤自己的时候，您是怎
么处理的? 
是/否 
6. 什么也没做 是 否 
7. 用水冲洗伤口 是 否 
8. 用肥皂水清洗伤口 是 否 
9. 用绷带包扎伤口 是 否 
10. 看
医生 
是 否 
 
E16 
E17 
您会担心在市场上售卖的动物中爆发
流行性疾病吗? 
是 1 
否 2 
 
 
E17 
E18 
去年这个时候开始您从菜市场购买过
活的动物吗?  
是 1 
否 2 
 
 
E18 
E19 
 
如果您对E18的回答是是，那么当您
去菜市场时会有一些行为上的变化吗
？ 
 是/否 
8. 戴口罩 是 否 
9. 戴手套 是 否 
10. 洗手  是 否 
11. 有时候从超市购买肉类 是 否 
12. 购买活体动物的频率降低 是 否 
13. 只购买养殖动物 是 否 
14. 不再在菜市场购买野生动物 是 否 
 
E19 
E20 
您认为动物能够传播疾病吗? 是  
否  
E20 
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7.22 Quantitative Consent Form (English) 
HUMAN AND ANIMAL CONTACT STUDY 
Survey Informed Consent 
 
Introduction: My name is ________ and I work for a project called “Human and Animal Contact Study.”  The project is 
funded by the US Government and conducted in collaboration with Wuhan University School of Public Health, Chinese 
CDC., and other local partners. We are studying how the health of wildlife, livestock and people affect each other and to 
better understand the patterns of local trade and consumption of meat and food animals. 
 
Interview: As part of this research we are conducting a survey to better understand the types of interactions people have 
with wildlife and their domestic animals, as well how people live their lives, do their jobs, and take care of their families 
and their animals. While you may not benefit directly from this research, the information you share with us may help to 
improve the health of other people who live near or work with animals. The main risk to you would come from a loss of 
confidentiality. To decrease any risk of someone else seeing your personal information, we give you a code number and 
use that instead of your name on all information that you provide. Your information is also kept secure in locked files and is 
considered confidential. We will use this information to better understand disease risks from wild and domestic animals to 
humans and share this with local and national leaders, non-governmental organisations and the scientific community. 
When we write about the study, we will not use your name or anyone else’s name, or anything about you that someone 
could recognise. 
 
You will also be asked to provide a small amount of blood, sputum, and stool so that we may test for infections that you 
may have had. Any leftover samples will be stored for future studies conducted by the research team.  These future studies 
may help us better understand the results of this study and to plan research to help us learn more. Your stored blood will 
be identified only by the code number that we assign.  
 
 
Additional information: I am here today to ask if you are willing to participate in this study by talking with me. Your 
participation is voluntary. You do not have to answer a question if you do not want to. The interview and specimen 
collection will take approximately 40 minutes of your time. 
 
An Institutional Review Board that is responsible for making sure that research subjects are protected from harm, has 
approved this project. Do you have any questions at any time? If you have any questions in the future about your 
participation in this study or your rights as a research subject, or if you change your mind and no longer agree to have your 
specimen stored, you may contact Guangjin Zhu zhu@ecohealthalliance.org or by phone at 13818140967 
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Study Code Number ___ ___ ___ ___ 
Statement of Consent  
I have read and understood all of the items on the information sheet.  I understand that my participation is voluntary All 
questions about the study have been answered to my satisfaction. 
I understand that: 
✓ My name will not appear on interview or other data collection forms: only a code number will be used; 
 
✓ All information will be kept in locked files that only the professional research staff can see; 
 
✓ All written and published information will not use my name, anyone else’s name, or anything about me that 
someone could recognise; 
 
______ (initials)  I agree to have my specimens stored for use in future studies that are related to this research 
study.    
 
________________________________ _________________________ 
 Participant Signature     Date 
 
 Participant Name (please print) 
________________________________ _________________________ 
 Interviewer      Date 
 
 
If the individual declines to participate, thank them for their time. Ask why they choose not to participate.  
 
Reason for not participating:________________________________________________________________. 
 
Certified by _________________________  Initials ________________ Date____________________ 
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7.23  Quantitative Consent Form (Chinese) 
人和动物接触研究 
调查知情同意书 
 
介绍：我的名字叫____________，我现在研究的项目是“人和动物的接触研究”，这个项目是由美国政府资助，由武
汉大学公共卫生学院，中国疾病控制与预防中心，以及其它的本地合作伙伴一起承担的。我们目前主要研究野生动
物，牲畜和人的健康如何相互影响，最终期待更好的理解当地的肉类，以及供给市场动物的贸易和消费模式。 
 
综述：作为研究的一部分，我们希望通过调查，能够更好的理解人和他们饲养的野生动物和家养动物之间的相互作
用模式，同时，我们也期望更好的理解人们如何生活，如何工作，如何照顾家庭，如何照顾他们的动物。接受访问
的人可能并不能直接从这个研究中获益，但是您和我们分享的信息可能能够帮助那些近距离接触动物或者工作中接
触动物的人提高健康状况。对受访者来说，最大的风险源自于私人信息的泄露，所以，为了降低可能导致别人获得
受访者私人信息的风险，我们对您提供的所有信息，都将用代码替代您的名字。您的私人信息也将完全受到保密。
我们使用以上信息是为了更好的理解疾病由野生和家养动物到人的传播危险，我们将和当地以及国家相关部门，以
及非政府组织和科学研究团体分享这些信息。当我们撰写研究报告的时候，我们不会使用任何人的姓名，或者任何
可能泄露您身份的信息。 
 
在该项调查当中，需要采集少量的血液，唾液和粪便用来监测可能的感染状况。任何检验后剩余的样品都会被保
存，用于以后研究团队进行的相关研究。今后的这些研究可能能够帮助我们更好、更深的理解该项研究结果。从您
身上采集并保存的血样会和我们给你的编号保持一致。 
 
补充信息：在这里我正式和你确认：您是否愿意通过和我交谈参加该项研究。请您自愿决定是否参与研究。你不需
要回答你不想回答的问题。访谈和收集标本大约会持续 40 分钟时间。 
 
我们有一个机构审查委员会负责保证研究参与者免于受到伤害，该项研究已经获得该委员会的批准。您在任何时候
对项目的研究内容、对您在研究过程中享有的权利有任何疑问；或改变主意不愿意保存标本，您可以通过电话
13818140967 或者电子邮件 zhu@ecohealthalliance.org 联系 Guangjian Zhu 博士。 
 
研究编号_____________ 
知情声明 
 
我已经通读并且了解信息表所有条目内容，我明白我的参与是自愿的，所有的疑问都得到了满意的回答。 
 
我明白： 
✓ 我的姓名将不会出现在访谈或者其它形式的数据收集过程中，编号将用来替代我的私人信息； 
✓ 所有的信息都将加密保存，并且只有专业的研究人员能够看到这些信息； 
✓ 所有撰写或者出版的信息都不会使用任何人的姓名信息，也不会使用其供其他人识别研究对象的信息； 
 
         ___________(姓名的首字母) 我同意保存我的标本，用于今后和本项目相关的研究。 
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